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Abstract 
 
Software design patterns are solutions for recurring design problems. Many 
have introduced their catalogues in order to describe those patterns using templates 
which consist of informal statements as well as UML diagrams.  Security patterns are 
design patterns for specific security problems domains, therefore, they are described in 
the same manner. However, the current catalogues describing security patterns contain 
a level of ambiguity and imprecision. These issues might result in incorrect 
implementations, which will be vital and at high cost security flaw, especially after 
delivery. In addition, software maintainability will be difficult thereafter, especially for 
systems with poor documentation. Therefore, it is important to overcome these issues 
by patterns formalisation in order to allow sharing the same understanding of the 
patterns to be implemented. 
The current patterns formalisation approaches aim to translate UML diagrams 
using different formal methods. However, these diagrams are incomplete or suffer from 
levels of ambiguity and imprecision. Furthermore, the employed diagrams notations 
cannot depict the abstraction shown in the patterns descriptions. In addition, the current 
formalisation approaches cannot formalise some security properties shown the 
diagrams, such as system boundary. 
Furthermore, detecting patterns in a source-code improves the overall software 
maintenance, especially when obsolete or lost system documentation is often the case 
of large and legacy systems. Current patterns detection approaches rely on translating 
the diagrams of the patterns. Consequently, the issue of detecting patterns with 
abstraction is not possible using such approaches. In addition, these approaches lack 
generality, abstraction detection, and efficiency.   
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This research suggests the use of Codecharts for security patterns formalisation 
as well as studying relationships among patterns. Besides, it investigates relationships 
among patterns. Furthermore, it proposes a pattern detection approach which 
outperforms the current pattern detection approaches in terms of generality, and 
abstraction detection. The approach competes in performance with the current efficient 
pattern detection approaches. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
 
In software engineering, design patterns are solutions for recurring design 
problems. They have been introduced and developed to convey expertise of specialists 
in a convenient and clear way. One type of these patterns is security patterns which 
have been first introduced by Yoder and Barcalow [1], [2] in 1997. However, security 
patterns have not been considered sufficiently and there is a lack of research in this 
direction, especially in terms of formalisation, reasoning, and detection of security 
patterns. 
It is important for security patterns to be implemented correctly in order to be 
maintained and evolved. One way to achieve this is to detect them from the source 
code. Many researchers [3]–[8] have introduced their approaches to detect instances of 
design patterns from the source code.  However, these pattern detection systems cannot 
detect security patterns from source codes.  
The inability of pattern detection systems to detect security patterns from source 
codes might be attributed to the way patterns are represented in these systems. This 
throws light on a number of issues in the current systems, such as formalisation of 
patterns and generality in pattern detection approaches. These issues were a motivation 
for the research of this thesis.  
Therefore, this research focuses on using Codecharts for modelling security 
patterns as Codecharts offer a visual and formal modelling method, unlike the current 
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method (UML diagrams) of modelling security patterns. Furthermore, it aims to 
develop a new approach to detect patterns modelled in Codecharts from a source code. 
One of the goals of the patterns detection direction of this research is to develop a 
general patterns detection that, unlike others, allows for the detection of any design 
patterns as well as user-defined patterns. This is to overcome the issue of restricting the 
pattern detection to fixed pre-defined and hard-coded design patterns. 
 
1.2 Motivation 
 
While studying security patterns, many unsolved problems have been noticed. 
These problems start with the descriptions of the security patterns. An example is the 
ambiguity encountered in the descriptions. Ambiguity is one of the main reasons 
behind the lack of formal descriptions of the patterns. With the existence of this 
ambiguity, the solutions cannot be applied efficiently. So, even when solutions are 
implemented, the different understanding of solutions (caused by ambiguity in patterns 
descriptions) among people who are involved in the development, can lead to 
inefficiencies in maintaining, verifying, and documenting a software system. 
Furthermore, there is a chance of incorrect implementation of these solutions. 
It is important to distinguish between the terms: informality, lack of precision, 
and ambiguity; which are used to describe the issues that exist in current security 
patterns catalogues. First, informality means that the current modelling notations used 
in the catalogues are not built on formal foundation. Specifically, UML diagrams are 
the modelling notations which are used in modelling these patterns in the catalogues. 
It is known that many have introduced their formal representations of these notations, 
however, there is not one agreed-on formal representation of these notations. In 
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addition, the authors of the current catalogues do not provide a formal representation 
with the patterns descriptions.  
Second, lack of precision means that the English statements and the modelling 
notations, which are used in the catalogues to describe the patterns, are unclear and 
needs further explanations. Many instances of this issue can be noticed in the 
catalogues, one example is the words “May”, “Could”, “Usually” etc., are always 
encountered in the security patterns descriptions. Another example is shown in Figure 
1 which illustrates the modelling of Check Point pattern in [9]. When looking at the 
relation between Client and ProtecedSystem, it can be seen that the relation is an 
“interacts with”, however, this does not imply any clear view on the type of interaction 
and who starts the interaction. Moreover, many other questions would be asked, for 
instance, is there any return values? Is there parameters allowed to be passed directly?  
 
Figure 1: Lack of precision example: UML class diagram modelling Check Point pattern 
Finally, ambiguity can be noticed in many of the existing security patterns 
descriptions. This issue and the above mentioned issues stand as an obstacle when 
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detecting patterns or carrying out any rigorous reasoning on them. Ambiguous 
statements, in the pattern descriptions, misleads the pattern user as they carry more than 
one meaning. For example, Figure 2 illustrates the modelling of Protection Reverse 
Proxy pattern in [9] page 459. By looking at the diagram, two relations named 
“getPage” are modelled between Firewall and ReverseProxy classes. First, the 
relations flow can be from either class and can be understood differently by readers. 
Second, from the name of the relation, it can be realised that the relation is a call 
method, however, no operations but attributes are shown in the classes’ modelling. So, 
it might be a relation of holding an instance of one another class. 
 
Figure 2: Ambiguity in relations example: UML class diagram modelling Protection Reverse 
Proxy pattern 
 
Although security design patterns are a good approach to handling security 
design problems, false implementation of the security patterns may result in a security 
hole which might be used by an attacker [10]. With no formal and precise 
representation of security patterns, false implementation problems emerge. For 
example, Figure 3 illustrates the common case which can occur when no formal and 
precise representation for a security pattern is given. Therefore, formal representations 
of security design patterns are practically important.  
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Figure 3: Security patterns precise descriptions motivation 
Inconsistency between design and implementation is also a common issue that 
many organisations encounter. The reason behind this issue lies in absent, obsolete, 
poor and/or lost software documentation. The issue of inconsistencies between design 
and implementation cannot be solved if detecting the patterns in the source code is not 
possible. Therefore, it is highly beneficial to have an approach which allows for 
detecting and locating the pattern within the source code by using high level analysis 
that saves both effort and time [10]. 
Figure 4 demonstrates the common situation when maintaining a system. For 
example, when a software architect has left an organisation which needs to maintain 
his or her software; they may think that he had implemented pattern x; however, the 
architect may not have left any proper documentation and this would lead to the need 
for dedicating people who can go through the source code in order to first understand 
it and then to locate the target pattern.  
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Another situation is the evolution of a legacy system which has been growing 
over the years and has never been documented properly. In this situation, developers, 
software architects and software designers need to know where the instances of x 
pattern are located. This is to ensure that the evolution is logical, systematic and effort 
saving.  
 
Figure 4: Security patterns detection motivation 
So, if there is a formal representation for pattern x and a tool which 
automatically indicates the places of x in the source code of the software, this will allow 
the development people to efficiently maintain the software. In addition, it will save 
the time and efforts spent on the maintenance and evolution of the software. Moreover, 
detection design pattern instances will help maintain the documentation of the software 
as well as give the developers a chance to generate (in case software documentation 
has become obsolete) an up-to-date architectural documentation of the software as the 
major patterns can then be located.  
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Many reasons motivate searching and finding patterns instances in source codes 
of legacy software systems. One reason is to allow managers and different groups 
involved in the software development to check that the design has been implemented 
as agreed. Another reason is regarding the maintenance of the code as finding patterns 
in the source code helps in better understanding of the code and save efforts. In 
addition, in a case of obsolete or lost documentations, finding patterns in source code 
is a significant help in understanding unfamiliar code and re-generate software 
documentation. However, as this research focus on security patterns, detection is 
obstructed with the existence of the above mentioned issues (informality, lack of 
precision, and ambiguity) in security patterns catalogues. So, finding a way to 
overcome these issues and model the patterns formally, precisely, and unambiguously 
is highly important prior the detection of patterns.   
In conclusion, the need for formal representation of security design patterns is 
highly important. By having such formal representation available, many will benefit, 
in particular software security architects, software designers, programmers and 
maintainers who will be confident that they share the same understanding of the 
patterns which are to be under consideration. Moreover, formal descriptions of security 
patterns will allow for developing algorithms to automate the process of detection. 
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1.3 Definitions of problems 
 
 Pattern formalisation  
The problem of security design patterns formalisation can be described, in 
general, as representing patterns in a formal manner that depicts the level of abstraction 
(which appears in patterns descriptions in their original catalogues) and security 
properties such as system boundary.  
 Patterns variants and relationships 
The problem of security design patterns variants can be described, in general, 
as studying and reasoning of the patterns which are claimed to be related or described 
in catalogues differently.  
 Pattern detection 
The problem of pattern (design or security design) detection can be described , 
in general, as looking for instances of static structure of security and/or design patterns, 
though with a level of abstraction which appears in patterns descriptions in their 
original catalogues.  
From the aforementioned problems, it can be concluded that the problems are 
of choosing and using Codecharts to represent fully decidable patterns description 
statements in order to reason out the variants of a pattern described in catalogues 
differently and the relationships which are claimed to exist among patterns. In addition, 
it is the problem of looking for instances of Codecharts (specification in LePUS3) with 
variables in a source code. 
This is challenging because there need to be theoretical and empirical 
investigations on pattern catalogues, particularly security patterns catalogues which 
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suffer from ambiguity and imprecision.  In addition, these investigations have not been 
carried out by any researchers. Furthermore, the Brute force solution of detection of 
patterns with a level of abstraction is exponential in complexity. 
 
1.4 Goals / Objectives 
 
Research goals 
1. To use Codecharts and formalise security patterns, to investigate the relations 
among patterns, and to highlight the patterns variations according to different 
patterns descriptions; 
2. To use the TTP Toolkit in order to check the conformance of intended 
implementations of patterns modelled in Codecharts in existing source codes; 
3. To design and implement an efficient algorithm detecting instances of patterns 
specified in Codecharts.  
Objectives 
1. To compare the UML class diagrams for security and design patterns with 
corresponding ones in Codecharts and analyse differences conceptually;      
2. To design an “efficient” pattern detection algorithm which detects static 
structure of patterns modelled in Codecharts from a source code within a 
reasonable amount of time; 
3. To analyse the algorithm complexity and compare it with similar detection 
algorithms and brute force algorithm; 
4. To extend the TTP toolkit to deliver an implementation of the detection 
algorithm that is practical in the following terms: “Find all of the instances of 
pattern y specified in Codecharts in program z within s seconds”;  
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5. To investigate the accuracy and efficiency of the detection algorithm and 
identify the tool and possible improvements; 
6. To carry out a number of case studies on open source software to evaluate 
composition of security and/or design patterns; 
7. To study the relations between security and/or design patterns modelled in 
Codecharts; 
8. To use Codecharts to highlight the variations in different patterns descriptions. 
 
1.5 Research contributions 
 
At present, many concerns have been raised in the field of security patterns. 
One instance is the ambiguity in the descriptions of security patterns. This issue has 
been addressed by many researchers. The researchers in [11] claim that due to the lack 
of formal descriptions of design motifs, their approach cannot be fully automated. In 
addition, The researchers in [12]  state that having well-described and well-defined 
security patterns descriptions would improve application security when the 
programmers rely on these descriptions. 
Another concern is the fully automatic detection of security and design patterns. 
This problem emerges in a common maintenance case when having obsolete, lost 
or/and poor documentation.  Many have introduced their approaches to detect patterns 
from a source code. However, only a small number of these approaches count as 
successful. The major defect of these approaches is that they are not being fully 
automated due to many reasons such as the problem with informal specifications of the 
patterns to be detected.         
Therefore, this research takes advantage of the formality and other properties 
of Codecharts to contribute to representing the structure of security patterns formally 
P a g e  | 11 
 
 
and building a formal reference for security patterns using Codecharts. As a result, 
building a reference would be the first attempt to formally model some of well-known 
security patterns. 
In addition to the formal reference, this research contributes to developing an 
algorithm for detecting the patterns in the source code in a reasonable amount of time. 
This will solve the problem of automatically assuring the conformance of the design. 
As mentioned earlier in this report, the detection would help in the maintenance process 
as it can automate the process of finding the patterns in the source code in the case of 
obsolete, lost or/and poor documentation. Moreover, it would be an essential method 
for enhancing applications security when it is used to detect security patterns in 
particular, as it will allow for checking the consistency of the design to be implemented. 
Furthermore, this research aims to investigate the correctness, complexity and 
performance of the algorithm. A comparison of the algorithm with the existing ones in 
the field will be conducted.  This will be considered as a key part of the research 
theoretical contribution.  
Indeed, it is highly important to implement the pattern detection algorithm. The 
implementation of the algorithm will show the tangible benefits for the algorithm. 
Therefore, the research aims to produce a tool which implements the algorithm. The 
tool is intended to be integrated with the TTP toolkit [13]. This will represent the 
empirical contribution of the research. 
The following list is to summarise the contributions of this research: 
1. The research will theoretically investigate the use of Codecharts for 
formally modelling some of the well-known security patterns. 
2.  The research will employ this formal modelling for studying the 
security patterns variations when inconsistency occurs in descriptions 
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of patterns in different catalogues. In addition, it will employ the 
modelling for reasoning out a number of relationships which are 
claimed among patterns. 
3. The research will develop an efficient pattern detection algorithm which 
aims to find the instances of given patterns that are modelled in 
Codecharts with a level of abstraction.   
4. The research will conduct a set of empirical case studies on detection 
and conformance checking of a number of security and design patterns 
in open source codes. 
 
1.6 Outline of the thesis  
 
This thesis has been structured as follows. After introducing the research goals 
and motivations in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 focus on giving a broad background on the 
topics which relate to this research directions. Next, Chapter 3 demonstrates the 
conducted literature review on earlier studies on pattern formalization and on pattern 
detection. Next, Chapter 4 discusses the reasons of using Codecharts for security 
patterns modelling and describes the method used to model security patterns from their 
original catalogues. Chapter 5 motivates the idea of identifying security patterns 
variants using Codecharts and studying the relations among security patterns and with 
design patterns.  
Chapter 6 shows and discusses a number of case studies on the manual finding 
and conformance checking of a number of security pattern. Chapter 7 explains the 
proposed patterns detection approach of this research. In addition, it shows a theoretical 
comparison of the proposed solution with the brute force solution of the problem of 
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pattern detection using Codecharts. Next, Chapter 8 demonstrates a number of case 
studies on pattern detection approach and compares with the manual results shown in 
Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 9 evaluates the pattern detection approach which has been 
proposed in this research with comparison with other pattern detection systems. 
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2 Background 
 
2.1 Object-Orientation 
 
Object orientation is a software design methodology which relies on 
representing a software system in the concept of object; which is an entity that 
encapsulates a set of data and related operations on them [14], [15]. A Class is regarded 
as a template for objects creation [16]. This design paradigm has been evolved radically 
especially after the introduction of UML (Unified Modelling Language), which is a 
now a widely used and accepted software design modelling language [17]. 
The object-oriented programming paradigm has been built on this design 
methodology and has been regarded as one of the most popular programing paradigms, 
such as logical, functional and imperative paradigms. A number of existing programing 
languages support object-oriented programing, for instance, Smalltalk, Java, C#, C++, 
and others. The object-oriented paradigm considers the generality and reusability of the 
design and code. In addition, many features can be gained when using the object-
oriented programing paradigm. The main features are: inheritance, abstraction, 
dynamic binding and polymorphism [14].  
Highlighting object-orientation is important in this research, which will be 
tackling the design patterns that are described using this paradigm. Furthermore, the 
design description language (Codecharts) chosen for patterns modelling in this research 
is an object-oriented description language.  Moreover, it is important to state here that 
the GoF [18], which is the most popular design patterns catalogue, employs this 
paradigm in order to template the well-known design patterns. This catalogue has 
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offered the current widely used design pattern template, which has also been used in 
security design patterns catalogues considered in this research. 
In particular, this research aims to model some of the OO aspects shown in 
security patterns descriptions such as inheritance, abstract, and dynamic binding. For 
example, using Codecharts notations (Figure 5), Hierarchy and the binary relation 
(arrow between two class notations) labelled with Inherit are used to model inheritance 
aspect that might occur in descriptions. Another notation, which is used to model a 
class as an Abstract, is the unary relation (the tringle superimposed on a class). In 
addition, the aspect of dynamic binding is modelled with Hierarchy notation and 
Signature notation superimposed on it. The Hierarchy means that there is an abstract 
class which has a number of subclasses with inheritance relation with it, Signature of 
a method with same name in the abstract class and all subclasses. Later in this thesis, 
the modelling of these aspects will be shown in modelling of security patterns as well 
as the detection of these modelling.         
 
2.2 Software maintenance  
 
Software maintenance is regarded as the activities that are carried out on a 
software system after its release in order to fix problems, improve features, and/or help 
with adaption to the environment. These activities are usually done by a team that is 
different than the development team and aim to make changes in the system as required 
[19], [20].  
The main two problems in software maintenance are high costs and 
considerable efforts. These issues are linked to the difficulties which maintainers face 
when trying to understand the software source code. Maintainers’ difficulties in 
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understanding will increase the effort, which will consequently  increase the time and 
the costs spent [20]. In addition, understanding the software source code will improve 
the software comprehension. It is estimated that 50% of the maintenance effort is taken 
for software comprehension [21]. 
Codecharts is a visual, precise, and concise language, which has a few 
notations. When using such a language for documenting  security design patterns or 
any design pattern, these features in the language will help ease the cognitive processes 
needed  for software understanding [22], [23]. Therefore, this research will improve 
the overall software maintenance by improving the software maintainers’ 
understanding.  
Furthermore, searching and locating design patterns and arbitrary user-defined 
design patterns will improve software comprehension and software re-documentation 
[6], [23], which in turn will improve the overall software maintenance. This research 
aims to detect patterns instances within the source code. In addition, as using 
Codecharts, the research aims to take advantage of the visuality of Codecharts in order 
to show the existing instances of the searched-for patterns in the source code. As 
previously mentioned, this will improve the software comprehension [22], [23].    
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2.3 Design Patterns    
 
A pattern is defined according to Longman dictionary as “a shape used as a 
guide for making something” [24]. In software engineering, patterns known to be 
design patterns describe solutions that have been developed over time to solve a 
recurring problem in a specific context [18]. In general, a pattern is a description of a 
justified solution for design problems offered in a specialised template.  In this research, 
whenever the word ‘pattern’ occurs, it refers to one of design/security patterns.  
Gamma et al. [18] have introduced the most popular design patterns catalogue. 
In their catalogue, they have described a number of well-known patterns in a template 
which consists of: Pattern Name, Intent, Also Known As, Motivation, Applicability, 
Structure, Participants, Collaborations, Consequences, Implementation, Sample Code, 
Known Uses, and Related Patterns. The authors regard the pattern solution as 
encapsulation of Structure, Participants, and Collaborations. Due to the ease and 
usefulness of the design patterns template offered by Gamma et al., many design 
patterns authors have employed this template when introducing new design patterns 
[9], [25]–[27], [1].  
In this research, it is an aim to formally model the solution part of the patterns 
descriptions. In particular, the focus is on formalising the fully decidable statements in 
the solution of a pattern while taking security design patterns as an application in this 
research. So, whenever the phrases ‘formalising a pattern’, ‘formally modelling a 
pattern’, and/or ‘pattern formalisation’ are used, they refer to the use of Codecharts for 
conveying a fully decidable statement in the solution section of a security design pattern 
to a visual and formal Codecharts specification. 
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2.4 Security Patterns 
 
Security patterns are solutions to solve recurring security problems in specific 
domains [9], [26]. They are aimed to combine the experience and knowledge of both 
security experts and software engineers to build a reusable way to solve a specific 
security problem. There are a growing number of catalogues [1], [9], [26]–[29] which 
describe security patterns. However, it has been noticed that they contain some 
ambiguity in their descriptions of the patterns [30].  
Security patterns are claimed to be related to the well-known design patterns 
[18], [9]. In the description of a security pattern, there is usually a subsection which 
discusses the pattern relation with one or more of well-known design patterns and/or 
other security patterns. However, validation of such relationships has not been 
sufficiently covered. 
A number of researchers have established their own approaches to organising 
and classifying security patterns [31]–[34]. These efforts were to overcome the 
difficulties faced by practitioners when intending to choose the appropriate pattern to 
apply. They were also to allow us to see the similarity and problem domain among 
these patterns.     
Security patterns are analysed in many sources to have both structural and 
behavioural specifications. They have been described using UML notations and 
diagrams. This has a number of drawbacks such as the difficulty or impossibility of 
automating the verification process. From this emerges the need for using a formal 
design description language in order to describe the security patterns for further 
investigation.  
Security patterns are described using a template [9]. This template consists of a 
number of sections as follows: Context, Problem, Solution, Consequences and See 
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Also. The Context section describes the situations of the problem occurrence. The 
Problem section describes the security problem itself. The proposed solution of the 
problem will be detailed in the section Solution. The solution, depending on the 
problem, might be at more than one level. A discussion of the advantages and the 
disadvantages of the solution is in the Consequences section. Finally, the See Also 
section will refer to other patterns when necessary. This is because introducing a 
solution might introduce new problems which need to be handled by other patterns. 
These are the main characteristics of security patterns. However, there are other 
characteristics but they are not specific for security patterns in comparison with the 
aforementioned ones.   
Security patterns acquired due attention by researchers. Currently, the number 
of security patterns as well as the research on these patterns is increasing. As a result, 
many catalogues, papers and technical reports have been published to cover different 
aspects of them. It is difficult to list all of these resources. However, some of the most 
prominent works will be highlighted and discussed.  
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Yoder and Barcalow catalogue 
 
J. Yoder and J. Barcalow  [1] have made a cornerstone catalogue for security 
patterns. The authors discuss seven security patterns and then attempt to provide a 
suggestion of a framework which represents them in a correlation. The paper introduces 
and follows a template for describing a pattern which has been later used as a common 
pattern description template by other security patterns catalogues. However, ambiguity 
in the descriptions is obvious. For instance, Check Point has been described 
ambiguously. Moreover, late checking is to be handled by a secondary interface; 
however, the questions of “How” and “What” emerge. 
 
Kienzle et al. catalogue 
 
Kienzle et al. [28] try to create a security pattern repository with more than 26 
patterns. Mainly, they describe the patterns in favour of internet applications. They also 
provide an excessive amount of information to suit the security needs in internet 
applications. However, the repository suffers from ambiguity. For example, in the 
Network Address Blacklist pattern description, it is stated that “client” is an element of 
the pattern. This is far too imprecise as the client is usually used for registered and 
known actors to the system. Another example is how the Blacklist controls and 
configures the Blocking Mechanism. Is this by instantiating new Blocking Mechanism 
and attaching the network address to it? Or is it by calling a method in the Blocking 
Mechanism which re-configures it? 
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Wassermann and Cheng catalogue 
 
Wassermann and Cheng [27] aim to describe Security Patterns in a way that 
improves comprehensibility. The catalogue highlights a revision to most of the well-
known security patterns. When investigating modelling a Checkpoint Pattern using 
Codechart, this this catalogue played a major role as it had the clearest description of a 
Checkpoint Pattern. Some other catalogues use this paper in order to reference their 
description of some security patterns. 
 
Schumacher el al. catalogue 
 
The most dominant book that concentrates on security patterns is written by 
Schumacher et al. [9]. The interesting point in this book is that it describes security 
patterns in a way that reflects securing a military base. In addition, it engages the related 
pattern in the description of a pattern at hand.  However, despite the aforementioned 
advantages, the book’s descriptions and UML diagrams of the patterns suffer from 
ambiguity. This ambiguity will be highlighted further in the results and discussion 
section. 
 
Alur et al. catalogue 
 
Alur et al. [26] have introduced their security patterns catalogue. In this 
catalogue, the authors have presented more than 20 security patterns. The catalogue 
shows the best practices of security patterns.  In addition, it describes the patterns which 
aim to secure applications and web services developed in J2EE. The catalogue follows 
the common template of pattern deception, which uses informal statements and UML 
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diagrams. Although the catalogue does not formally describe the patterns, it presents 
the patterns with less ambiguity with comparison to other catalogues. 
 
In order to compare the above discussed catalogues, it is a good idea to start 
with the elements of the template used for patterns descriptions. The aforementioned 
catalogues have a section, in the template, which lists all other names of a pattern, 
except the Alur et al. and Kienzle et al. catalogues. In addition, the catalogues, but 
Wassermann et al. catalogue, explain the problem which a pattern is designed to tackle. 
However, Wassermann et al and Yoder et al. catalogues are the only catalogues which 
motivate a pattern in the description. This might be due to that Wassermann et al 
catalogue improves on Yoder et al. one. In addition, all the catalogues provide a section 
named “Related Patterns” which refer to some relations exist between a pattern and 
other patterns. However, they differ in explaining the relations as some catalogues are 
just listing the related patterns such as Kienzle et al. catalogue.  
Further differences among catalogues are the use of visual notations as Yoder 
et al. and Kienzle et al. catalogues are using symbolic notations (computer, actor, boxes 
etc..) beside the textual description in the “Solution” of a pattern description, whereas, 
the other catalogues uses UML class and sequence diagrams. Among Wassermann et 
al., Alur et al., and Schumacher el al. catalogues which use UML diagrams, Alur et al. 
catalogue has the most clearer and comprehensive UML diagrams. Furthermore, Alur 
et al. catalogue is the only catalogue that provide a sample code in a pattern description.   
Some researchers tend to investigate the classifications of security patterns. 
Others aim to improve the templates used to describe them. For example, Alvi et al  
[31] have proposed a classification scheme which depends on the security flaws to 
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organise the security patterns. Another paper [32] proposes a new representation called 
“Pattern Graph” to enhance the descriptions of security patterns in terms of precision. 
Hafiz et al. [33] attempt to investigate the current security patterns classification 
and organisation approaches to reach a technique that overcomes the drawbacks in the 
current approaches. The authors propose a classification scheme which uses a hierarchy 
so that the patterns are displayed as nodes in this hierarchy. This is based on 14 security 
patterns to be in the hierarchy. As a result, the pattern users can navigate through and 
choose what fits most. 
In conclusion, security problems can be at an expensive cost if not considered 
during the software development process. Therefore, many have proposed software 
security as a major part of the software development lifecycle [35]. Security patterns 
play a key role in software security by offering security expertise in an organised 
template.    
Currently, security patterns are holding many researchers’ interests in terms of 
evolution, classification, modelling, formalisation, verification and detection. 
However, this field of research is not covered sufficiently. It is important to mention 
here that, in the case of formalisation, verification and detection, security patterns 
solutions are referred to as security patterns.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 | P a g e  
 
2.5 First order predicate logic (FOPL) 
 
In order to express declarative statements, which propositional logic could not 
help with, First Order Logic (FOL) was introduced which is a richer logical language. 
In FOL, variables and quantifiers are features which make FOL richer than 
propositional logic. So, a formula in FOL is a set of terms (variables, constants, and 
functions with finite arguments) and predicates with finite arguments [36], [37]. 
This topic is highlighted in this research background as some FOL formulas 
might be shown in some parts of this research. This is due to the fact that Codecharts 
is a visual and formal specification in LePUS3 [38], [39] which in turn has been defined 
using first order logic predicate calculus. Therefore, whenever a Codechart is shown in 
this research, it is understandable that the Codechart is a set of first order predicates 
and can be automatically translated, using TTP Toolkit [13], from visual representation 
to LePUS3 (first order logic predicates) and Class-Z. 
      
2.6 Codecharts (LePUS3) and Class-Z 
 
2.6.1 LePUS3 
 
Codecharts are the statement of static design encoded in OOP languages. The 
language of Codecharts is LePUS3, which is an object-oriented design description 
language. LePUS3 is built on top of the strength of other specification and modelling 
languages. Mainly, LePUS3 came to address the following concerns [39]: 
1) Rigour; 
2) Scalability; 
3) Minimality; 
4) Program Visualization; and 
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5) Automated Verifiability. 
LePUS3 offers solutions for the aforementioned concerns. For example, 
LePUS3 specification (Codecharts) is graphical. This addresses one of the concerns, 
namely Program Visualization. In addition, LePUS3 uses first order predicates calculus 
to formalise each element in the specification. This makes it a formal (rigour) graphical 
language. Having such formal specifications, the design conformance verification 
process can be automated in a more accurate and confident way. This addresses the 
concern of Automated Verifiability [38].   
 
Figure 5: LePUS3 vocabulary [38]    
However, this does not mean that this comes at the expense of minimality and 
elegance, which are LePUS3 concerns. Figure 5 shows a summary of LePUS3 visual 
vocabulary. In addition, LePUS3 provides means of variables in order to represent 
design motifs. This offers an opportunity to specify the static structure without 
constraints of naming. Furthermore, LePUS3 introduces an abstraction mechanism 
which is highly beneficial when modelling large scale software (scalability). 
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Abstraction mechanism relies on the notion of dimension, hierarchy and transitive 
relations [38].  Moreover, LePUS3 has a tool support which is called Two Tier 
Programming toolkit (TTP toolkit) [13].  In addition, with comparison to UML, 
Codecharts could outperform UML in formalising security design pattern as will be 
seen later in this thesis in Chapter 4. 
2.6.2 LePUS3 formalism 
 
LePUS3 is a formal object-oriented specification language. It relies on a subset 
of first order logic. LePUS3 is a visual and symbolic language. Its diagrams consist of 
terms and constraints on those terms  [38], [40].  The terms and constraints are 
summarised and illustrated in a hierarchy form in Figure 4. 
1. Terms (ݐ)  
a. Variables (ݒ) 
i. d-dimensional class ࣪ௗ 	ℂॷ८ॺॺ 
ii. d-dimensional signature  ࣪ௗ 	ॺॴॳℕ८ॻॼℝॱ 
iii. d-dimensional hierarchy ࣪ௗ 	ℍॴॱℝ८ℝℂℍঀ 
b. Constants (c) 
i. d-dimensional class ࣪ௗ 	ℂॷ८ॺॺ 
ii. d-dimensional signature  ࣪ௗ 	ॺॴॳℕ८ॻॼℝॱ 
iii. d-dimensional hierarchy ࣪ௗ 	ℍॴॱℝ८ℝℂℍঀ 
2. Constraints (݂) 
a. Relations ℝ 
i. BinaryRelation ܤ݅݊ܽݎݕܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊(ݐ1, ݐ2) 
1. Inherit ܫ݊ℎ݁ݎ݅ݐ	(ݐ1, ݐ2) 
2. Create    ܥݎ݁ܽݐ݁(ݐ1, ݐ2) 
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3. Produce    ܲݎ݋݀ݑܿ݁(ݐ1, ݐ2) 
4. Return    ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊(ݐ1, ݐ2) 
5. Call    ܥ݈݈ܽ(ݐ1, ݐ2) 
6. Forward    ܨ݋ݎݓܽݎ݀(ݐ1, ݐ2) 
7. Member    ܯܾ݁݉݁ݎ(ݐ1, ݐ2) 
8. Aggregate    ܣ݃݃ݎ݁݃ܽݐ݁	(ݐ1, ݐ2) 
9. SignatureOf  ܵ݅݃݊ܽݐݑݎܱ݂݁		(ݐ1, ݐ2) 
ii. UnaryRelation    ܷ݊ܽݎݕܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊(ݐ) 
1. Abstract    ܣܾݏݐݎܽܿݐ	(ݐ) 
2. Method   ܯ݁ݐℎ݋݀	(ݐ) 
3. Class     ܥ݈ܽݏݏ	(ݐ) 
4. Signature   ܵ݅݃݊ܽݐݑݎ݁	(ݐ) 
b. Predicates ℙ 
i. Isomorphic     ܫܱܵܯܱܴܲܪܫܥ(ܤ݅݊ܽݎݕܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊, ݐ1, ݐ2) ii. Total     ܱܶܶܣܮ	(ܤ݅݊ܽݎݕܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊, ݐ1, ݐ2) 
iii. All    	ܣܮܮ	(ܷ݊ܽݎݕܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊, ݐ) 
c. Operators 
i. Superimposition (⊗) 
ݏ ⊗ ܿ					݂݅			〈ݏ, ܿ〉 	∈ SignatureOf  and 〈ܿ, ݏ〉 	∈ Member   
28 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 6: LePUS3 formalism 
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2.6.3 Class-Z 
 
Class-Z is a specification language derived from Z specification language. 
However, unlike the Z language, which is more expressive and not limited to specific 
domains or purposes, it is limited to terms declarations and formulas corresponding to 
LePUS3 vocabulary. Class-Z is an equivalent specification language to LePUS3, 
however, it is used with LePUS3 as a helpful approach to resemble the formulas of 
LePUS3 in their traditional way. It is important to emphasise her that the formal 
foundation of LePUS3 is First Order Predicate Logic and all the specifications in 
LePUS3 (any Codecharts) are predicates in this logic, and because of the 
aforementioned reason, Class-Z has been used with the LePUS3, so that LePUS3 
improves on the benefits of visual notation. , the two specifications (Class-Z and 
LePUS3) has been used together for attracting traditional audiences.     
In Class-Z, specifications are in a schema form which is divided into a 
declarations section and a formulas section. The declarations section shows constant 
and variables terms, whereas the formulas section shows constraints or formulas in 
LePUS3 [38], [41]. Automatic converting of Codecharts (specifications in LePUS3) to 
Class-Z schema is one of the TTP Toolkit [13] features. An example of LePUS3 and 
Class-Z schema is shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: Class-Z schema for Factory Method pattern Codechart 
 
2.7 Two-Tier Programming Toolkit (TTP Toolkit) 
 
The GUI prototype tool provides a number of round-trip software engineering 
actions. These actions start with a reverse-engineering object-oriented source code to 
Codecharts diagrams, which are formal specifications in LePUS3. In addition, the TTP 
Toolkit offers verifying design conformance of a code against Codecharts diagrams. 
Furthermore, it allows visualising the reverse-engineered source code, showing the 
software in different abstraction levels. Moreover, it has the functional feature of 
navigating through the software visualisation from the highest level of abstraction to a 
detailed and concrete view of the software. Figure 8 displays the TTP toolkit in action 
[13].  
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Figure 8: TTP Toolkit in action [13] 
 
Figure 8 displays the TTP Toolkit in action. The main interface of the TTP 
Toolkit is divided into 4 sections namely Menus and Quick Buttons, Projects, 
Workspace, and Information section. The Menus and Quick Buttons section 
encapsulates all the functionalities which TTP Toolkit offers. Starting with the File 
menu, it allows to create, open, and/or save ‘ttp’ projects which are the files that store 
the model of analysed source code, Codecharts, assignments and verifications objects, 
and schemas. The Model menu allows a user to select any java source and analyse it to 
have its model. Creating new specification (Codecharts), Schema, and/or assignment, 
can be carried out through the Specify menu which also provide a set of already 
specified design patterns that are modelled in [38].  It is obvious that Verify menu 
provides means of creating new verification objects that TTP Toolkit verifier can work 
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on. The Navigate menu offers a sophisticated function of viewing the model of the 
source code in different level of abstraction based on the Codecharts notations. Finally, 
the Quick Buttons are actually a way of fast access to the functionalities offers in the 
menus. 
The Project section offers a tree viewing of the opened ‘ttp’ projects and the 
items created in them. So, opening a specification (Codecharts) in order to modify 
and/or delete can be done through this section. Whereas, the Workspace section (in the 
middle) allows the user to drag and drop the Codecharts notations and create the 
relations among them. As seen in Figure 8 the workspace is showing the modelling of 
Composite Pattern. Finally, the Information section (bottom of the window) shows the 
results of verifications, notifications and logging information of the projects saving, 
exporting, importing code analysing, etc. 
The current version of the TTP toolkit provides a means of automated design 
conformance verification. This is carried out using a means of assignment (shown in 
Figure 9) which associates each variable in generic specifications with a constant 
(representing specific elements of concrete programs) of the same type and dimension. 
The verification algorithm has been automated in the TTP toolkit in a component called 
Verifier, which proves (or refutes) conformance of a code to your design, which is a 
LePUS3 specification or, in another word, a Codechart. The result of the verification 
is displayed using GUI as appears in Figure 10 [13]. TTP Toolkit is available for free 
at ttp.essex.ac.uk. 
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Figure 9: Editing an assignment [13] 
 
 
Figure 10: The result of verification [13] 
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However, the TTP Toolkit has a number of limitations which can be overcome 
with further investigation of it and of LePUS3. For instance, the TTP Toolkit does not 
offer features for runtime-verification. The reason behind this is that it supports 
LePUS3 languages that only accommodate specifying decidable design statements, 
which are only statically checked by TTP Toolkit verifier. Another limitation is that 
the current version of the TTP Toolkit only supports analysing a Java source code. 
However, because the TTP Toolkit was developed for any object-oriented programing 
language, this limitation can also be overcome by further development of the tool. 
Finally, pattern detection (searching) is provided in the TTP Toolkit. However, this 
research aims to study the detection problem and develops an algorithm to solve it. The 
implementation of the algorithm will be integrated into the new version of the TTP 
Toolkit. 
In this research, the TTP Toolkit is employed in order to accomplish a number 
of tasks. Firstly, it is used for specifying and visualising the formalised security design 
patterns, which are the application of this research. In addition, the verifications of the 
formalised security patterns against the claimed-to-implement source code is carried 
out with the TTP Toolkit verifier. Moreover, as this research targets studying and 
developing an algorithm for pattern detection, the algorithm will be integrated in the 
TTP Toolkit and will be used for verification of the existing instances of patterns. 
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2.8 Conformance checking  
 
It is important to distinguish between software validation and software 
verification. Software validation is the process of checking that the software is doing 
the expected functionality, whereas software verification is  the process of proving that 
the software is correct [42].   
In this research, the use of verification in the pattern detection is to check that 
a source code has a correct architectural and structural implementation of a pattern. It 
is important to mention here that this research does not aim to check whether the found 
pattern implementation in the source code is functioning are required or as what the 
pattern should do (validation). So, when an instance of a pattern is found in the 
detection, the verification process shows whether the instance is a correct 
implementation against a source code. Therefore, distinguishing between verification 
and validation is necessary in this research. 
Software consists of static and dynamic aspects. Software verification needs 
formal representations for those aspects of the software. These formal representations 
are produced using one of the known formal languages, such as propositional logic, 
First Order Logic, Hoare logic, etc. [36]. In order to prove the correctness of the static 
aspects of a software, the process is as follows: the aspects are formalised using one of 
the formal methods to have a set of specifications; then, the source code of the software 
is reverse-engineered using an appropriate tool for the chosen formal method to have a 
software model; finally, the model is checked against the specifications for satisfaction 
[43]. This process is usually referred to as model checking, design conformance 
checking, static check/analysis, or design verification [36], [38]. This process can be 
automated due to the fact that specifications for static aspects are decidable. A number 
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of tools offer such automated design conformance checking such as TTP Toolkits [13], 
SPIN [44], KRATOS [45], Bandera [46], [47],  Ptidej [48], etc. 
On the other hand, proving the correctness of the dynamic aspects of a software 
relies on Runtime Verification, which is  the process of checking the execution trace of 
a software against a set of specifications [49]. Checking the execution trace can be 
either online (which is done immediately whenever an event occurs) or offline (which 
is done after a certain amount of time or after software termination) [50]. Many have 
introduced their runtime verification approaches, for instance, LAVA [51], RV4WS 
[50], E-Chaser [49], etc. 
This research aims to overcome the ambiguity in the security design patterns 
catalogues by formalisation through using Codecharts. So, it is important to check the 
conformance of the patterns against the software source code, in which a pattern is 
claimed to be implemented. Therefore, the term ‘pattern verification’ refers to the 
checking of the decidable specification (shown as Codecharts) of the solution of a 
pattern using the TTP Toolkit verifier [13], which is the available tool support for 
Codecharts.    
Furthermore, this research aims to design and implement an algorithm for 
patterns detection from the source code. As a result, it is vital to reason out the detected 
instances of patterns.  Therefore, verification of the instances is used with the proposed 
pattern detection. Again, the TTP Toolkit verifier [13] will be used to check the 
satisfaction of the detected instances of  patterns against the pattern specifications 
shown in Codecharts. 
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3 Literature review 
 
 
Note: some parts of this chapter were published in: 
Alzahrani, Abdullah A. H., Majd Zohri Yafi, and Fawaz K. Alarfaj. 2014. 
‘Some Considerations on UML Class Diagram Formalization Approaches’. 
International Journal of Computer, Information, Systems and Control Engineering 8 
(5): 47 – 50. 
 
3.1 Patterns formalisation 
 
Formalisation could be defined as any process of conveying ambiguous 
statements or notions into precise ones [52]. This is usually achieved using a variety of 
mathematical and logical methods (i.e. first order logic FOL, higher order logic HOL, 
and temporal logic). In the context of pattern formalisation, it is the process of formally 
representing the pattern structure and behaviour.   
In software engineering, particularly in design and security patterns, natural 
language statements and graphical notation (such as UML) are used for patterns 
specification purposes. However, this could lead to incompleteness and lack of 
precision. Therefore, formalisation could help with overcoming such issues. 
Furthermore, formalisation is an essential requirement for rigorous and automated 
analysis [41], [53].  
UML accommodates a number of diagrams, for instance, Class, Sequence, and 
other diagrams which are used to represent structural and behavioural aspects of 
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patterns and systems. UML suffers from informal representation [54], which means 
that it has no formal foundation. This has led to ambiguity and incompleteness in its 
diagrams. Consequently, rigorous analysis cannot be carried out when such issues exist. 
This includes consistency verification, traceability, and formal reasoning [55], [56].  
Therefore, many researchers have introduced their approaches [55], [57]–[64] to 
formalise those diagrams. In fact, the formalisation of design and security patterns often 
involves the formalisation of the UML diagrams shown in the patterns descriptions. 
In order to overcome the ambiguity in the UML diagrams shown in patterns or 
any system documentations, researchers have introduced many methodologies to 
present UML in a formal shape. These methodologies fall into two categories [56]: a) 
transforming UML to formal models [65]–[67], and b) providing abstract syntax and 
formal semantics for UML diagrams [68]–[70]. However, there has to be a trade-off 
between these categories as each category emphasizes certain aspects of UML 
formalisation. Many formal languages have been proposed in formalising UML such 
as Object Constraints Language (OCL), Z, Description Logic (DL), B, PVS, etc. Each 
of these languages has a number of properties which might not appear in others. As a 
result, UML formalisation has been studied and carried out differently according to the 
researchers’ reasons for choosing the formalisation approach. As a result, choosing an 
approach to formalise those diagrams is a difficult / challenging task [56]. The 
following casts light on some of the UML formalisation approaches which are based 
on different formal languages. The focus will be on the formalisation approaches of the 
UML structure diagrams (Class diagram).    
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3.1.1 Formalization using OCL 
 
OCL is regarded as a formal language used with UML in order to specify 
constraints and conditions on an UML model. It plays an important role in improving 
precision of the specification of UML [71], [72]. Many researches [57], [63] have used 
OCL to express UML syntax and semantics. 
In order to explain how OCL specify UML class diagrams, it is important to 
unpack some of the keywords and operators that are commonly used in OCL 
specifications. First, there is a number of reserved words that have a meaning in OCL. 
For example, context is the most frequent and essential word in OCL. It is used in order 
to specify the context Classifier (a class in a UML diagram) of the specification 
expression. Another reserved words is def which specify that anything, appears after, 
is either a class attribute definition or a class operation definition. Using def allows 
specifying the attribute name, type, and the initial value. In addition, in the case of 
defining an operation, it allows specifying operation name, set of parameters and their 
types, and the returning value type. 
Table 1 shows an example of specifying an arbitrary class using OCL. The class 
name is “Student” which has three attributes namely “tuitionFees”, “fullName”, and 
“title” and typed Integer, String, and String respectively. All the attributes were 
initialised with values as can be seen. In addition, the class “Student” has one operation 
(method) named “hasTitle” and the operation takes one parameter of type String and 
returns value of type Boolean.  
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Table 1: Example of specifying an arbitrary class using OCL 
Context Student 
def: tuitionFees  : Integer = 3000  
def: fullName : String = ‘Sophie’ 
def: title : String = “Miss” 
def: hasTitle(t : String) : Boolean = self.title->exists(title = t) 
  
Importantly, the constraints in OCL are specified in similar manner, as the 
context needs to be specified, but with a use if inv keyword that abbreviates the word 
invariant which actually means a constraint in OCL.  inv keyword specifies on classes 
and types and could be followed by a name of the invariant (constraint), however, it 
must be followed by a colon (:) to indicates the start of the constraint. Figure 11 
illustrates a number of examples of invariants on two classes named “Researcher” and 
“Paper”.  
Specifying associations among patterns is done with invariants and navigation 
operators which allow accessing, checking, and other operations to the class of 
association using the operators such as (->) specify a call relation to another operation 
or method call, (implies), and (.) access attribute and navigate to. Furthermore, the 
followings are some other keywords, OCL operations, and operators such as “implies”, 
“and”, “or”, “let”, “exist()”, “select()”, “forAll()”, “=”, “.”,“:”, “<>”, etc. Finally, there 
are many keywords, OCL operations, and operators in OCL that cannot be discussed 
here but it is beneficial to check them in [71]. 
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Figure 11: Example of specifying associations between two classes using OCL from [73]  
 
Gogolla et al. (2002) suggested an approach which [63] guides the system 
designers to transform UML class diagrams with constraints and relations into another 
UML class diagram, employing only binary associations and OCL constraints. It 
basically reforms the UML class diagrams to be more precise and encloses them with 
sets of OCL constraints. The approach stands as a de-facto in formalising UML class 
diagrams with OCL. Many researchers have used this approach in their work for 
checking design consistency [74]–[79].  
Although, this approach improves the precision with the UML class diagrams, 
it raises the issue of losing semantic information when translating complex associations 
to binary ones [63, p. 93]. Furthermore, it does not support formalisation of abstraction 
(as there is no means of showing the class hierarchies, set of classes, and/or set of 
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methods), which exists in patterns descriptions. In addition, formalising the security 
boundaries in the diagrams is lost when using this approach as this feature is not 
supported by the guide offered by this approach.     
Another instance of using OCL to formalise the UML class diagram is 
demonstrated in [57] by Chavez et al. (2012). The authors address the problem of 
consistency between the design presented in UML and the implementation. In 
particular, the authors focus on formalising the composition relationship, which is often 
shown in the UML class diagram. The authors highlight the issue of formalising UML 
composition relationships in terms of lifetime and interoperability, and they suggest 
using OCL to formalise composition in the UML class diagram.  
However, the approach concentrates on the formalisation of only one UML 
class diagram relationship, which is a composition relationship. Without considering 
other UML class diagram relationships (dependency, aggregation ...), it is obvious that 
this approach cannot be comparable with other OCL formalisation approaches. 
Moreover, it does not have tool support to automate the generation of the OCL of a 
given class diagram as well as the verification of the consistency of a given class 
diagram and a given implementation. 
By means of formality, OCL was founded to overcome ambiguity in UML 
diagrams. However, OCL itself suffers from a level of ambiguity. As a result, it does 
not help with formal reasoning and formal proofs [55], [80], [81]. Furthermore, it is 
difficult to be checked and detected, so it raises issues in the development and the 
maintenance process of the software system. Moreover, OCL does not seem to be 
sufficient when stating complex constraints [55].  
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On the other hand, Codecharts allows formalising the structure of patterns or 
systems precisely, visually, and concisely with the feature of a small number of 
vocabulary. Furthermore, Codecharts supports formalisation of abstraction as it offers 
tokens for this, such as a hierarchy symbol, a set of method signatures symbol, and a 
set of classes symbol.  The current version of OCL, however, does not support 
abstraction. Moreover, loss of information occurs when dealing with complex 
constraints.     
In addition, Codecharts has tool support for specifying design conformance, 
translating it to LePUS3, and verifying it. On the other hand, OCL, to the best of my 
knowledge, does not have competing tool support. None of the tools, which apply 
formalising UML class diagrams using OCL, is available for investigation; whereas 
Codecharts tool support is publicly available at [ttp.essex.ac.uk]. 
3.1.2 Formalisation using DL 
 
Description Logic (DL) is one of many formal languages for knowledge 
representation. It is built on a mathematical foundation and supports formal reasoning. 
A number of description logic languages exist, such as AL and ALEN [82]. Many 
researchers [55], [58], [61], [62], [64] have tried to formalise UML in DL.  
Kadir et al. (2010) [55] have proposed an approach to formalise a UML class 
diagram using DL. They have assessed their approach to UML formalisation as not 
satisfactory. This is due to two reasons: (1) many properties, such as dependency, are 
not defined, and (2) the formalisation is done manually and there is no tool to automate 
it. Figure 12 shows the formalisation of one attribute and one operation of one class in 
a class diagram [55]. It can be seen that formalisation is textual and will be long in case 
of formalising all operations and attributes of all classes in any medium-size class 
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diagram. It is obvious that employing such an approach in the process of the 
formalisation of a large-scale software can lead to an unreadable formal specification, 
which can consequently be error prone. Moreover, it would need a solid mathematical 
foundation to be understood and verified. 
 
 
Figure 12: An example of formalising one attribute and one operation of a class in DL [55] 
In order to explain the formalization example in Figure 12, it is beneficial to 
translate it in English. So, the first line of formalization means that there is a class 
named “AccountItem” which includes (⊑ quantifier) an operation (∀P) named 
“GetOrderId” with a return value of type (.) “String” and (⊓) the operation visibility is 
publicly visible and has one restriction (≥). In the same way an attribute is formalized 
but without the use of operation identifier (∀P ). 
Zhihong et al. (2003) [61] considered the formalisation of a UML class diagram 
in DL but from a different perspective. They considered the formalisation process itself. 
They first provided a summary of the comparison between DL languages used in 
formalising UML. Then, they addressed some concerns when choosing a DL language 
for formalisation. They suggested some solutions to the problems which occur in 
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formalising a UML class diagram. They concluded that formalising UML in DL is a 
difficult task. 
Another approach to formalising UML diagrams with DL was suggested in [62] 
by Calì et al. (2002). The authors have chosen the DLR description logic language in 
order to formalise the UML class diagram in terms of classes, associations, and 
constraints. They have shown how to map the constructs of a class diagram to the 
corresponding formalism in DL. However, they did not consider those aspects which 
relate to the source code (public, protected and qualifiers for methods and attributes) 
when formalising the class diagrams. Moreover, the approach does not support the 
formalisation of some advanced constraints, in particular the constraints on attributes 
names and operations parameters [60]. The approach was experimented in FACT [83]. 
Although, the work is promising, many properties need to be considered to mature this 
formal framework (such as modelling and reasoning out objects and links), as the 
authors concluded. 
Some researchers chose to study the use of DL for formalisation from a different 
perspective. For instance, Berardi et al. (2001) [64] carried out an experimental 
investigation of the use of the most dominant DL-based reasoning systems to reason 
out UML class diagrams. The authors illustrate their approach of formalising the UML 
class diagram in the DLR description logic language. The approach they used in 
formalisation is similar to the work of Calì et al. (2002) in [62]; however, the difference 
is only that the work in [62] pays more attention to formalising the constraints shown 
in UML class diagrams. Berardi et al. [64] reported detailed results about the most 
popular DL-based reasoning systems, namely FACT [83] and RACER [84]. Briefly, 
the result of the experiment showed that the tested DL-based reasoning systems suffer 
from critical efficiency issues when dealing with knowledge bases. 
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DL is a formal approach which can be used to formalise UML class and other 
diagrams. Its main features are soundness and completeness, which are essential in 
rigorous reasoning. In addition, DL has a number of languages which vary in their 
features. However, DL cannot formally represent all UML properties, such as 
dependency relation [55], [58], [60]. In addition, when formalising a UML class 
diagram in DL, the choice of the DL language needs to be considered carefully [61].  
Furthermore, as DL’s languages are similar, transferring between DL languages 
can happen easily, which makes it difficult to say which DL language is used if an 
explicit statement does not exist. In addition, the process of formalisation using DL is 
a challenging task as it is still done manually and needs solid mathematical foundations 
and skills in DL. 
 On the other hand, Codecharts is a formal language, as it is built on First Order 
logic, which makes it superior and more expressive, since DL and DLR are regarded 
to be subsets of First Order logic [85]. In addition, Codecharts is visual, which makes 
formalisation easier in produce and understanding. Furthermore, Codecharts supports 
formalising abstraction and offers a number of vocabularies for abstraction; whereas 
the current approaches of formalisation using DL do not offer this support [55]. 
Supporting abstraction helps with the formalisation of large scale system models. 
Finally, Codecharts has a tool support for specifying design performance, verifying it 
automatically,   and translating it automatically to LePUS3 formulas. Whereas the 
formalisation in DL is done manually and the current tools dealing with DL 
formalisation suffer from issues such as efficiency.    
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3.1.3 Formalization using Z language  
 
Z is a specification language strongly typed in mathematics [59]. Since its 
introduction, it has been an interest for formalisation advocates. This resulted in 
introducing Object- Z, which is an extension of Z. Object-Z was developed to improve 
Z in many aspects, mainly in structuring and object-oriented representations. This is to 
enhance effectiveness in specifying large and medium scale software systems. 
However, it is claimed that a specification in Z is also a specification in Object-Z [86]. 
It seems a true claim as Z’s syntax and semantics are parts of Object-Z, however, the 
latter improves in inheritance, polymorphism, and encapsulation. UML formalisation 
using Z and Object-Z has been of interest to many researchers.  
Sengupta et al. (2008) [59], for instance, have proposed a methodology to 
formalise different kinds of UML diagrams in Z language and represent the result 
visually using an Entity-Relationship (ER) diagram. The authors have clarified their 
methodology of formalising a UML class, a Use-Case, and Sequence diagrams. 
However, the proposed approach has a number of drawbacks. First, the ER diagram 
can be large when representing an industry-scale system. Second, the process of the 
transformation of Z specification into an ER diagram is not clear. This would introduce 
more ambiguity than UML diagrams do. Finally, the proposed approach has not been 
implemented in a tool which automates formalisation into Z, ER representation, and 
consistency verification. 
Another work has been carried out by Mostafa et al. (2007) [60] to formalise 
UML diagrams in Z language. The authors introduce a manual which provides formal 
semantics for a Use-Case diagram, a Class diagram, and a State Machine diagram in Z 
specification language. They have, in addition, implemented a tool to support their 
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approach. The tool is claimed to be able to check diagrams and automatically generate 
the appropriate Z specification if there is no violation of constraints. Additionally, the 
tool could generate a source code for class diagrams in C#, visual basic and JavaScript.  
Although the approach offers a straightforward formalisation guide for skilled 
people in Z, it does not consider formalising abstraction in UML class diagrams. 
Furthermore, the authors have shown no evidence of the implemented tool. They only 
mention, in the conclusion section, that a tool was implemented and list what it does.      
 
 
Figure 13: An example of formalising one generalisation relation between two classes in Z [60] 
Figure 13 demonstrates an example of a generalization relation in Z as shown 
in Mostafa et al. work [60]. Clearly, from the figure, a number of shortcomings of the 
approach are noticed such as asymmetry. In addition, this approach has the limitation 
when dealing with a large-scale software.  The reason behind this is the overwhelming 
specification generated, which makes carrying out any formal reasoning a difficult 
process. 
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In conclusion, Z specification is a formal method which can help in formal 
reasoning and formal proofs. However, Z notations are not graphical and need a solid 
mathematical background to be formed and understood [59]. In addition, Z lacks some 
notations such as Interface. It also lacks clarity when the specification is for large scale 
software systems [86]. Furthermore, a glance at the state-of-the-art approaches reveals 
that there is no tool to support automating the formalisation of UML diagrams in Z and 
the detection of Z specification from a source code. 
On the other hand, Codecharts is a formal graphical language. It supports 
formalising abstraction shown in design models.  Furthermore, the TTP Toolkit [13] 
provides considerable tool support for Codecharts. The tool offers a number of actions 
that can automate verification of consistency, translating to LePUS3 formulas, and 
visualisation.   
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3.1.4 A Comparison of Formalisation Methods  
 
After reviewing many approaches to formalisation of UML class diagrams 
using different methods, the following compares between the three aforementioned 
methods used in the approaches reviewed. Table 2 describes the main findings of the 
comparison. The following criteria have been used in the comparison as these criteria 
are either regarded as formalisation concerns or as consequences of the formalisation 
processes.  
1. Full Formality: it highlights the approaches which have formality 
issues. 
2. Information loss: it highlights the possibility of losing some 
information during the process of transferring the UML class diagram 
into a formal specification. Basically, the information loss occurs when 
an approach is not able to formalise some information in the class 
diagrams such as dependency relation or complex constraints. 
3. Abstraction support: it shows to what extent an approach is responsive 
to large-scale software representation. In addition, it displays the ability 
of the approach to formalise abstraction shown in a class diagram. 
4. Complex constraints support: it refers to whether an approach is used 
in formalising complex constraints. 
5. Automation tool support: it illustrates the availability of any tool which 
automates the formalisation processes. 
6. Math background: it describes the need for a solid mathematical 
background during the formalisation process or thereafter for 
understanding and checking the formalisation outputs. 
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7. Graphical: it refers to the outputs of the formalisation; i.e. whether the 
outputs are graphical or textual.  
8. Behaviors formalisations: they show whether the approaches in the 
formalisation method is able to formalise behavior models.    
Table 2: Comparison of the Formalisation approaches using different methods 
Formalization method 
Feature 
Z DL OCL Codecharts 
Fully Formal √ √ × √ 
Overcome Information loss × × × √ 
Modelling Abstraction support × × × √ 
Complex constraints support √ √ × √ 
Automation tool support √ × × √ 
Naive Math background × × √ √ 
Graphical  × × × √ 
Behaviours formalizations √ √ × × 
 
Formalisation approaches vary in order to fulfil the different needs. This makes 
each approach unique in the way it deals with formalisation of design models. The 
difference does not make one approach outperform the others; however, it shows the 
main purpose behind the introduction of such an approach. Table 2 demonstrates the 
outcome results from comparing a number of UML class diagram formalisation 
approaches in OCL, DL, and Z. 
It can be seen from Table 2 that the approaches of formalization reviewed differ 
in their abilities to meet all the criteria. This might be due to the chosen formalisation 
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methods (OCL, DL, or Z) or due to the concerns which were the motivations for the 
introduction of the formalisation approach. However, Codecharts shows an ability to 
meet all the criteria, except for the last one, which is modelling the behaviors. This 
limitation in Codecharts is due to the fact that Codecharts is only able to model fully 
decidable statements, which is often not the case with behavior modelling. 
However, Codecharts is graphical, which means that it does not require special 
math skills to be understood. This leads to satisfying the criterion of no Math 
background is needed. It is formal, which means each graphical vocabulary has a 
formal meaning in First Order Logic. This leads to satisfying the criterion of 
Information loss as no transferring is required. In addition, Codecharts has a tool 
support which is shown in the TTP Toolkit [13]. Furthermore, it supports formalizing 
abstraction, which is shown in design models, by offering a number of vocabulary 
items for this purpose. Finally, Codecharts is a visual specification in LePUS3, which 
is formulas built on First Order Logic.  As a result, one of the important features of 
First Order Logic is expressiveness, which allows supporting formalisation of 
complex constraints.  
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3.2 Pattern detection  
 
Design pattern detection is defined as the activity of finding design motifs in a 
source code of subject system. In this context, the activity is limited to find the 
occurrences or instances of the “Solution” proposed in the patterns descriptions. Often, 
the detection activity includes a number of sub processes such as pattern solution 
formalisation, source code reverse-engineering, occurrences searching, and 
occurrences reasoning/explanation [11], [87], [88], [3], [4], [89], [8], [90]–[92].   
Pattern Detection is to look for instances of a given or selected pattern in a given 
source code. The search is divided into two classes, which are static search and dynamic 
search. The former search is required to perform the latter search. However, not all the 
existing pattern detection approaches combine the two searches. The static search is 
the richer and the core search as it allows finding the structure and the locations of the 
instances within the source code. Whereas the dynamic search allows further checks 
on the instances found by explaining  the execution trace of the source code or by 
plugging some chunks on codes in the original source code in order to log on the source 
code components activity during the execution time [11].  
The Pattern Detection problem has been the focus for many researchers [6], 
[87], [88], [3], [4], [89], [8], [93]–[97], [5], [7], [98], who have introduced their 
approaches in order to solve it. In the next section, a number of state-of-art pattern 
detection systems and approaches will be reviewed. The review will be focused on the 
definitions of the pattern detection approaches, formalisation methods, search means, 
and analysis of the main findings and issues. 
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3.2.1 SPQR 
 
One of the early and expressive pattern detection systems is SPQR (System for 
Pattern Query and Recognition).. SPQR tackles POML (Pattern/Object Mark-up 
Language) schema as inputs and outputs. It uses Otter automated theorem prover to 
find the instances of pattern from the source code. SPQR aims to ease the 
documentation and understanding of systems from the source code [99]. 
The SPQR has been experimented to detect instances, from a source code, of a 
number of design patterns described in [18]. The experiment was conducted on a small 
scale source code. Furthermore, a possibility of performance issue in the case of a large-
scale source code is present [8], [93], [99]. Moreover, the SPQR system is not available 
for testing and many researchers find that the system approach cannot be rebuilt easily 
[90].  
SPQR depends on the extracted structural relations to detect patterns instances. 
This might result in high false positive or negative ratios [100].  Moreover, SPQR has 
the limitation of being specific to the C++ source code. In addition, SPQR uses ρ-
calculus, which does not support data flow [101].  
3.2.2 Ptidej 
 
Another example is Ptidej (Pattern Trace Identification, Detection, and 
Enhancement in Java). Ptidej is a system for analysing and maintaining object-oriented 
software systems. It is comprised of a number of sub-components as follows: a) SAD, 
which is a tool for detecting and correcting architecture defects; b) EPI, which is a 
design patterns occurrence identification tool; c) DRAM, which is a tool for visualising 
static and behaviour properties of a software system with matrices; d) Aspects, which 
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models and computes matrices. As EPIis the design patterns identification tool in 
Ptidej, it is a relevant tool to this research and will be used when referring to Ptidej. 
EPI is designed to find occurrences of design patterns using a bio-informatics string 
matching algorithm. EPI is claimed to find exact as well as approximate pattern 
occurrences [7].   
 
Figure 14: Composite design motif in Ptidej [3] 
 
Figure 15: Ptidej output [7], [48], [102] 
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Ptidej is a large project which aims to cover many aspects such as Quality 
models, Program comprehension, Test-case generation, Design smells, Linguistic 
smells, Evolution patterns, and Features and requirements [48]. The next will 
concentrate on Ptidej efforts on the topics relevant to design patterns detection and 
identification which is the interest of this research. 
Ptidej relies on an improved version of a design pattern detection system called 
DeMIMA  [4]. Figure 14 shows the use of Constraint Programming in Ptidej in order 
to represent Composite pattern as input. In addition, Figure 15 depicts the Ptidej outputs 
of the pattern detection of Composite shown in Figure 14. 
3.2.3 DeMIMA 
 
From the source code, DeMIMA [4] aims to find microarchitectures (which are 
generally class diagrams) that are similar to design motifs. Constraint Programming 
and tree search methodologies are employed in order to find the patterns matches. 
DeMIMA is a semi-automatic pattern detection system. Its pattern detection algorithm 
tries to recognise the pattern constraints in the program model. However, it misses 
composition relationships. As a result, this reduces the number of exact instance of the 
pattern. Therefore, the algorithm does not provide all instances.    
Furthermore, an early experiment has been carried out to check the approach 
performance, microarchitectures validation, and accuracy. The main findings show that 
DeMIMA still suffers from efficiency issues as it takes an average of 50 minutes to 
find all the microarchitectures of one design pattern. Furthermore, the accuracy is not 
at the desired level [4], [96]. 
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An evolution of DeMIMA is presented in [3]. The improvement was towards 
efficiency and accuracy. The authors adopted numerical signatures in order to enhance 
the previous work on design pattern identification. In the improvement, Constraint 
programming is still the methodology applied. However, the performance is still an 
issue when dealing with a large-scale software. For instance, the authors conducted an 
experiment on JUnit, which has 236 classes and 1,995 methods, to identify the 
occurrences of Adapter, Abstract factory and Composite patterns. The results show that 
the identification of the Adapter and Composite patterns is still inefficient, whereas the 
identification of Abstract factory has significantly improved and all instances of this 
pattern were found quicker with comparison to other aforementioned patterns. 
Furthermore, the computation of the numerical signatures introduces more overhead 
for the identification process. Moreover, the accuracy was not improved significantly 
as the author concentrated on the recall more than the precision [96]. 
In conclusion, a number of well-known pattern detection/identification systems 
have been reviewed. Those systems use different approaches for patterns representation 
as well as different patterns finding algorithms. Each system has its strengths and 
drawbacks. Form what has been done and what is missing, this research aims to fill the 
research gap.  
Form the above review, it can be seen clearly that the area of pattern detection 
still suffers from the problem of inefficiency. The aforementioned state-of-art pattern 
detection systems can be evidence for such a claim. Furthermore, as SPQR is limited 
to the C++ source code and Ptidej is limited to the Java source code, the need for a 
more general pattern detection system emerges. This means a system which can detect 
design patterns in any platforms of source codes (e.g. Java, C++, C#, Python,…..).  
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Additionally, improving system understanding, maintainability, and evolution 
are the main goals for pattern detection systems, and in order to achieve those goals, a 
fully automated pattern detection system is required. The state-of-art pattern detection 
systems are semi-automated as they need human interaction at some point in the 
detection process [7], [99]. 
Furthermore, the state-of-art pattern detection systems are limited to specific 
patterns to be detected. Usually, these patterns are hard coded and known in advance. 
For instance, SPQR uses a component called OTTER, which finds instances of patterns 
from a fixed and hard coded collection called Elemental Design Patterns (EDPs). An 
example is shown in Figure 16. The OTTER finds instances using inference, based on 
certain hard coded rules, and then provides proofs which will be analysed by the 
proof2pattern component to make the final outputs in the form of ObjectXML as shown 
in Figure 17 [98].  
As a result, SPQR takes a source code as an input and uses a fixed set of hard 
coded patterns to find only a first instance of the chosen pattern. This finally generates 
the result in a form of ObjectXML. It can be concluded form this that SPQR does not 
find all the instances and is not a general pattern detection system as it relies on a fixed 
hard coded pattern to be looked for. On the other hand, this research aims to produce a 
general pattern detection system which is able to find all instances on any given pattern 
in any given implementation. Moreover, it aims to visualise the output to improve the 
readability and understanding of the result. 
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Figure 16: An example of EDP [98] 
 
Figure 17: SPQR output [98] 
Although many studies have been carried out to improve the Ptidej and 
DeMIMA pattern detection systems, limitations and issues are still present. For 
example, Ptidej and DeMIMA offer a fixed set of design patterns which can be looked 
for in any reverse-engineered source code. The design patterns are described in the 
form of a Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP).  As a result, Ptidej and DeMIMA 
have a fixed and hard coded specialised constraints library to describe the design 
patterns [3].  
So, again, these pattern detection systems are restricted to a hard coded design 
patterns. Furthermore, the outputs of Ptidej detection systems are not all the exact 
instances of a chosen pattern. In fact, the result of the detection process includes a 
considerable number of similar patterns. Finally, the result is shown in textual format. 
Clearly, this is unlike the general pattern detection system which this research aims to 
accomplish. 
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The final point is that the current pattern detection systems represent patterns 
either in a new or in a special language to transform the patterns from their UML 
diagrams. In the case of using a new language, this has the shortcoming of being textual 
and not graphical. Also, this requires the user of such a system to study this language. 
This leads to making such systems as not easy-to-use systems. In the case of UML 
transformation, a considerable chance of lost information is present [61].  As a result, 
this research aims to overcome the issues discussed above in pattern detection systems 
by proposing a system which is efficient, easy-to-use, and fully automated. 
Furthermore, it should rely on a formal, graphical, and easy-to-understand pattern 
description language.    
3.2.4 Other detection approaches 
 
3.2.4.1 Tsantalis et al. approach 
 
Tsantalis et al. (2006) [8] have proposed a new pattern detection approach 
which uses similarity scoring between graph vertices in order to find the pattern 
instances. In this approach each pattern’s relation (generalisation, association, ….. ) are 
shown as a matrix of size n×n  where n is the number of classes in the pattern. The 
same applies to the program representation. As a result, the pattern as well as the source 
code are represented as adjacency Matrices. So, if we have a pattern P that has 3 classes 
A, B, and C, and the class A and C are in generalisation relation which means that C 
inherit from A, the adjust matric for this relation as follows: 
 A B C 
A 
B 
C 
൥
0 0 00 0 01 0 0൩ 
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A pattern and the software system are divided into subsystems matrices. A  subsystem  
is  a  set  of  components  or  pattern  participants  that  form  a  hierarchy structure. 
Next, a specialised algorithm is used to calculate similarity scoring between vertices of 
all matrices for the pattern with the corresponding ones for the source code in order to 
find the pattern instances.  
The authors have tested their approach on three large scale software systems, 
namely JHotDraw, JRefactory, and JUnit. The patterns used in their experiment are: 
Adapter/Command State/Strategy, Composite, Decorator, Visitor, Observer, and 
Prototype. The approach provides a very efficient way for pattern detection. 
Furthermore, unlike other pattern detection approaches and systems, the amount of 
memory needed for the pattern detection is at the minimum. 
Although the approach offers a very efficient methodology for design patterns 
detection, it is limited to a fixed, predefined, and hard coded set of patterns to be 
detected. In addition, as the approach relies on similarity scoring where the score 
between matrices bounds in the range of 0 and 1, it cannot find all exact instances. 
Rather, it indicates the instances with higher similarity scores. Moreover, the 
construction of subsystems might introduce invalid or unnecessary candidates, 
especially when a subsystem is linked to two or more hierarchy roots.  Furthermore, 
the approach does not provide or use any reasoning methods on the detected instances. 
In addition, as the authors claim that the approach has been implemented, it was not 
possible to find a tool which implements the approach in order to tests the approach 
with other patterns and software source codes. 
On the other hand, in this research aims to offer a methodology for a general 
pattern detection. So, the user can detect any design or user-defined patterns. Moreover, 
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specifying the pattern (Codecharts) is rather easier as it is visual but formal. In addition, 
the algorithm proposed in this research is designed to find all exact instances of a given 
pattern in a given source code. This will be integrated with the TTP Toolkit (a tool 
support for Codecharts) which will be used as well for reasoning and verifying the 
pattern instances detected by our algorithm. As this research aims to integrate the 
pattern detection approach in the TTP Toolkit, it will be available for testing and further 
investigations on the TTP Toolkit at ttp.essex.ac.uk. 
3.2.4.2 Dong et al. approach (DP-Miner)          
 
Dong et al. (2007) [5] have introduced their approach for pattern detection 
named Design Pattern Miner (DP-Miner).  The approach is divided into three phases: 
structural analysis, behavioural analysis, and semantic analysis. The approach uses a 
manner of matrices, weight, and type in order to represent a pattern. In addition, it uses 
the same manner for representing the reverse-engineered software system source code. 
With such representation, the authors propose an algorithm to calculate the similarity 
and find the pattern instances statically for further behavioural analysis. 
The DP-Miner pattern detection system was developed on this approach. In 
addition, the authors conducted a case study in order to test and evaluate the approach 
and the DP-miner tool support. The case study was to find a number design pattern 
(namely: Adapter, Composite, Strategy, and Bridge patterns) in a large scale open 
source code, which was Java.awt package in JDK 1_4. The detected instances are 
shown in the textual form as a table and in the visual form as a class diagram. 
Although DP-Miner seems to be an efficient, user-friendly, and complete 
pattern detection system, it has a number of limitations and issues.  First of all, it is, 
like other pattern detection systems, only limited to a fixed, pre-defined, and hard coded 
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set of design patterns to be detected. Currently, it is limited to only 4 design patterns, 
namely Adapter, Composite, Strategy, and Bridge patterns.  On the other hand, as 
mentioned before, this research aims to offer a general pattern detection approach for 
detecting design, security, and user-defined patterns; whereas this could overflow in 
the DP-Miner as the optimisation of it relies on the attributes number, which might be 
large for a general pattern detection system.  
In addition, DP-Miner has no reasoning in the detected pattern instances. 
Moreover, the correct instances are manually checked in the source code by an expert 
human interaction. This makes it a semi-automatic pattern detection. However, this 
research pattern detection approach, as mentioned before, will be integrated in the TTP 
Toolkit and  will be using the TTP Toolkit verifier to check the instances and reasoning 
in them. 
Finally, DP-Miner employs in the search algorithm the semantics which are 
shown in source code design documentation, inline codes comments, methods and 
classes naming. It is obvious that if a correct, clear, and up-to-date documentation of 
the source code is available, then there is no need for pattern detection. In addition, 
inline code comments are often more misleading for humans than pattern detection. 
Therefore, relying on these might be misleading and might cause the elimination of 
some correct instances. This dependency on the semantics introduces the possibility 
that DP-miner might miss or drop some correct instances. Therefore, it cannot be said 
that DP-Miner finds all the pattern instances, unlike the pattern detection approach in 
this research which aims to find all instances.  
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3.2.4.3 Uchiyama et al. approach 
 
A new approach was introduced by Uchiyama et al. (2014) [94] in order to 
detect design patterns from an object-oriented source code. The approach aims to solve 
the problem of detecting patterns with same class structure. In addition, it aims to solve 
the problem of finding a pattern when pattern applications are different. Furthermore, 
the approach is limited to the Java source code.  
In order to solve the above mentioned problems, the approach employs machine 
learning and source code matrices. The approach is developed to solve the problem of 
pattern detection automatically. However, human interaction is essential in the role 
judgment phase as well as some other steps. 
In this approach, the pattern is described using the GQM method (Goal 
Question Metric). However, this method has a problem in effectiveness and ease-of-
use [103]. Moreover, describing a pattern using such a method requires patterns’ 
specialists and experience. Additionally, beside the fact that the output is textual 
descriptions, the problem of lack of Questions might occur. This leads to unsatisfactory 
results in the approach phases as well as a loss of patterns information. In this research, 
using Codecharts offers a visual and formal method to describe the decidable 
descriptions of a pattern. Furthermore, the tool support TTP Toolkit [13] offers user 
friendly interface to describe a pattern.  
The patterns to be detected in Uchiyama et al. [94] approach are only 5  hard-
coded and fixed sets of patterns, in  contrast, this research overcomes this limitation as 
it offers an approach to detect any well-known design patterns modelled using 
Codecharts. Moreover, this research facilitate detecting any user defined patterns. 
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Therefore, pattern detection in this research can be regarded as a general pattern 
detection approach. 
The detection process in current pattern detection approaches relies on relations 
among components in patterns and on relations among source code components. In the 
approach proposed by [94], they only consider a limited set of relations which are only 
4 relations, namely inheritance, interface, implementation, and aggregation. Unlike this 
research which aims to consider more relations by using Codecharts in order to employ 
them to gain more accurate and specified results. This research considers the following 
relations: Call, Return, Forward, Produce, Create, Member, and others beside the 
relations mentioned in the compared-with approach. 
Finally, in this research, a specialised algorithm has been developed to detect 
patterns instances from the Java source code or any object-oriented source code that 
can be model-extracted using TTP Toolkit. The algorithm finds all instances and locate 
them in the source code in a fully automated process, whereas the [94] approach relies 
on manual human judgement to decide the most likely to be a class playing a role in a 
pattern. Moreover, it does not find all instances of a pattern compared with the pattern 
detection in this research; in fact, it ranks classes from a source code according to its 
relevance to the role of each participant in a pattern. 
3.2.4.4 Mirakhorli et al. approach 
 
Mirakhorli et al. (2012) [104] have introduced their approach for detecting 
tactics. The authors distinguish clearly between a tactic and a design pattern as they 
refer to the former to be a group of classes and their association, and the latter to be a 
group of roles and interactions. The approach aims to solve the problem of automating 
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the construction of traceability links for architectural tactics. The solution proposed in 
this approach relies on machine learning, information retrieval, and structural analysis. 
As mentioned, Mirakhorli et al [104] approach defines a tactic in terms of roles 
and interactions. However, the authors divide the roles into two categories: primary 
roles and additional roles. In their approach, they consider only the primary roles to be 
detected, where there are usually two roles in each tactic considered in their work.  
The tactics in Mirakhorli et al [104] approach are described using tTIMs (Tactic 
Traceability Information Models) in order to describe the design decisions [105]. tTIMs 
provides infrastructure to visualise software architecture decisions using UML-like 
diagrams. Although the tTIMs is a great method to help in understanding the software 
architecture, tTIMs is not formally defined. In this research, design obligations are 
described using a formal and visual method, which is Codecharts. Formality is essential 
when rigorous reasoning about the results is needed. Consequently, in this research you 
use the TTP Toolkit automatic verifier [13] in order to verify the output of the pattern 
detection approach of this research, whereas in Mirakhorli et al approach, the 
verification process is done all manually and with the need of experts to carry it out. 
After describing the design decisions, the approach of Mirakhorli et al needs a 
human interaction in order to link the architectural elements to proxies in the source 
code. This interaction needs to be with the developer or the analyst. The mapping is 
important in order to have traceability information inherited in tTIMs; however, the 
mapping is done manually, which makes this approach a semi-automatic approach. 
 This research aims to find all instances of a given design pattern in a given 
source code. This makes the pattern detection, of this research, surpasses Mirakhorli et 
al approach which uses Information retrieval to detect instances of design decisions 
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and Information retrieval depends on terminology, so some instances might be missed.  
Furthermore, the authors [104] highlight the risks of the correctness of the training and 
test sets as well as the time efficiency. Finally, in this research, in order to detect all 
instances from a given source code, the detection relies on design decisions showed as 
a visual and formal input (Codecharts). However, beside tTIMs of the architectural 
decisions, Mirakhorli et al approach requires a source code and its documentations in 
advance in order to pre-analyse the result and enhance the results when needed. 
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4 Security Patterns Formalisation 
 
Note: some parts of this chapter were published in: 
Alzahrani, Abdullah A. H., and Amnon Eden. 2013. ‘UML versus LePUS3 for 
Modelling Structure of Security Patterns’. In, 260–69. Kyiv, UA: Cybernetics Faculty 
of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. 
 
 
Design patterns formalisation is the process of having the pattern in a formal 
and precise representation for further investigations. In this chapter, the formalization 
investigation on security design patterns using Codecharts will be elaborated and 
discussed. This includes highlighting the issues in the current security patterns 
catalogues and descriptions. Furthermore, an analysis of reasons, which make 
Codecharts might outperform other formal and informal representations of the structure 
of security design patterns, will be shown. 
In addition, this chapter demonstrates the methodology followed in this 
research in order to formalise structures of security patterns from the original 
descriptions. This includes showing the linkage of the descriptions statement with the 
LePUS3 formulas and Codecharts notations. Finally, the outcomes of using this 
research methodology of formalising a number of security patterns from different 
security patterns catalogues will be shown.   
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4.1 Why security patterns as Codecharts 
 
During the process of software development, many people are involved, such 
as software architects, security engineers, designers, implementers, maintainers and 
others. Each of those might not have enough knowledge about the others' views on 
points which they all share and work on. For example, the implementer and/or designer 
might understand that the security engineer needs to secure the communication with 
the client by using a password authentication pattern. However, the implementer and/or 
designer might have insufficient knowledge or have a different understanding about 
the password authentication pattern. This might introduce unnecessary confusion, 
which costs time an effort. Therefore, it is essential to clearly deliver the knowledge of 
the security engineer to the implementer and/or designer. 
This would promote many aspects in all the software development stages. In 
the case of security, it will enhance the overall security of the system as it assures that 
all people in the development process share the same understanding about the specific 
security matter. In addition, it will allow the validation and/or verification team to 
check the implementation against clear points. It will also improve the process of 
maintaining the software as it will be easier to locate the aspects that the security 
engineer delivered to the designer, implementer, verification team and finally the 
maintainer [106]. 
In order to convey expertise, the patterns were introduced. Security design 
patterns are solutions to solve reoccurring security problems in a specific domain [9], 
[26]. In principle, security patterns are design patterns but they are for a specific 
domain, namely the security domain. Security patterns have gained a growing amount 
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of interest. As a result, many researchers have introduced much research to describe, 
classify, detect, and verify security patterns. 
In the case of security patterns descriptions, many have introduced patterns in 
many templates in order to improve the current descriptions of security patterns [1], 
[9], [26], [28], [29], [106]. The templates are similar to some extent.  They usually 
combine the use of an informal description (expressed in the English language) with 
the use of UML class diagrams and sequence diagrams to demonstrate the structure and 
the behaviour, respectively, of a pattern.  However, the descriptions of security patterns 
still suffer from a number of issues which can be noticed when putting them into 
practice. These issues are lack of precision, ambiguity and inconsistency between 
different descriptions of the same pattern.   
Lack of precision and ambiguity are shown in all well-known security patterns 
catalogues in many forms. One example is the use of a natural human language to 
describe the pattern. It is obvious that the human language can be interpreted differently 
form one person to another. This makes it difficult to assure the identical understanding 
of the pattern by all the people involved.  
In order to allow for understanding, implementing, verifying and/or detecting 
instances of security patterns, it is important to model them in a graphical, formal and 
elegant design description language. UML is a graphical modelling language. This 
makes it more useful and comprehensive when describing any design pattern. In other 
words, it is better than using a mathematical or textual representation for a pattern 
solution. However, UML diagrams are not formal, and therefore they cannot be used 
for rigorous reasoning for the patterns.  
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This research proposes the use of Codecharts for modelling the patterns, in 
particular security patterns. By modelling security patterns using Codecharts, the 
architectural and structural aspects of the patterns solution are to be modelled. A 
number of reasons are behind our choice of using Codecharts. These reasons are as 
follows: 
1. Modelling abstraction; 
2. Formality and tool support; and 
3. Modelling Security properties. 
 
4.1.1 Modelling abstraction  
 
Abstraction is an important property in the modelling language. It is tangibly 
beneficial especially when modelling a large-scale software as well as when taking 
place in patterns. Codecharts has a number of elements (vocabulary) which 
demonstrate abstraction when modelling a pattern. For the context of modelling 
security patterns, the following elements are the interests and the focus (vocabulary): 
a) 1 -Dim Hierarchy; b) 1-Dim Signature; c) 1-Dim Class. While studying security 
patterns catalogues and descriptions, it was noticed that some patterns are described in 
an abstract way.  
An example of abstraction is that in the description of the Intercepting Validator 
Pattern in the statement of “Intercepting Validator retrieves the appropriate validators 
according to the configuration for the target” [26]. This is clearly indicating the use of 
dynamic binding, especially as it is also stated, in the description, that “Intercepting 
Validator invokes a series of validators” and “Each Validator validates and scrubs the 
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request data, if necessary". In the UML class diagram modelling this statement has 
gone far too abstract as shown in Figure 18. It can be seen that in order to model this 
statement in Figure 18, Intercepting Validator has a dependency relation with Validator 
labelled by “creates”. This might lead to the misunderstanding that there is only one 
class called “Validator” and it encapsulates all the validation process. 
 
Figure 18: UML class diagram: Intercepting Validator Pattern [26] 
If considering modelling them in a better way using UML, the above discussed 
statements in Intercepting Validator Pattern description could be modelled as shown in 
Figure 19. However, this would also not help with capturing the abstraction of the 
statement in the pattern's description. It is clear that 2 more class symbols (besides the 
existing one) are introduced to illustrate the idea of different validators. On the other 
hand, in Codecharts, it is possible to model the same statement using only one symbol 
which is a 1-Dim Hierarchy symbol as shown in Figure 20. 
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Figure 19: UML class diagram for modelling a different Validator in the Intercepting Validator 
pattern 
 
Figure 20: Codechart modelling a different Validator in the Intercepting Validator Pattern 
In conclusion, if the UML class diagram does not reflect the patterns structure 
description, which is informal statements, this will introduce an issue of precision. The 
UML class diagram is a good way to represent the structure of a pattern. However, it 
does not help with modelling abstract structure effectively, whereas Codecharts can 
model the abstract structure in a more elegant and effective manner, as the latter 
provides few symbols which can be used to represent abstract aspects of the pattern's 
structure. 
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4.1.2 Formality and tool support 
 
Formality is important when rigorous reasoning is needed. For example, in 
order to verify that a pattern is implemented in a source code, it is necessary to have 
the pattern formally represented. Security patterns are described using informal human 
language statements and UML diagrams. However, UML is an informal modelling 
language [56]. This means that is not based on formal semantics. Therefore, it cannot 
be used to represent the design or security design patterns formally.  
Formal representation of the pattern allows many things to be carried out on it. 
For example, it allows searching for the instance of the pattern in the source code. It 
also allows for verifying source code conformance to the pattern as mentioned earlier. 
However, many researchers [55], [57], [59]–[62], [64], [80] have introduced their 
approaches to add formality to the UML diagrams. Several formal languages have been 
proposed to formalise the UML semantics. The most dominant languages are OCL, 
Description Logic (DL) languages and Z. However, these languages differ in their 
capability of representing UML properties.  
For the context of formally representing  the structure of the security pattern 
form a UML class diagram, using these languages introduces a risk of losing 
information as the languages might not be able to capture some UML properties, for 
instance, UML dependency in DLs languages [55] and interface notation in Z [86].  
Another issue with using these languages is the problem of tools supporting 
automatic translation of the UML class diagram to the desired formal language. In the 
case of DL languages, the most well-known tools are FACT [83] and RACER [84]. 
However, these tools are suffering from a considerable efficiency issue as well as they 
do not support all UML properties [64]. In the case of using Z language, many have 
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introduced their approaches to translate the UML class diagram to Z. However, these 
approaches have not been combined with tools to automate the translation process, or 
the tools are not available to be tried and tested.  
On the other hand, Codecharts diagrams depend on (are based on) a formal 
language, which is First Order Predicate Logic (FOPL). Each element shown on the 
Codecharts diagram (Codechart) has a formal and semantic meaning. So, this shortcuts 
the process of detecting instances of the pattern structure as there will be no need for 
finding a suitable translation language and a tool for automating the translation process. 
Moreover, Codecharts has a tool support, the TTP Toolkit [13], which offers 
functionality such as automatic translation of the Codecharts diagram from graphical 
representation into LePUS3 and Class-Z formal schema, model extraction of java-
based source code, and verification of Codecharts diagrams against source code. In 
order to show this tool in action, the formal representation of Figure 20 has been auto-
generated and the result obtained from the tool is illustrated in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21: Auto-generated LePUS3 and Class-Z schema 
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4.1.3 Modelling Security properties 
 
The most important and key feature that Codecharts can offer for modelling 
patterns, especially security patterns, is the ability to model and identify the secured 
components in the patterns and/or the system. These secured components are usually 
identified as components within the system boundary. It can be seen in Figure 22 that 
the secured components are gathered and surrounded by the  -rectangle which is 
labelled “System”. 
 
Figure 22: UML class diagram: Single Access Point [106] 
 
Codecharts can be used to identify the secured components and formally model 
the system boundary which other languages cannot. Codecharts has an interesting 
symbol, called exclusivity symbol, which indicates either LEFT exclusive or RIGHT 
exclusive predicate [38]. This symbol serves information hiding or neglecting when 
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modelling a pattern. For example, in the description of Single Access Point Pattern 
(SAP) in [106], it is expressed that the internal components can communicate with each 
other and/or with the single access point; however, external entities cannot 
communicate with the internal components except via a single access point participant 
in Figure 22. This has not been represented effectively in the UML diagram. In 
addition, it might not be possible to translate into any formal language as the UML 
class diagram has no notation expressing such a constraint. This issue can be solved 
when using Codecharts to model the pattern as shown in Figure 24. 
 
4.2 Our Formalisation methodology 
 
In this research, an approach have developed in order to be used when 
formalising any security patterns. This approach was developed after thorough analysis 
of a number of well-known security patterns catalogues [1], [9], [26], [28], [106]. The 
main outcome of this analysis was this approach, which aims to link the informal 
statements in the patterns description with the formal Codecharts notations.  
The approach uses a pattern description which should be following the security 
patterns description template used currently in the existing catalogues [1], [9]. The 
approach is meant to take the “Solution” section of the pattern description and to 
analyse it. Then, it takes the clear and precise statements and converts them to 
Codecharts notations. 
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The precise statements are identified by the clear key words shown in the Table 
3. These key words are the guidelines for our approach in the process of formalising 
the statements in the descriptions of patterns into Codecharts notations. Consequently, 
the notations form a single Codecharts. 
Table 3: Our methodology for formalising security patterns from descriptions of pattern 
structure 
Informal Statements  LePUS3 formula  Codechart notation 
(visual notations) 
: 
- Participant: 
-  ݔ:…… 
- … consists of … 
classes…  
ܥ݈ܽݏݏ(ݔ) 
or 
ܣܮܮ(ܥ݈ܽݏݏ,ܺ) 
 
 
 
 
- ݔ implements a 
method to … 
- ݔ provides an 
interface … 
- ݔ defines a 
method.. 
- ݔ provides a set 
of actions 
 
ܵ݅݃݊ܽݐݑݎ݁(ݕ) 
or 
ܣܮܮ(ܵ݅݃݊ܽݐݑݎ݁,ܻ)  
 
- ݔ implements a 
method to … 
- ݔ provides an 
interface … 
- ݔ defines a 
method.. 
- …..ݔ provides a 
set of actions 
-  
ݔ ⊗ ݕ 
Or 
ݔ ⊗ ܻ 
Or 
ܺ ⊗ ݕ 
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Or 
ܺ⊗ ܻ 
 
 
 
- ݔ uses ݕ 
- ݔ defines an 
instance of ݕ 
- ݔ keep/hold a 
reference of ݕ 
-  
ܯܾ݁݉݁ݎ(ݔ,ݕ) 
Or  
ܱܶܶܣܮ	(ܯܾ݁݉݁ݎ,ݔ,ܻ) 
Or  
ܱܶܶܣܮ	(ܯܾ݁݉݁ݎ,ܺ,ܻ) 
Or 
ܱܶܶܣܮ	(ܯܾ݁݉݁ݎ,ܺ, ݕ) 
 
- ݔ invokes  ݕ’s 
method 
- ݔ triggers 
actions… 
- ݔ submits the 
request  
-  
ܥ݈݈ܽ(ݔ, ݕ) 
Or  
ܱܶܶܣܮ	(ܥ݈݈ܽ, ݔ,ܻ) 
Or 
ܱܶܶܣܮ	(ܥ݈݈ܽ,ܺ,ܻ) 
Or 
ܱܶܶܣܮ	(ܥ݈݈ܽ,ܺ,ݕ) 
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- ݔ returns a 
generic failed 
login message. 
- ݔ provides 
information 
about its users… 
- ݔ grants 
messages access  
ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊(ݔ,ݕ) 
Or  
ܱܶܶܣܮ	(ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊, ݔ,ܻ) 
Or 
ܱܶܶܣܮ	(ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊,ܺ,ݕ) 
Or 
ܱܶܶܣܮ	(ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊,ܺ,ܻ) 
- ݔ defines an 
instance of ݕ 
- ݔ creates a ݕ 
instance 
-  
 
 
ܥݎ݁ܽݐ݁(ݔ,ݕ) 
Or  
ܱܶܶܣܮ	(ܥݎ݁ܽݐ݁,ݔ,ܻ) 
Or 
ܱܶܶܣܮ	(ܥݎ݁ܽݐ݁,ܺ, ݕ) 
Or 
ܱܶܶܣܮ	(ܥݎ݁ܽݐ݁,ܺ,ܻ) 
 
- ݔ passes the ݕ the 
request….. 
- ݔ forwards data 
to… 
ܨ݋ݎݓܽݎ݀(ݔ,ݕ) 
Or  
ܱܶܶܣܮ	(ܨ݋ݎݓܽݎ݀,ݔ,ܻ) 
Or 
ܱܶܶܣܮ	(ܨ݋ݎݓܽݎ݀,ܺ, ݕ) 
Or 
ܱܶܶܣܮ	(ܨ݋ݎݓܽݎ݀,ܺ,ܻ) 
 
- ݔ provides a 
means for 
separating 
responsibility 
through  
inheritance 
ܫ݊ℎ݁ݎ݅ݐ(ݔ, ݕ) 
Or  
ܱܶܶܣܮ	(ܫ݊ℎ݁ݎ݅ݐ,ܺ,ݕ) 
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- ݔ inherits from ݕ 
- ݔ can be nested 
so that more 
senior roles 
inherit the 
privileges of 
junior roles. 
- Define or re-use 
an interface to be 
used by your 
CHECKPOINT 
…… Implement 
required concrete 
CHECKPOINT
…… at least one 
concrete 
CHECKPOINT 
implementation 
is needed 
Or  
ܣܮܮ(ܥ݈ܽݏݏ,ܺ) 
 
- ݔ prevents 
external entities 
from 
communicating 
directly with ݕ in 
the system 
- communication 
between ݔ and 
the ݕ may not be 
overheard by 
external entities. 
- ݔ defines one 
single interface 
for all 
communication 
with system 
external entities 
-  
ܮܧܨܶܧܺܥܮܷܵܫܸܧ(ܯܾ݁݉݁ݎ, ݔ,
Or  
ܮܧܨܶܧܺܥܮܷܵܫܸܧ(ܥ݈݈ܽ,ݔ, ݕ) 
Or 
ܮܧܨܶܧܺܥܮܷܵܫܸܧ(ܥݎ݁ܽݐ݁, ݔ,ݕ
 
- ݔ contains a set 
of privileges 
-  
ܣ݃݃ݎ݁݃ܽݐ݁(ݔ,ݕ)	 
Or  
ܱܶܶܣܮ	(ܣ݃݃ݎ݁݃ܽݐ݁, ݔ,ܻ) 
Or  
ܱܶܶܣܮ	(ܣ݃݃ݎ݁݃ܽݐ݁,ܺ,ܻ) 
Or 
ܱܶܶܣܮ	(ܣ݃݃ݎ݁݃ܽݐ݁,ܺ, ݕ) 
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As it can be seen in Table 3, the key words are taken from the patterns 
description statements, which are commonly used. The second and the third columns 
of the above table show the formal interpretations of the statements having the key 
words in the form of LePU3 formulas and their graphical notations in Codecharts. 
Finally, in order to formalise the security patterns, the above approach has been 
adopted in this research. The following section shows and discusses a number of 
formalised security patterns. The diagrams in the following section are the outcomes 
of the approach, shown in this section, and the pattern descriptions that this research 
investigated.  
     
4.3 Formalised security patterns 
 
Using our methodology shown in the previous section, a number of security 
design patterns from different security patterns catalogues have been formalised using 
Codecharts. This section shows and discusses the formalised patterns as Codecharts, 
which are the outcomes of using our methodology to analyse the patterns descriptions 
and formulise the structure and architecture of the investigated patterns. The number 
of the formalised patterns using Codecharts is more than 16 patterns from 5 different 
catalogues [9], [26], [28], [106], [107].  
In this section, some of the patterns which have been formalised using 
Codecharts are selected in order to discuss the features and the benefits of using 
Codecharts to formally model security patterns. Namely, Single Access Point pattern 
(Figure 24) and Intercepting Validator pattern (Figure 26) are selected to be shown and 
discussed. More formally modelled security patterns can be found in APPENDIX A.  
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4.3.1 Single Access Point pattern in Codecharts  
 
Single Access Point (SAP) is one of the well-known security design patterns. It 
is implemented in many secured systems. Wassermann et al. [106] has described SAP 
using the common design patterns description catalogue. Table 4 abbreviated the 
pattern description from its original catalogue. In addition, Figure 23 illustrates the 
UML class diagram which has been used in the original catalogue to demonstrate the 
patterns structure and architecture.    
Table 4: Single Access Point pattern [106] (abbreviated) 
Intent Single Access Point pattern limits all communications form outside 
to one single interface in order to control and monitor. 
Structure The Single Access Point represents the systems’ only connection to 
the outside. All incoming communication requests are passed to the 
Single Access Point instance. From there, they will be directed to the 
intended recipient, if all security relevant requirements are met. …… 
The class Single Access Point (SAP) is the only one that interacts 
with external entities. 
Participants External Entities: they are components located outside the systems 
boundary. They contact the SAP in order to communicate with 
internal entities. Internal Entities: they are all components located 
inside the systems boundary. Single Access Point: it provides an 
interface that allows external parties to communicate with system 
internal components, gathers information about the occurring access 
requests, their origin and authorisation information, triggers actions 
or forwards data to parties inside the system. 
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Figure 23:UML class diagram: Single Access Point Pattern [106] 
 
As it can be seen from the diagram in Figure 23, not all the statements of the 
pattern structure and architecture are depicted in the diagram. For instance, the 
statement “The class Single Access Point (SAP) is the only one that interacts with 
external entities” demonstrates a security property which can be captured using 
Codecharts by means of exclusive operator (Exclamation symbol) as can be seen in 
Figure 24.  
Exclusive operator (Exclamation symbol) appears in Figure 24 on the Call 
relation symbol between the elements named Access and secureAction. It represents 
an important feature which can be used to present “Access Control” in security patterns.   
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Figure 24: Codecharts: Single Access Point pattern (SAP) 
 
Table 5  gives a brief description on the elements shown in Figure 24. This will 
clarify more on how Codecharts outperform UML the class diagram in depicting 
patterns architecture. Furthermore, abstraction in the description of the patterns 
structure is detailed in a misleading manner. For example, the “Internal Entities” are 
illustrated in Figure 23 by three named classes and operations in classes (CustomerDB, 
CustomerRecord, and ProductDB). This will be additionally solved when using 
Codecharts by means of class variables and signature variables as can be seen in Figure 
24. 
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Table 5: Explanation of tokens in Figure 24 
Class variables (Client, SAP, 
accessLog, InternalComponent, 
RecipientUnknownOrRecipient
Unavailable) 
Represent classes and interfaces. 
Binary relations (Call) Represent relation between components. 
Signatures variables (Access, 
SecureAction, logAccess, 
AvailabilityChecker, 
showMessage, createEntity) 
represent signatures of methods in classes 
A signature over a class 
(superimposition) 
is called a superimposition which represents a method. 
An example of such superimposition is Access 
superimposed on SAP which is a superimposition 
representing a method whose signature is Access and is 
in class SAP. 
! symbol  shown on the Call relation between Access 
(superimposed on SAP) and SecureAction 
(superimposed on InternalComponent) represent Left 
Exclusive operator which means if and only if 
SecureAction (superimposed on InternalComponent) is 
in Call relation and SecureAction (superimposed on 
InternalComponent) is the callee then the caller must be 
Access (superimposed on SAP). 
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4.3.2 Intercepting Validator pattern in Codecharts 
 
Intercepting Validator is also a well-known security design pattern. It has been 
introduced to solve the problems of requests that contain invalid or harmful data. One 
example of Intercepting validator application is the validator of SQL injections. So, the 
main aim of this pattern is to check the data before processing it in order to make sure 
that no attack codes are included in the requests. 
   Alur et al. [26] have described Intercepting validator pattern in their 
catalogue. Although the authors of this catalogue aimed to be as clear as possible with 
reserving the abstraction level of patterns, some ambiguity can be noticed in the 
catalogue. In addition, ambiguity can be noticed in the UML diagrams, which are used 
to describe patterns aspects. 
A UML class diagram is used to present the pattern structure and architecture. 
This diagram is shown in Figure 25. However, with a glance at Figure 25, it can be 
seen clearly that the diagram suffers from ambiguity. For instance, it can be seen that 
the SecureBaseAction class has a relation labelled “validates parameters” with the 
InterceptingValidator class. This relation can be interpreted differently by 
implementer. In addition, the diagrams only show classes (boxes) with nothing inside. 
Therefore, these are an ambiguous way to present the pattern. 
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Figure 25: UML class diagram: Intercepting Validator Pattern [26] 
Furthermore, it is important to ask whether the diagram reflects the description 
itself. The following quote is from the same pattern description which is used Figure 
25 to present the pattern structure. However, the level of object-oriented abstraction 
shown in the statements of the quote could not be presented. This is having an 
“abstract” Validator class to represent all types of validators. Even if this was shown, 
it would be shown using at least three tokens (validators), as can be seen in Figure 19.      
 “InterceptingValidator retrieves the appropriate validators according to the 
configuration for the target. InterceptingValidator invokes a series of validators as 
configured. Each Validator validates and scrubs the request data, if necessary.” [26] 
The aforementioned issues can be solved when using Codecharts. Therefore, 
the Intercepting Validator pattern description [26] has been analysed and the formal 
modelling of this pattern is introduced and demonstrated in Figure 26. Unlike Figure 
25, each element shown in Figure 26 does have only one meaning and a formal 
representation. This improves the precision; however, it does not impact the level of 
abstraction shown in the pattern description. 
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Figure 26: Codecharts: Intercepting Validator pattern 
As can be seen from Figure 26, the issues of modelling the abstraction in the 
pattern description formally, precisely, and concisely can be solved using the Hierarchy 
variable, which represents any set of classes that has a superclass. The other notations 
in Figure 26 are similar to the ones that have been explained earlier when Figure 24 
was discussed. However, for more details and explanations on the notations of 
Codecharts, these [38], [108] would provide a useful manual and references on 
Codecharts and LePUS3.        
 
4.3.3 Formality in the Codecharts of patterns 
 
Although Single Access Point and Intercepting Validator patterns shown in 
Figure 24 and Figure 26 are visually presented in Codecharts, this does not mean that 
these two types of modelling are not formal modelling.  Figure 27 illustrates the 
formality behind the visual modelling of SAP pattern shown in Figure 24. In addition, 
Figure 28 demonstrates the formalisation of the visual modelling of Intercepting 
Validator pattern shown in Figure 26. 
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Figure 27: LePUS3 and Class-Z schema of SAP 
 
 
Figure 28: LePUS3 and Class-Z schema of Intercepting Validator 
It is important to mention here that these formal schemas are not the outputs of 
Codecharts transformation. In fact, these are the formal face of the shown Codecharts. 
Furthermore, in order to auto-generate these schemas from the Codecharts, an 
advantage was taken of the TTP Toolkit [13], which is the tool support of Codecharts. 
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4.4 Summary  
 
In this chapter, issues in the current security patterns catalogues have been 
discussed. These are informality, lack of precision, and ambiguity. Furthermore, 
critical analysis has been shown in order to highlight and explain the reasons which 
might make Codecharts outperform other formal and informal representations of the 
structure of security design patterns.  
Furthermore, in this chapter, the methodology of formalising structures of 
security patterns from the original descriptions has been demonstrated. This includes 
showing the linkage of the descriptions statement with the LePUS3 formulas and 
Codecharts notations. Finally, the outcomes of using our methodology for formalising 
a number of security design patterns from different security patterns catalogues have 
been shown.  
The number of security design patterns formalised using Codecharts are more 
than 16 patterns. Single Access Point and Intercepting Validator have been shown and 
discussed in this chapter. However, more formally modelled security patterns can be 
found in APPENDIX A. The Codecharts of those patterns will be used as inputs for 
further investigation of the security patterns. The investigation will be carried out on 
analysing the relations among patterns, patterns variations, conformance checking, and 
pattern detection.    
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5 Variations in Security patterns and relations 
among patterns 
 
Note: some parts of this chapter were published in: 
Alzahrani, A.A.H., A.H. Eden, and M.Z. Yafi. 2014. ‘Structural Analysis of the 
Check Point Pattern’. In 2014 IEEE 8th International Symposium on Service Oriented 
System Engineering (SOSE), 404–8. doi:10.1109/SOSE.2014.56. 
 
Many issues exist in the current security pattern catalogues. For example, some 
of the current catalogues [9], [27], [109] describe the same patterns such as Single 
Access Point, Check Point, Full View With Error, and others; however, are the 
descriptions of the same patterns consistent? What are the consequences of not being 
consistent?  
Another issue, which exists in the current security catalogues, is the claims of 
relations among security patterns and with design patterns. These claims are often 
shown in a designated section, which is the patterns description template called 
“Related Pattern”. Indeed, it is useful to know what other patterns are related to the 
pattern at hand when studying a pattern. However, having these “strong” claims of 
relations without validating and investigating them might result in incorrect 
implementation of the patterns.  
Therefore, this chapter discusses the issues of the inconsistency of descriptions 
of the same patterns in security pattern catalogues. In addition, the problem, of the non-
validated claims of relations among security patterns and with design patterns, will be 
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highlighted and discussed. Our investigation of the above mentioned issues is 
conducted using Codecharts and a number of security patterns.     
5.1 Variations in Security patterns 
 
Security patterns are to be implemented at the end. Therefore, they have been 
described and shown in catalogues to allow any interested person to understand them 
and apply them in systems which need to overcome a security issue that patterns are 
authored for.   A number of security patterns catalogues are describing the same 
patterns. For instance, Single Access Point is described in [9], [27], [109]. However, 
are the descriptions consistent? 
Security patterns catalogues describe patterns differently. For example, one 
catalogue emphasises more in the description of Single Access Point on the structure 
[27]. Another emphasises more in the description of the pattern on the concrete 
application and dynamic behaviour [9]. Others emphasise more on showing the pattern 
as a part of a framework which combines a set of security patterns [109].   
Although each catalogue describes the pattern in a common template, the 
catalogues fail to be consistent in describing the same pattern. Inconsistency raises 
many issues such the issue of sharing the same understanding among the people 
involved in the system development life cycle. In order to ensure the correct 
implementation of a pattern, it is important that implementers, designers, security 
architects, verification and validation teams, and maintainers share the same 
understanding of the pattern. 
Furthermore, precision is important in reasoning out the security pattern. Here, 
the term ‘reasoning’ means the verification of the implementation of the pattern in the 
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source code. Moreover, when automating this verification process, the need for 
precision emerges again. Therefore, the current issue of inconsistency in describing the 
same patterns needs to be tackled.        
In order to tackle the above mentioned issues, the patterns need to be formalised 
with one of the formalisation languages. When aiming to formalise a pattern from one 
of the catalogues, it is important to know what to formalise. Obviously, security 
patterns catalogues share a similar description template [9], [26]–[28], [107], [109]. 
This template has two important sections which are the problem (pattern motivation) 
and the solution (pattern structure and behaviours).  
Formalisation of a security pattern focuses on the solution section for pattern 
description. This section gathers statements and often the UML diagram describing the 
patterns. The information in this section is used to understand and implement the 
pattern. Therefore, formalising the information in this section reflects formalising the 
pattern.  
In this research direction, Codecharts have been chosen for formalising the 
patterns. The choice of Codechart has been discussed and explained in former chapter 
in the section entitled Security Patterns Formalisation. However, it is important to 
mention here that the formalisation will be carried out on the static structure described 
in the solution section of the pattern description. A number of reasons are behind this. 
First, Codecharts are limited to formalise static structure. Second, formalising the 
structure of the pattern provides the base for behaviour formalisation. Third, the 
information about structure is richer than the information about behaviour as the former 
gathers much core information such as inheritance, dependency, production, etc.    
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Back to security patterns catalogues, it can be easily noticed that there are 
differences in the descriptions of the same pattern. Having Check Point Pattern as a 
case study, the pattern is described in [9] and [27] differently. Using Codecharts to 
formalise and analyse the pattern, it can be proven formally and visually that the pattern 
is not consistent in the two catalogues. This has led us to the term “pattern variant”.  A 
pattern variant can be regarded as a different version of a pattern which has been 
standardised in a number of security patterns catalogues.  
Bayley et al. [110] have addressed this issue of specifying patterns variants in 
their work of formalising design patterns using FOL and GEBNF. The authors have 
introduced an approach in order to improve on their previous work [111] of formalising 
structure of patterns. This approach was to improve on the accuracy on patters 
specifications as well as to tackle ambiguity in informal descriptions of patterns. 
Furthermore, it is used to reports on patterns variations. 
Bayley et al. introduced a use of a set of keywords to allow specifying a pattern 
and its variants. They keywords are: “Optional”, “Alternatives”, “Depends on”, and “In 
case of”. Each of which has a definition in their approach. Despite the fact that this 
approach offers a clearer way of specifying a pattern with all variants in ONE 
formalization, the specification of a pattern with variants is still textual. Moreover, 
without a good background in logic notations, these specifications cannot be unpacked. 
On the other hand, the research in this thesis aims to specify variants of security patterns 
using a visual, however, formal specification language (Codecharts). Visual notation 
allows easier understanding of patterns and the differences among variants. 
Furthermore, as these visual notations (Codecharts) are based on a formal foundation 
of FOL predicates, variants can be formally presented, analysed, and evolved.  
In addition, in the case of carrying rigorous reasoning (such as pattern 
detection), Bayley et al. formalization of any pattern needs to be unpack and variants 
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needs to be separated as reasoning would be conducted for each variant. Therefore, as 
the aim in this thesis is to use the formalization of patterns in order to detect patterns 
in the source code, the formalization in this thesis shows pattern variants separately. 
As a case study aimed to show the pattern variants, the Check Point Pattern, 
which is described in [9], has been studied in order to show the main difference in the 
structure of the pattern with the description in [27], Figure 29 and the following 
statement are taken from the description of the pattern. 
“This CHECK POINT interface corresponds to the abstract strategy in 
STRATEGY [GoF95]. The interface will provide hooks for I&A, authorization, 
handling unsuccessful attempts.” [9]. 
 
Figure 29: Check Point (with hierarchy) structure [9] 
The description has been analysed and formalised using Codecharts. The results 
of the analysis and the formalisation of the pattern are shown in Figure 30.  When 
Looking at the Codecharts shown in Figure 30 (which formalises the pattern described 
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in [9]) and the Codecharts shown in Figure 31 (which formalises the pattern described 
in [27]), the difference can be clearly and visually seen between the pattern’s variants. 
Check Point pattern has another variant which is with a hierarchy of “Concrete Check 
Point” as described in [9]. 
 
Figure 30: Codechart: Check Point pattern with hierarchy 
 
 
Figure 31: Codecharts: Check Point pattern (CP) 
 
The Check Point patterns in the two catalogue in [9] and [27] are the same in general, 
however, they differ in a number of aspects when modelling them formally using 
Codecharts on the two descriptions. Starting with the similarity between them, first, the 
Check Point patterns in the two catalogues describe a participant called “CheckPoint” 
which implements a method for checking the received requests to authenticate and/or 
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authorize the sender of the request. In addition, “CheckPoint” employs a “Policy” to 
carry out the authentication and authorization. Furthermore, they describe a 
“CounterMeasure” action that is triggered based on the results of the checking. 
Moving to the differences between the Check Point patterns in the two catalogues, first, 
Schumacher et al. [9] Check Point variant in (Figure 30) demonstrates the 
encapsulation of “Policy” in the “CheckPoinHrc” participant as it does not regard it as 
a separate class, whereas, Wassermann et al. [27]  pattern (Figure 31) separates it from 
the “CheckPoint” participant (with the class variable called “Policy”). Second, 
Schumacher et al. [9] Check Point variant in (Figure 30) defines an interface (Hierarchy 
notation) for “CheckPoinHrc” participant to allow implementing any number of 
“CheckPoint” each with a special policy entity, whereas, Wassermann et al. [27]  
pattern (Figure 31) does not allow such generality. It is important to mention that the 
“Call+” in Wassermann et al. [27]  pattern (Figure 31) is a mean of generality in the 
pattern as the “+” denotes that the relations can be either direct or indirect, whereas, 
the “Call” and Schumacher et al. [9] Check Point variant in (Figure 30) restrict the 
relations to be only direct “Call” relations.  
The method named “CheckRequest”, which is responsible for checking the 
incoming request of access in Figure 30, does not directly trigger the countermeasure 
action; instead, it delegates this to another method in the concrete object of 
“CheckPointHrc” named “TriggerAction”. Whereas, the Check Point pattern in Figure 
31 includes the responsibility of triggering the countermeasure actions in the method 
of checking which is named “Check” in the class “CheckPoint”. 
In the Check Point variants shown in Figure 30 and Figure 31, the 
countermeasure are modelled as a class despite the naming used as these as just 
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variables names base on the Codecharts notations (white box is a viable 
class).  However, the difference between variants in the countermeasure is that the 
variant in Figure 30 specify two different points that variant in Figure 31 does not do. 
The first point is that “CounterMeasure” class has a set of methods (“Trigger”) that 
each method in this set represents an action which can be called by “TriggerAction”, 
whereas, the pattern variant shown in Figure 31  specify that the 
countermeasure  (“Action”) class has only one method (“Trigger”) which represents 
the action to be triggered The second point is that “TriggerAction” can call any method 
in the set of methods  “Trigger”  which are defined in the class “CounterMeasure”.   
 
Moreover, from the formal specifications shown in Figure 32 and Figure 33, 
which translate the two Codecharts (Figure 30 and Figure 31) into LePUS3 and Class-
Z formulas and specifications, the differences can be formally proven and shown. 
Consequently, it can be proven that the catalogues are not consistent and the two 
descriptions [9], [27] of the same pattern (Check Point pattern) are offering two variants 
of the pattern.     
 
Figure 32: LePUS3 and Class-Z schema of Check Point Codechart shown in Figure 31  
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Figure 33: LePUS3 and Class-Z schema of Check Point Codechart shown in Figure 30 
With the above, it can be shown that using Codecharts can help depict the 
variants of the same pattern. This would assure that the same understanding of the 
pattern would be shared among the people involved in the development life cycle of 
any system in whose source code security patterns will be implemented, verified, 
maintained, and/or documented in its source code. Codecharts can be used as a formal 
input for an automating tool to reason out the patterns in a source code. One instance 
of this automated reasoning is the detection of the patterns from the source code.  
 
5.2 Relations among security patterns and other design patterns 
 
Relations among security patterns and with design patterns are often described 
in security patterns catalogues. In the catalogues [9], [26]–[28], [107], [109], the 
common pattern description template refers to the relation of the pattern at hand with 
other patterns in the designated subsection called “Related Patterns”. It is important to 
validate and explain these claimed relations among patterns in order to select and 
implement the patterns [2], [33], [112]–[114].  
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Many researchers [2], [33], [112]–[114] have proposed their approaches to find 
these relations either manually or automatically by investigating and studying the 
similarity among security and design patterns descriptions. However, validations of the 
actual relations are not covered sufficiently. Furthermore, the work done up-to-date is 
introducing more claims about relations among patterns.   
Most of the studies [2], [33], [112]–[114] on relations among patterns are to 
check the similarity of patterns to one another. The similarity is calculated and claimed 
based on the comparison between the patterns descriptions sections such as Problem, 
Context, Forces, and/or Related Patterns sections.  
Bayley et al. [115] have introduced their approach for formalising the relation 
of composition between design patterns. In order to do so, the authors have employs 
GEBNF in order to specify patterns separately, then introduced a set of operators to 
formalise the different kinds of compositions. The operators, which the authors have 
defined, are: Restriction operator, Superposition operator, Extension operator, Flatten 
operator, Generalisation operator, Lift operator. As a case study to demonstrate the 
approach, the authors have formalise the composition relation between Builder and 
Composite patterns as described in [18]. 
Similarly, this thesis aims to investigate the relations among patterns, however, 
there are a number of differences between Bayley et al. approach and this thesis 
approach. First, Bayley et al. approach aims to formalise the composition relations 
among patterns, whereas, this thesis aims to formalise and investigate all claims for 
relations generalisation, concrete cases, implementation, and composition relations. 
Current case studies of Bayley et al. approach are considering the relations among the 
design patterns only and in particular design patterns of [18] book, whereas, this thesis 
102 | P a g e  
 
case studies focus on security patterns and their relations with design patterns ([18] 
book) and other security patterns from different sources. 
Although Bayley et al. approach formalizations of composition are formal, they 
are still textual. On the other hand, this thesis employs the use of visual formalisation 
(Codecharts) in order to formalise the patterns separately, then formalise the 
composition relations visually and formally by the means of   formal schemas as can 
be seen in Figure 35 and Figure 36.  
In addition, in this thesis, validating the results of formalisation of the case 
studies is considered and done by the detection approach and reasoning on found 
instances of composition formalisation by use of TTP Toolkit verifier, whereas, this is 
not considered in Bayley et al. approach.    
The used method to study and validate the claims of relations among patterns 
can be summarised as follows: first, claims of relations among patterns are gathered 
from patterns catalogues; second, patterns are formalised using Codecharts or imported 
if already formalised patterns in Codecharts. After having the claims gathered and the 
patterns formalised in Codecharts, a visual comparison between patterns is made. 
Finally, a formal comparison is carried out using Codecharts and LePUS3 and Class-Z 
schemas as has been shown in the previous section when comparing Figure 32 and 
Figure 33. 
An example of claims of relations is the relation between Check Point security 
pattern and the Strategy design pattern. The below gathered claims show that the Check 
Point pattern has a strong relation with the strategy pattern [9], [109]. However, using 
Codecharts, the claims of relations among patterns have investigated in order to 
validate them.  
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 “This CHECK POINT interface corresponds to the abstract strategy in 
STRATEGY [GoF95]. The interface will provide hooks for I&A, 
authorization, handling unsuccessful attempts.” [9, p. 291] 
 “CHECK POINT uses STRATEGY [GoF95] for gaining flexibility in 
application security”. [9, p. 296] 
 “Key feature of Check Point is that the security policy can be changed in a 
single place. In this way, the Check Point algorithm is a Strategy [GHJV 
95].” [109, p. 8] 
 “The Check Point algorithm uses a Strategy for application security.”[109, p. 
10] 
 
 
 
So, now claims of relations among patterns have been gathered and the Check 
Point pattern formalised in Codecharts according the pattern description in the sources 
of the claims. The Check Point variant is shown in Figure 30. Regarding the strategy 
design pattern, the already formalised pattern using Codechart from [38] as shown in 
Figure 34 can be imported. 
 
 
Figure 34: Codechart: Strategy pattern [38] 
From the two formalised patterns in Codecharts, it can be seen clearly that 
Check Point does not include a complete implementation of the Strategy pattern. Figure 
30 and Figure 34 show that the patterns in fact differ substantially. In particular, the 
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Strategy pattern as described in [18] includes at least three constraints that are missing 
from the Check Point pattern, highlighted in red in Figure 34:  
• The context class has a member (attribute or field) of type AbstractStrategy, 
whereas the SingleAccessPoint is not expected to have a member of type 
AbstractCheckPoint. 
• The set of dynamically-bound algorithm methods defined in the Strategies 
hierarchy call methods in the interface of context, whereas the set of dynamically-
bound Check methods defined in the CheckPointHrc hierarchy are not expected to 
call methods in the SingleAccessPoint class 
• The dynamically-bound algorithm methods defined in the Strategies hierarchy 
take the context as a formal argument whereas the set of dynamically-bound Check 
methods defined in the CheckPointHrc hierarchy are not expected to take 
SingleAccessPoint as a formal argument. 
It is beneficial to explain the meaning of the greying out notation (Interface) 
shown in Figure 34. By looking at Codecharts vocabulary illustrated in Figure 5, it can 
be seen that this notation is a 1-dim signature variable which denotes a set of methods, 
defined in the Context Class, that can be called by the dynamically-bound algorithm 
methods, defined in the Strategies Hierarchy. The Call relation between these two 
variables (Interface on Context and Algorithms on Strategies) is derived from the 
following statements in [18] in participants section of Strategy pattern description.  
 “Context:  may define an interface that lets Strategy access its data” 
[18] Page 351  
 “Context must define a more elaborate interface to its data which 
couples Strategy and Context more closely” [18] Page 354 
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It can be concluded that the Check Point security pattern variants in [9], [109] 
share the idea of having a set of “Checking” strategies; however, the Strategy pattern 
[18] imposes more constraints than the Check Point variant in [9], [109]. This leads us 
to the conclusion that, on the claims shown above, the Check Point pattern does not 
make a full use of the Strategy pattern. Furthermore, attaching the Check the Point 
pattern to the Strategy pattern might mislead to incorrect implementation of the Check 
Point pattern when following the descriptions that claim the use of the Strategy pattern 
in the Check Point pattern. 
An example of claims of composition relations among security patterns is the 
relation between the Single Access Point pattern and the Check Point pattern. A number 
of security patterns catalogues [9], [27], [109] claim the relation between these two 
patterns. The next quotes from those catalogues show the claims of the relation between 
the Single Access Point pattern and the Check Point pattern. 
  “CHECK POINT (287) defines the interface to be supported by concrete 
implementations to provide the I&A service to the SINGLE ACCESS 
POINT (279)”. [9, p. 289] 
 “SINGLE ACCESS POINT (279) usually calls CHECK POINT (287), 
providing a client’s identification and the authentication information they 
provided.” [9, p. 291] 
 “The Check Point Security Pattern enforces the current security policy, by 
monitoring the traffic passing the Single Access Point.” [27, p. 26] 
 “Single Access Point is predestined to be combined with a Check Point.” 
[27, p. 28] 
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 “The implementation of Check Point combines several patterns. Single 
Access Point is used to ensure that security checks are performed correctly 
and that no initial security checks are skipped.” [109, p. 8] 
 
In order to test and validate the above claims, the patterns were formalised using 
Codecharts as shown in Figure 24, Figure 31, and Figure 30. The descriptions used to 
formalise the patterns are the same descriptions [9], [27], [109] where the claims of the 
relation are taken from. It can be seen that the aim is to validate the claims for relations 
of two Check Point pattern variants (Figure 30 and Figure 31) with one Single Access 
Point pattern variant (Figure 24). This is due to the fact that the Single Access Point 
variant in [9] is not complete and could not be formalised as an essential part of the 
pattern variant is described imprecisely using statements such as “Protect the boundary 
of your system.”. Such statements combine two important aspects of the pattern. These 
aspects are the protection and the system boundary. It is obvious that the statement is 
ambiguous and imprecise especially when combined with other statements in the same 
description. 
Having the patterns formalised in Codecharts, it can be visually noticed that the 
patterns have a particular participant in common called “Client”. The Check Point 
variant shown in Figure 30 also has this participant; however, it has been named as 
“SingleAccessPoint”, which is actually playing the same role of “Client” in others 
which are shown in Figure 24, Figure 30, and Figure 31.    
With the participant in common in the patterns at hand and with the above 
claims of relations, it is possible to link the Check Point pattern and the Single Access 
Point pattern using this participant “Client”. The results of the linkage are a new pattern 
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which compose the two patterns as shown in Figure 35.  Although this diagram 
demonstrates the visual linkage between the two patterns, formality is not absent as 
Figure 36 shows the formal representation of the Codecharts shown in Figure 35. 
 
 
Figure 35: Codecharts: Single Access Point & Check Point patterns 
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Figure 36: LePUS3 and Class-Z schema of Single Access Point & Check Point patterns  
The Check Point pattern variant, shown in Figure 31, is selected to be linked 
with the Single Access Point pattern. The main reason for this is that the selected 
pattern variant separates the “Policy” participant from the “CheckPoint” participant. 
This itemise more on the participants of the patterns when studying the composition of 
patterns together. In addition, this pattern variant has been checked and verified to be 
implemented in an open source code. The checking of this variant is shown in the 
section entitled “Check Point pattern in JAAS” in this document. Moreover, the Single 
Access Point pattern has been checked and verified to be implemented in the same open 
source code. The checking of Single Access Point pattern is shown in the section 
entitled “Single Access Point pattern in JAAS” also in this document. 
Having modelling of  Figure 35 of the composition of the two patterns, the 
claim, which states that the two patterns are often composed together, has been put 
under investigation. In order to complete the investigation, the followings have been 
used: the Codecharts (Figure 35) of the two patterns, the source code that the patterns 
are proven to be implemented in separately, and our pattern detection algorithm in order 
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to find the new pattern (Figure 35), which composed the two patterns together, and to 
check whether the patterns are composed together. 
The main findings of our investigation are strengthening the claims of the 
relations between the Single Access Point pattern and the Check Point pattern. They 
especially strengthen the claims which show that the patterns are often composed 
together. This case study is shown in the section entitled “Single Access Point & Check 
Point in JAAS”. In addition, from the results of the case study, the claims can be 
evidently supported and it can be said that the Single Access Point pattern has a strong 
relation with the Check Point pattern as whenever the Check Point is implemented, the 
Single Access Point is also implemented with it. 
5.3 Summary  
 
In conclusion, this chapter has discussed the security pattern variations and the 
inconsistency of the descriptions of the same pattern as the cause of the variations. This 
has been illustrated with an example of Check Point security pattern variations in 
different security patterns catalogues. In addition, this chapter has discussed the 
relations among security patterns and with the design pattern. A number of examples 
of such claims of relations have been shown such as relations between the Check Point 
security pattern and the Strategy design pattern, and relations between the Single 
Access Point and the Check Point patterns. Using Codecharts, some of those claims of 
relations have investigated and validated. 
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6 Case Studies:  Formalisation and manual 
conformance checking of security patterns 
 
Note: some parts of this chapter were published in: 
1. Alzahrani, A.A.H., A.H. Eden, and M.Z. Yafi. 2014. ‘Structural Analysis of the 
Check Point Pattern’. In 2014 IEEE 8th International Symposium on Service 
Oriented System Engineering (SOSE), 404–8. doi:10.1109/SOSE.2014.56. 
2. Alzahrani, Abdullah AH, Amnon H. Eden, and Majd Zohri Yafi. "Conformance 
checking of Single Access Point pattern in JAAS using Codecharts." 
Information Technology and Computer Applications Congress (WCITCA), 
2015 World Congress on. IEEE, 2015.. 
 
 
This chapter describes a number of case studies which have been conducted to 
check the design conformance (design verification) of a number of security patterns in 
some open source java-based implementations. The case studies were manually 
conducted to find and check conformance of instances of security patterns in source 
codes that are claimed to implement the patterns. The reason behind these case studies 
is to evaluate the possibility of automating (and the need for automating) patterns 
instance finding (or pattern detection). In addition, the case studies are to test the use 
of Codecharts for formal modelling and conformance verification of security patterns. 
In this chapter, first, the manual conformance checking (verification) process is 
explained. In addition, the open source codes, which are used in the case studies, are 
briefly described. Second, a number of case studies are shown and explained. Finally, 
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the chapter is completed by a discussion of the results and the benefits offered by 
manual conformance checking of security patterns. 
         
6.1 Manual conformance checking of security patterns  
 
Manual conformance checking of security patterns generally refers to a human 
involvement to help with checking the conformance of patterns in a source code. This 
includes two phases. The first phase includes a manual analysis of the source code and 
the documentation if available. The process in this phase requires a human to study a 
source code (which has been claimed to implement a security pattern) line by line in 
order to understand the code and its components.  
The second phase is manually finding code components which have relations 
that resemble the pattern’s participants and relations. This phase includes a number of 
sub processes. First, after using the TTP Toolkit to extract the model of the studied 
source code, human interaction is needed to decide on the linkage between the source 
code components and the pattern participants. Second, a manual creation of 
assignments (mapping) between the pattern’s participants and the code components 
will be the next. Figure 46 shows an example of these assignments which are manually 
created. Finally, sending the assignments to TTP Toolkit verifier manually is required 
in order to verify the design conformance of the pattern in the source code.    
The TTP Toolkit [38]; [13] is used for model extraction of the source codes. In 
addition, it is used to verify the design conformance using the manually created 
assignments from the Codecharts of the pattern to the source code. Moreover, it has 
been used to visualise the model of the source code and the instances of patterns.  
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The TTP Toolkit is used for round-trip software engineering for OO programs. 
This system is developed by a software engineering team at the School of Computer 
Science and Electronic Engineering at the University of Essex. It supports software 
modelling, automated design verification (conformance checking) and design recovery.  
After having the security pattern formalised using Codecharts as shown in the 
chapter entitled “Security Patterns Formalisation”, claims stating that some well-
known systems’ implementations apply/implement these patterns have been traced. 
Some claims were found and the source code of implementations, mentioned in the 
claims, were searched for. Next, the TTP Toolkit has been used to extract the models 
for these source codes.  
6.2 Open source software for the Case studies 
 
In the following, the main open source implementation which is used in this 
section’s case studies is briefly described and discussed. Three main open source codes 
are used in the case studies. These open source codes are JAAS, Log4J, and Java 
Apache Struts. These implementations are written in Java programming language. This 
allowed the case studies to be conducted as the current version on the TTP Toolkit only 
supports model extraction of the Java-based source code. However, the TTP Toolkit 
was designed to be extendable for any object-oriented programing language.  
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 JAAS 
Java Authentication and Authorisation Service (JAAS) is the Java 
implementation of the Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) framework originally 
developed for Sun's Solaris operating system. It is a standard for providing application-
level security. In addition, it has been integrated as a package into Java SDK 1.4v. 
JAAS provides a useful pluggable framework which can be configured to offer 
authentication and authorisation services [26], [116], [117]. 
 
 Log4J 
Log4j is a widely known and used Java-based logging utility written and used 
in Java programing languages. It was first introduced in 1996 and is freely available at 
http://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/. Log4J provides an API logging facility. In 
addition, it allows store logging output in a permanent place. This allows further studies 
of the log afterward. Log4j is designed to be reliable, simple, and easy to understand 
and use [118], [119]. 
 
 Java Apache Struts 
Java Apache Struts is an MVC (Model-View-Controller) framework developed 
using Java programming language. In addition, it is a free and open-source framework 
and a part of the Apache Software Foundation project. Apache Struts allows 
programmers to develop contemporary web application. It provides support for the uses 
of REST, AJAX and JSON. The source code of Apache Struts is freely available for 
downloading at https://struts.apache.org/ [120], [121]. 
114 | P a g e  
 
6.3 Case studies results 
 
The following are some examples of the case studies on manual conformance 
checking of security patterns in some source codes which are claimed to implement the 
patterns. Java-based source codes were the focus in the case studies as the current 
version of the TTP Toolkit allows only the extraction of the model of Java-based source 
codes. 
 
6.3.1 Intercepting Validator in Apache Struts 
 
Alur et al. [26] have claimed that the Intercepting Validator pattern has been 
implemented in Apache Struts. As shown in the chapter entitled “Security Patterns 
Formalisation”, the pattern has been formally modelled using Codecharts and Figure 
26 illustrates the Codecharts of the pattern. With the claim of implementation and the 
Codecharts of the pattern, a case study of manual conformance checking of the pattern 
in Apache Struts was conducted and an instance was found. 
Figure 37 visualises the manually found instance of the Intercepting Validator 
pattern. As it can be seen, the instance contains a 1-dim hierarchy constant called 
“validators” which was manually created. It consists of three classed in Apache Struts, 
namely ActionValidatorManager, DefualtActionValidatorManager, and 
AnnotationActionValidatorManager. Figure 38 illustrates the classes that construct the 
hierarchy of “validators” which has ActionValidatorManager as the superclass for the 
other classes.  
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Figure 37: Codechart: An instance of Intercepting Validator Pattern in Apache Struts 
Looking at the instance in Figure 37, the 1-dim hierarchy constant called 
“validators” practically demonstrates the benefits of using Codecharts to model the 
abstraction in patterns as “validators” can have any number of subclasses of the 
superclass ActionValidatorManager. In addition, it can be noticed that the class 
ValidationInterceptor is playing the role of two participants in the pattern, namely 
SecureActionBase and InterceptingValidator. This ability allows finding the instances 
of a pattern when some roles of the pattern’s participants are encapsulated in one 
component in the source code.  
 
 
Figure 38: Manually-defined higher-dimension entities (hierarchy) (Intercepting Validator - 
Apache Struts) 
In order to verify the design conformance of the instance (Figure 37) found in 
Apache Struts of the Intercepting Validator pattern, an assignment from the pattern to 
the source code components was manually created in the TTP Toolkit.  Figure 39 shows 
this assignment (mapping). Then the TTP Toolkit verifier was used to verify the 
instance and the assignment. Figure 40 illustrates the results from the TTP Toolkit 
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verifier. As can be seen in Figure 40, both the instance (Figure 37) and the assignment 
(Figure 39) have passed the design verification according to the TTP Toolkit verifier. 
 
Figure 39: Manually created assignment of Intercepting Validator Pattern in Apache Struts 
 
 
 
Figure 40: Verification Result of Intercepting Validator Pattern instance in Apache Struts 
 
6.3.2 Secure Logger in Java Logging API 
 
 Alur et al. [26], in their catalogue, claimed that the Secure Logger is 
implemented in Java Logging API (Log4J). In addition, in this research, the same 
catalogue was used to formally model the structure of the pattern. However, the Secure 
Logger case study is a special case among all case studies. It was more appropriate to 
articulate the result as “Partially-Passed”. In the source code, the pattern was partially 
implemented. This was due to the absence of the participant (Figure 41) called “Secure 
Logger” and superimposition on it called “Log”.  
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Figure 41: Codecharts: Secure Logger pattern 
Apart from the absence of “Secure Logger”, all the participants, 
superimpositions, and relations were implemented and could be found in the source 
code as shown in Figure 42. Regarding the “Create” relation shown in the pattern 
(Figure 41) from “getHandler” to “Handler”, the “Produce” relation in the instance 
(Figure 42) is reflecting the same meaning as any “Produce” relation between two 
components in the source code (getHandler and Handler[]) has to be, first, in the 
“Create” relation [108]. Therefore, this relation is satisfied in the instance found in the 
pattern. 
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Figure 42: Codechart: An instance of Secure Logger Pattern in Java Logging API 
When the manual analysis of the Java Logging API (Log4J) was completed and 
an incomplete instance of the pattern was found, an assignment (mapping) from the 
pattern to the source code components was manually created using the TTP Toolkit as 
shown in Figure 43. This was for design conformance verification of the detected 
instance. The TTP Toolkit verifier, then, was used to check the detected instance 
conformance to parts of the pattern. These parts were missing the participants “Client”, 
“Secure Logger”, superimpositions of “Request” over “Client”, superimpositions of 
“Log” over “Secure Logger”, and the relation among them as shown in Figure 41.  
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Figure 43: Manually created assignment of Secure Logger Pattern in Java Logging API 
The results of verifying the assignment, Figure 43, from the pattern to the source 
code components was “Passed” as can be seen in Figure 44. However, as explained 
earlier, the assignment was to map some participants of the pattern to components in 
the source code. Therefore, the pattern is not implemented completely in Log4J. So, it 
is concluded that the pattern is “Partially-implemented” in Log4J.      
 
 
Figure 44: Verification Result of Secure Logger Pattern instance in Java Logging API 
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6.3.3 Single Access Point pattern in JAAS 
 
This case study shows an investigation of an implementation of a Single Access 
Point (SAP) in JAAS. The case study is to search for an instance of an implementation 
of the pattern in the source code of JAAS. Many researchers [9], [26], [106]  claimed 
that SAP is implemented in Login services which JAAS is one of and/or is used in.  
With the claim, the source code of JAAS [116], and the SAP pattern Codecharts (Figure 
24), a manual search for an instance of SAP in JAAS was carried out.  
 The main feature in SAP Codecharts is the modelling of the secured 
component. This is done using the Exclusive Operator (Exclamation symbol) on the 
relations with secured component or participants. This has been discussed in the section 
entitled “Single Access Point pattern in Codecharts” in “Security Patterns 
Formalisation” chapter. This feature allows controlling the access and allow only one 
component of the code to access the secured component.  
Figure 45 shows the detected instance of SAP in JAAS. It can be noticed that 
the role of secureAction (which is a component whose access should be controlled) is 
played by “Subject()” in the class “Subject”. This means that there is no method in any 
class of JAAS calling “Subject()” in the class “Subject” except “login()” in the class 
“LoginContext”.       
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Figure 45: Codechart: An instance of SAP in JAAS 
In order to verify the detected instance (which uses Exclusive Operator) of SAP 
in JAAS, the TTP Toolkit was used to manually create assignment (mapping) from the 
SAP Pattern to the source code components. Figure 46 illustrates this assignment, while 
Figure 47 shows the verification results of the TTP Toolkit verifier of the instance and 
the assignment shown in Figure 45 and Figure 46, respectively.    
 
 
Figure 46: Manually created assignment of SAP in JAAS 
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Figure 47: Verification Result of SAP instance in JAAS  
The verification results of the TTP Toolkit verifier shown in Figure 47 
demonstrate that the instance found in JAAS passed the design conformance check 
against the SAP specifications in the Codecharts shown in Figure 24. This includes a 
check and assurance of that, in JAAS source code, only “login()” in the class 
“LoginContext” is calling “Subject()” in the class “Subject”. 
6.4 Discussion  
 
It can be seen from Figure 37, Figure 42, and Figure 45 that instances of the 
investigated patterns are found. Moreover, these instances are verified using the TTP 
Toolkit verifier as illustrated in Figure 40, Figure 44, and Figure 47. The verifications 
for the patterns were carried out using the Assignments (mappings) from a pattern to 
the source code components. These assignments are illustrated in Figure 39, Figure 43, 
and Figure 46.  
In this chapter, a number of case studies on manual design conformance 
checking of security patterns were shown. However, for more case studies, APPENDIX 
B shows more results.  In order to summarise the above case studies and other case 
studies (APPENDIX B), Table 6 indicates the main findings and results of the case 
studies. It is obvious from the table that for each pattern an instance is found in the 
searched source code. Furthermore, these instances were verified and they passed the 
design conformance verification.  
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Table 6: Security Patterns Design Conformance Checking results 
Open source 
 
 
Pattern 
JAAS Apache Struts Java Logging (API) – Log4J 
SAP Passed - - 
Check Point Passed - - 
Secure Architecture Passed - - 
Secure Logger - - Partially-Passed  
Intercepting Validator - Passed - 
 
As the case studies were manually conducted to find instances of the patterns 
from the source code, the time spent was important to calculate. Therefore, Table 7 
illustrates the time spent on each case study. The time is shown in hours and explains 
time is spent on reading the source code line by line and the documentations of the 
source code when available, as well as exploring the extracted model of the source 
code. It is obvious that 115 hours makes around 5 days. This shows the extensive effort 
to find an instance of each security pattern under consideration in a source code. 
Consequently, a motivation to automate this process is generated.       
Table 7: Time spent on case studies 
Open source 
 
 
Pattern 
JAAS Apache Struts Java Logging (API) – Log4J 
SAP 20 hours - - 
Check Point 12 hours - - 
Secure Architecture 48 hours - - 
Secure Logger - - 16 hours  
Intercepting Validator - 19 hours - 
Total time  115 hours 
 
With the large amount of time taken to conduct the case studies, one instance is 
found in each pattern case study. Although the results are sought after, they lack in 
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comprehension. This is due to the obvious investigation question which could be asked. 
The question is “Is this instance the only instance of a pattern in the given source 
code?”. The case studies do not answer this question. Moreover, in order to answer this 
question, more time is needed for studying the source code.  
However, the manual design conformance of security patterns offers a number 
of benefits, one of which is the ability of finding incomplete implementation of 
patterns. This is demonstrated in the case study of Secure Logger. Another benefit is 
recognising the component (in the source code) that plays the roles of more than one 
participant of a pattern. This is shown in the case studies of the Intercepting Validator 
pattern and Secure Logger. 
6.5 Summary 
 
In conclusion, these case studies consume a considerable amount of time as they 
need a full manual analysis of the source code. Furthermore, they do not show all the 
instances of a pattern in a source code. These two issues (time and number of instances) 
are the motivation behind this research’s second direction, which is pattern detection. 
Furthermore, the case studies practically showed the needs of automatic approach for 
finding instances of a given pattern in a given source code as well as for automatically 
generating the mappings from the patterns’ participants to the source code components. 
In addition, as using the TTP Toolkit was manual, the need of automatic use emerges. 
This last thing is to complete the circle of automatic pattern finding. So, the second 
direction of this research is to automatically search for a given pattern in a given source 
code, automatically generate the mappings (Assignments) from the pattern to instances, 
and automatically verify the instances design conformance using the TTP Toolkit. 
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7 Pattern Detection 
 
 
 
This chapter will discuss the pattern detection theoretical side. The section will 
begin with a clear problem definition statement. Next, all the terminologies and 
notational conventions which will be used will be clarified. After this, the brute force 
solution for the pattern detection problem will be shown in the respective section.  
In addition, this chapter will show our pattern detection solution and discuss the 
notion of minimising the search space in the source code. Our solution will be shown 
as an algorithm. Moreover, the theoretical comparison analysis between the pattern 
detection solutions will be made and explained.  
Furthermore, in this chapter, the proof of our pattern detection algorithm will 
be shown and explained. Finally, the implementation of our pattern detection algorithm 
will elaborated. This includes illustrating the integration of it in the TTP Toolkit.   
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7.1 Terminology 
 
1. Specification	Ψ (open specification) is on a par with a set of open formulas ݂ in 
the predicate calculus [38, p. 183].  
2. Design model   [38, p. 230] LePUS3 Definition VII. is a triple ै = {ॼ∗,ℝ, I} 
where 
 ॼ∗ ≜	ॼ଴⨄	ॼଵ	⨄… .⨄	ॼୢ is the universe of ै where each ॼ୩ is a finite 
set of entities of dimension k and d is some small natural number (usually 
no greater than 3) 
 ℝ is a set of relations (Definition II) including the unary relations Class, 
Method, Signature, and Abstract and the binary relations Inherit, 
Member, Produce, Call, Return, Forward, and SignatureOf.   
 I is an interpretation function which maps some constant terms 
(Definition VI) to entities in ॼ∗.  
3. An assignment ݃ from Ψ into a ै is a function ݃ mapping each free variable in 
Ψ to a constant in Iୢ୭୫ୟ୧୬  [38, p. 232] LePUS3 Definition XIV. 
4. Iୢ୭୫ୟ୧୬      is a domain of interpretation function [38, p. 230] LePUS3 Definition 
VII. 
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7.2 Notational conventions  
 
1. Φ[x/v] stands for the consistent replacement of free variable v in Φ with  x  
2. ݀݅݉(ݔ)	is the dimension of x 
3. ݁ଵ, ݁ଶ, …	entities  
4. ݒଵ,ݒଶ, … variables 
5. Vஏ 	 ∶= 	{ݒଵ,ݒଶ, … , ݒ௞}|{ݒ௜}௜ୀଵ…௞   is free variables in some ݂ ∈ Ψ 
6. We say ै satisfies Ψ, written  ै ⊨ Ψ, iff there exists some mapping g such that 
ै	 ⊨୥ Ψ  
7. ݂ ∶≝
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
ܷ݊ܽݎݕܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊(ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊)
ܤ݅݊ܽݎݕܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊(ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊,ܴܽ݊݃݁)	
ܣܮܮ(ܷ݊ܽݎݕܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊,ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊)
ܱܶܶܣܮ(ܤ݅݊ܽݎݕܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊,ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊,ܴܽ݊݃݁)
ܫܱܵܯܱܴܲܪܫܥ(ܤ݅݊ܽݎݕܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊,ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊,ܴܽ݊݃݁) 
8. 〈݈ଵ:ݔଵ, . . ݈௞:ݔ௞〉 stands for a labelled tuple. 
9. Given ݎ = 〈ߙଵ: ݔଵ, . .ߙ௡:ݔ௡〉	ܽ݊݀	ܿ = 〈ߚଵ:ݕଵ, . .ߚ௠:ݕ௠〉	ݐℎ݁݊ 
o ݎ ⋅ ܿ ∶= 〈ߙଵ:ݔଵ, . .ߙ௡: ݔ௡,ߚଵ:ݕଵ, . .ߚ௠:ݕ௠〉  
and  
o ݎ.ߙ௜ ∶= 〈ߙ௜: ݔ௜〉	ݓℎ݁ݎ݁	1 ≤ ݅ ≥  
and  
o ݎ[ߙ௜] ∶= ݔ௜  
and  
o ݎ = ܿ	iff ݊ = ݉	ܽ݊݀	{ߙ௜ = ߚ௜}	ܽ݊݀	{ݔ௜ = ݕ௜}	݂݋ݎ	݅ = 1 …݊ 
o ܮ௥ ∶= {ߙ௜}௜ୀ଴→௡ 
10. Given ܻ ∶= {ݎ}		ݐℎ݁݊		ܮ௒ = ܮ௥ 	 
11. ݃: Vஏ → {ܿ[ݒ௜]}௜ୀଵ…|୚ಇ|	ݏݑܿℎ	ݐℎܽݐ	݃(ݒ௜) ∶= ܿ[ݒ௜] 
12. Vஏ଴ ∶= 	{ݒ ∈ Vஏ| dim(ݒ) = 0}    
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13. Vஏଵ 	 ∶= 	{ݒ ∈ Vஏ| dim(ݒ) = 1}    
Notes: 
 Definition 9 is to describe the handling of the labelled tuples in different 
processes such as joining labelled tuples by checking the values which has the 
same labels, retrieving the value in a tuple with its label.  
 Definition 10 shows that if {ݎ} is a set labelled tuples and has been copied into 
ܻ then  ܮ௒ (which is the set of the labels) will be the same of the ܮ௥ . 
 Definition 11 is showing the mean of assignment ݃ that is used to replace each 
variable ݒ in the specification Ψ with a found entity ܿ from the model of the 
source code. 
 Definition 12 and 13 describe the sets that will contain the free variables shown 
in the according to their dimensions as the variables of dim-1 are the notations 
of set of classes, signatures, and hierarchies, whereas, the variables of dim-0 are 
the notations of classes and signatures. 
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7.3 Brute force pattern detection algorithm and complexity  
 
In this section, Table 8    shows the brute force solution for the problem of 
pattern detection, which has been defined in the introduction section of this document. 
Next, the inputs and the expected outputs of pattern detection are described and 
elaborated. In addition, Table 8   illustrates the complexity study of this algorithm. 
 Input: Ψ, ै 
 Output: a set of assignments {݃}  mapping variables from Ψ to constants in 
ै such that ै	 ⊨୥ Ψ  
 इ = |ॼ଴| + |࣪(ॼ଴)|, is the number of 0-dim and 1-dim entities in ै	where |࣪(ॼ଴)| is the number of all possible 1-dim entities 
 ݊ = |Vஏ|, ݊	݅ݏ	ݐℎ݁	݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	݂ݎ݁݁	ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ	(ݒ)	݅݊	Ψ,	 
ݓℎ݁ݎ݁	Vஏ	ℎܽݏ	ܾ݁݁݊	݂݀݁݅݊݁݀	݁ܽݎ݈݅݁ݎ 
 
  
130 | P a g e  
 
Table 8: Brute force pattern detection algorithm 
  
1.ܥ ∶= {} 1 
2. Foreach ݁ ∈ ॼ଴ ∪ ࣪(ॼ଴	)   इ 
3.  ॼୢ୧୫(ୣ) ∶= ॼୢ୧୫(ୣ) ∪ {e} इ 
4.  I ∶= I ∪ {⟨cୣ,e⟩}	 इ 
5.  ܥ ∶= ܥ ∪ {cୣ} इ 
6. Hcaerof  
7. ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐ ∶= {} 1 
8. Foreach 	⃗ݔ ∈ ܥ|୚ಇ|  इ௡ 
9.  i ∶= 	0 इ௡ 
10.   Foreach ݒ ∈ Vஏ ݊ ∙इ௡ 
11.   ݃ ∶= ݃ ∪ {(ݒ, ⃗ݔ ↓ ݅)} // down arrow denote indexing ݊ ∙इ௡ 
12.   i ∶= 	i + 1 ݊ ∙इ௡ 
13.  Hcaerof  
14.  If  ै	 ⊨୥ Ψ1   then   ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐ ∶= ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐ ∪ {݃}   इ௡ 
15. Hcaerof  
16. Return ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐ 1 
 
Complexity:  ܱ൫ܶ(݊,इ)൯ = ݊ ∗इ௡ 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 The complexity of this step constitutes a separate topic of research 
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7.4 Controlling search space in proposed pattern detection algorithm  
 
Pattern detection is a process which consists of having a pattern formalised in 
any language and a model of a source code. Then, the process is to map the components 
from the source code to the pattern’s components (participants). Finally, the mapping 
needs to be checked where the successful cases form the pattern’s instances and the 
failure cases are reasoned. This is done by passing all mappings to a verifier. In this 
research the detection inputs are a pattern formally modelled in Codecharts and a model 
extracted from a java source code using the TTP Toolkit [13], [38]. In addition, in order 
to check the mappings, the verifier used is also a TTP Toolkit verifier.    
Detecting a pattern in a source code requires looking at the model of a source 
code to find all components and relations among them, which satisfy the given pattern 
formalisation and constraints. The brute force algorithm (Table 8) is one solution which 
simply makes all mappings combinations of components from the model of the source 
code to the pattern’s components (participants). Then, it passes mappings to the verifier 
for checking and returns the successfully passed mappings.  
Here is an explanation of how the proposed pattern detection algorithm (Table 
9) controls the search space and attempt to look at the minimum information in order 
to detect a pattern’s instances. However, it is important to recap some of the 
mathematical notations which will be used in the following explanations. The next are 
the notations and their descriptions: 
 ै  is the model of the source code 
 ॼ଴ ∈ ै  is a set of all classes and methods (entities) of the 
source code 
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 ܴ ∈ ℝ   is a set of tuples each denotes two entities 
(classes and/or methods) in specific relation (e.g Inherit)   
 ℝ ∈ ै  is a set of all sets of relations between classes and 
methods in the source code. 
 Ψ ≝ {݂} where Ψ is the pattern formalised in LePUS3 and 
f is a formula. 
When a pattern specification has more participants (variables) and a model of a 
source code consists of large number of entities, it is obvious that the brute force 
algorithm (Table 8) will generate all mappings combinations from the variables in the 
specification to entities in the model of the source code. This will be a significant 
number of mappings to be checked by the verifier of the TTP Toolkit, especially, in the 
case of a specification that has variables of dim-1 (set of methods, set of classes, or/and 
hierarchies). In such a case, the brute force algorithm will generate the power set of the 
set of entities in the model of the source code. Next, all the generated subsets will play 
the role of the candidates in the combinations of each dim-1 variable in the 
specification.  
Therefore, the brute force algorithm solution is not practical. So, the need for a 
cleverer solution emerges.  In our proposed algorithm (Table 9), the aim is to control 
the search space by means of considering the patterns relations (formulas) and looking 
only at the related components of the source code. 
In order to do so, the proposed algorithm considers only ℝ in the model. This 
allows it to have only the related entities in the mappings. Therefore, the algorithm 
reduces the number of mappings by eliminating the entities which are not related to 
pattern’s constraints (steps 6, 12). Moreover, ℝ is the actual set which the TTP toolkit 
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verifier considers in the process of checking the mappings. So, the mappings from the 
proposed algorithm are closer to the correct instances.   
Furthermore, the algorithm reduces more numbers of mappings by only 
considering the corresponding  ܴ ∈ ℝ . As described in the algorithm correctness 
section, when saying R corresponds to f, this means that if ݂ ∶= ܫ݊ℎ݁ݎ݅ݐ(ݒଵ,ݒଶ) then 
the corresponding R is Inherit∈ ℝ. So, the algorithm retrieves a subset of ℝ. As a 
result, more entities are omitted and the only relevant entities are looked at in detecting 
the algorithm (steps 3, 5, 6, 11, 12 - (Table 9)). 
In order to minimise the search space more and look at the only related entities, 
the algorithm connects the retrieved subset of ℝ. Connecting the subset of ℝ allows the 
algorithm to limit the number of entities only to the entities with high potential for the 
pattern’s participants. In order to connect the subset of ℝ, the algorithm labels the tuples 
in each subset of ℝ with the names of variables in the corresponding formula  f (steps 
6, 12 - (Table 9)). After connecting the subsets, the algorithm uses the labels to check 
the connection by the names of the entities and the labels in the joinAlgorithms 
(BinaryRelationJoin steps 5,9,13 Table 10 —UnaryRelationJoin steps 4 Table 11), 
where the algorithms do the final eliminations of irrelevant entities and produce the 
mappings which are to be sent to the TTP Toolkit verifier. 
As connecting the subset of ℝ is one of the ways the algorithm uses in 
minimising the search space, the checking of connections can go through the problem 
of Cartesian product in the case of checking two labelled sets of the considered subset 
of ℝ  in the joinAlgorithms (Table 10 and Table 11). Therefore, the algorithm is 
designed to avoid such a problem by checking whether the two sets intersect in the 
labels of tuples. In the case of not having common labels in the two sets, the algorithm 
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delays the checking for the coming new set and retrieves a new set. In the case of having 
common labels, the algorithm carries out the checking by passing the two sets to the 
joinAlgorithms (Table 10  and Table 11) and removing the checked  sets coming from 
the waiting set denoted by (ߪ, steps 4 Table 9). This will allow the algorithm to avoid 
going through the Cartesian product issue. 
Regarding the patterns with participants as higher-dimensional (dim-1) variable 
such as set of signatures and/or set of classes, the brute force algorithm (Table 8) 
generates all possible dim-1 entities which can be used to replace the pattern’s 
participants of higher-dimension. This is done by means of a power set of ॼ૙ denoted 
byच(ॼ૙). Then, it uses them to make the mappings. If a set ॼ૙ is known to a subset 
the number of combinations it has can be exponential. Moreover, this would increase 
the search space dramatically, especially in the large scale source code. Therefore, a 
solution is required to avoid such an issue in the brute force algorithm (Table 8). 
The proposed algorithm (Table 9) aims to avoid such an issue by providing only 
the ultimate candidate for the dim-1 variables (pattern’s participant). So, the algorithm 
tries to find only the set of entities which satisfies the corresponding pattern’s 
participant in combination with other entities satisfying the pattern’s other participants. 
The following explains the ultimate candidate: 
Let’s say ݁ is an ultimate candidate for ݒ	 in a mapping ݃  then: 
݁ ∶= {ܿ|	ܿ ∈ 	ॼ଴}	 and  ݁ ∈ 	ॼଵ and ै ⊨௚(௘/௩) 	Ψ					 ⇒ 				∀ݔ ∈
࣪(݁):	ै ⊨௚(௫/௩) 	Ψ 
Finding the ultimate candidate for a higher-dimensional variable will limit the 
search space and allow for minimising the uncompleted pattern instance by omitting 
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the mappings which can be considered as subsets of other mappings and produce only 
the complete mappings. GroupingAlgorithm (Table 12) is responsible of checking 
whether a mapping is subsets of another mapping and it combines the mappings to have 
in them only the ultimate candidates for the pattern’s higher-dimensional participants 
(variables). GroupingAlgorithm (Table 12) uses the dim-0 pattern’s participant in 
order to check the mappings obtained from joinAlgorithms (Table 10 and Table 11) 
and to cluster them depending on the pattern’s participant of dim-0. Then, it produces 
only mappings with ultimate candidates for the pattern’s higher-dimensional 
participants (variables). 
In conclusion, the proposed pattern detection algorithm (Table 9) controls the 
search space in the model of a source code by considering the ℝ instead of ॼ଴. Then, 
it considers the corresponding ܴ ∈ ℝ, which represents only the relevant subset of	ℝ . 
By doing so, it eliminates the entities in the source code that are irrelevant to be 
candidates for a given pattern’s participants. Next, it connects the considered subset of 
ℝ by means of labelling the tuples in the subsets of ℝ with the variables names 
(pattern’s participants’ names) of the corresponding formula for each R in the 
considered subset. After connecting the sets, the algorithm starts to omit entities by 
checking the names of entities and, in every connected set, using the labels. The 
algorithm, in addition, avoids going through a Cartesian product, when checking the 
entities names by labels, by delaying checking the coming set R when there is no 
common label with the previously checked R (s).  Finally, the algorithm uses the idea 
of the ultimate higher-dimensional candidate for the higher dimensional pattern’s 
participants. This allows the algorithm to avoid having the solution of the power set, 
which increases the search space dramatically. In addition, it omits the mappings which 
can be regarded as subsets of other mappings. 
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7.5 Proposed efficient pattern detection algorithm and complexity  
 
 Input: Ψ, ै 
 Output: a set of assignments {݃}  mapping variables from Ψ to constants in 
ै such that ै ⊨୥ Ψ 
 ݏ = 	 |Ψ| 
 ݉ = ݉ܽݔ(|ܴ|)|ܴ ∈ ℝ 
 ݇ = |Vஏଵ | 
Table 9: Proposed efficient pattern detection algorithm – Main 
 
1. ߚ ∶= {} 1 
2. ߪ ∶= {݂|݂ ∈ Ψ} 
While 	ߪ ≠ ∅ 
 
3. foreach ݂ ∈ ߪ ݏ 
4.    
5.   if 
݂ = ቐܫܱܵܯܱܴܲܪܫܥ(ܤ݅݊ܽݎݕܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊,ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊,ܴܽ݊݃݁)ܱܶܶܣܮ(ܤ݅݊ܽݎݕܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊,ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊,ܴܽ݊݃݁)
ܤ݅݊ܽݎݕܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊(ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊,ܴܽ݊݃݁) then ݏ 
6.    ߨ ≝ {〈ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊: ݔ,ܴܽ݊݃݁: ݕ〉	|	〈ݔ,ݕ〉 ∈ BinaryRelation} ݏ 
7.    if (ܮగ ∩ ܮߚ) ≠ ∅ then  
8.     ߚ
∶=ܤ݅݊ܽݎݕܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ܬ݋݅݊(ߚ,ߨ,ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊,ܴܽ݊݃݁)  
9.     ߪ ∶= ߪ − {݂}  
10.    Endif  
11.   else if ݂ = ൜ ܷ݊ܽݎݕܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊(ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊)
ܣܮܮ(ܷ݊ܽݎݕܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊,ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊) then   
12.    ߨ ≝ {〈ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊: ݔ〉	|	〈ݔ〉 ∈ UnaryRelation}   
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Complexity:  ܱ൫ܶ(݇,݉, ݏ)൯ = ݇ ∗ ݉ଶ ∗ ݏ 
 
13.    if (ܮగ ∩ ܮߚ) ≠ ∅ then ݏ
∗ ݉ଶ 
14.     ߚ
∶=ܷ݊ܽݎݕܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ܬ݋݅݊(ߚ,ߨ,ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊) ݏ 
15.     ߪ ∶= ߪ − {݂} ݏ 
16.    Endif ݏ
∗ ݉ଶ 
17.   Endif  
18.   if ߚ = {} then  
19.    ߚ ∶= ߨ  
20.    ߪ ∶= ߪ − {݂}  
21.   Endif  
22.    
23. Hcaerof  
24. End while  
25. ߚ ∶= ܩݎ݋ݑ݌݅݊݃ܣ݈݃݋ݎ݅ݐℎ݉(ߚ, VΨ0 , VΨ1 ) ݇
∗ ݉ଶ 
26. ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐ ∶= {}  
27. foreach ܿ ∈ ߚ  ݉ଶ 
28.  ݃: Vஏ → {ܿ[ݒ௜]}௜ୀଵ…|୚ಇ|	ݏݑܿℎ	ݐℎܽݐ	݃(ݒ௜) ∶= ܿ[ݒ௜]  
29.  if  ै	 ⊨୥ Ψ    
30.   ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐ ∶= ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐ ∪ {݃}    
31.  Endif  
32. Hcaerof  
33. return ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐ  
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7.6 Supplementary algorithms for our pattern detection algorithm 
 
7.6.1 BinaryRelationJoin 
 Input:	ߚ, ߨ sets of labelled tuples ,ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊,ܴܽ݊݃݁: variables 
 Output: a set of labelled tuples  
Table 10: Supplementary algorithms - BinaryRelationJoin 
 ܤ݅݊ܽݎݕܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ܬ݋݅݊(ߚ,ߨ,ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊,ܴܽ݊݃݁)  
1. ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐ ∶= {}  
2. foreach ܿ ∈ ߚ   
3.   foreach ݎ ∈ ߨ   
4.   if ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊ ∈ ܮ௖ ∧ 	ܴܽ݊݃݁ ∈ ܮ௖ then if ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊,ܴܽ݊݃݁ are labels in c 
5.    if ܿ.ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊ = ݎ.ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊	 ∧
	ܿ.ܴܽ݊݃݁ = ݎ.ܴܽ݊݃݁ If the common attributes in ݎ and ܿ  are equal in values, then 
concatenate tuples and return one 
tuple with no duplicated attributes   6.     ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐ ∶= ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐ ∪{ܿ} 
7.    endif  
8.   else if ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊ ∈ ܮ௖  then if ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊ is a label in c 
9.    if ܿ.ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊ = ݎ.ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊ If the common attributes in ݎ and ܿ  
are equal in values, then 
concatenate tuples and return one 
tuple with no duplicated attributes   
10.     ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐ ∶= ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐ ∪{ݎ.ܴܽ݊݃݁ ∙ ܿ} 
11.    endif  
12.   else if ܴܽ݊݃݁ ∈ ܮ௖ then if 	ܴܽ݊݃݁ is a label in c 
13.    if ܿ.ܴܽ݊݃݁ = ݎ.ܴܽ݊݃݁ If the common attributes in ݎ and ܿ  
are equal in values, then 
concatenate tuples and return one 
tuple with no duplicated attributes   
14.     ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐ ∶= ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐ ∪{ݎ.ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊ ∙ ܿ} 
15.    Endif  
16.   endif   
17.  Hcaerof  
18. Hcaerof  
19. return ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐ  
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7.6.2 UnaryRelationJoin 
 Input:	ߚ, ߨ sets of labelled tuples ,ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊ is a variable 
 Output: a set of labelled tuples  
Table 11: Supplementary algorithms - UnaryRelationJoin 
 ܷ݊ܽݎݕܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ܬ݋݅݊(ߚ,ߨ,ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊)  
1. ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐ ∶= {}  
2. foreach ܿ ∈ ߚ   
3.   foreach ݎ ∈ ߨ   
4.    if ܿ.ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊ = ݎ.ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊ If the common 
attributes in ݎ and ܿ  
are equal in values, 
then concatenate 
tuples and return one 
tuple with no 
duplicated attributes   
5.     ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐ ∶= ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐ ∪ {ܿ} 
6.    endif  
7.  Hcaerof  
8. Hcaerof  
9. return ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐ  
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7.6.3 Grouping Algorithm  
 Input:	ߚ, Vஏ଴ , Vஏଵ  
 Output: a set of labelled tuples  
Table 12: Supplementary algorithms - Grouping Algorithm 
ܩݎ݋ݑ݌݅݊݃ܣ݈݃݋ݎ݅ݐℎ݉(ߚ, Vஏ଴ , Vஏଵ )  
1. ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌݁݀ݐݑ݌݈݁ݏ ∶= {}  ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌݁݀ݐݑ݌݈݁ݏ is HashMap 
2. if Vஏଵ = {}  
3.  return ߚ  
4. Endif  
5. foreach ܿ ∈ ߚ   
6.  ݇݁ݕ ∶= {ܿ.ݒ|ݒ ∈ Vஏ଴ }  
7.  ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌݁݀ݐݑ݌݈݁ݏ ∶= ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌݁݀ݐݑ݌݈݁ݏ ∪ {〈݇݁ݕ, ܿ〉}  
8. Hcaerof  
9. foreach ܿ ∈ ߚ   
10.  ݇݁ݕ ∶= {ܿ.ݒ|ݒ ∈ Vஏ଴ }  
11.  ݔ = 	݃ݎ݋ݑ݌݁݀ݐݑ݌݈݁ݏ(݇݁ݕ) return a tuple in ݔ 
12.   foreach ݒ ∈ ܸଵ   
13.   if ݔ[ݒ] ≠ ܿ[ݒ] not to duplicate 
14.    ݔ[ݒ] ∶= ݔ[ݒ] ∪ {ܿ[ݒ]}  
15.   Endif  
16.  Hcaerof  
17.  ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌݁݀ݐݑ݌݈݁ݏ ∶= ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌݁݀ݐݑ݌݈݁ݏ ∪ {〈݇݁ݕ,ݔ〉}  
18. hcaerof  
19. ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐ	 ∶= {}  
20. foreach ݔ ∈ ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌݁݀ݐݑ݌݈݁ݏ to get the labelled tuples only 
to be passed as the result 
21.  ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐ ∶= ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐ ∪ {ݔ.݃݁ݐܸ݈ܽݑ݁}	  
22. Hcaerof  
23. return ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐ  
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7.7 Comparison analysis  
 
In this section, a theoretical comparison between our pattern detection 
algorithm (Table 9) and the brute force algorithm (Table 8) will be made. The analysis 
will start with articulating the important parameters in the comparison analysis. Table 
13 shows the analysis and highlights key factors which are used in the analysis. 
 
 
Parameters: 
 इ = |ॼ଴| + |࣪(ॼ଴)|, is the number of 0-dim and 1-dim entities in ै	where |࣪(ॼ଴)| is the number of all possible 1-dim entities 
 ݊ = |Vஏ|, ݅ݏ	ݐℎ݁	݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	݂ݎ݁݁	ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ	(ݒ)	݅݊	Ψ,	 
ݓℎ݁ݎ݁	Vஏ	ℎܽݏ	ܾ݁݁݊	݂݀݁݅݊݁݀	݁ܽݎ݈݅݁ݎ 
 ݏ = 	 |Ψ| 
 ݉ = ݉ܽݔ(|ܴ|)|ܴ ∈ ℝ 
 ݇ = |Vஏଵ | 
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Table 13: Brute force and our algorithm comparison analysis 
Algorithm Brute force pattern detection 
algorithm 
Efficient pattern detection 
algorithm 
Complexity  ݊ ∗इ௡ ݇ ∗ ݉ଶ ∗ ݏ 
Explanation   
⇒ |Vஏ| ∗ (|ॼ଴| + |࣪(ॼ଴)|)|୚ಇ| 
 
⇒ |Vஏ| ∗ (|ॼ଴| + 2|ॼబ|)|୚ಇ| 
 
⇒ 2|ॼబ|	∗|୚ಇ| 
 
 Most likely ߙ =
݉ܽݔ(|Vஏ|, |Vஏଵ |, |Ψ|) <12 
 Because: there is no 
pattern up-to-date  which 
has more than 12 
components 
 Therefore: with ignoring 
the constant values, 
algorithm complexity is 
 
⇒ 2|ॼబ| 
 
 
 
⇒ |Vஏଵ | ∗ ݉ܽݔ(|ܴ|)ଶ ∗ |Ψ| 
 
⇒ ݉ܽݔ(|ܴ|)ଶ 
ܴ ∈ ℝ 
 
worst case |Vஏଵ | ∗ |Ψ| ∗ |ॼ଴|ସ  
 as if every entity in ॼ଴ is 
having the ܴ relation 
with every entity in ॼ଴ 
 
 Most likely ߙ =
݉ܽݔ(|Vஏ|, |Vஏଵ |, |Ψ|) <12 
 Because: there is no 
pattern up-to-date which 
has more than 12 
components 
 Therefore: with ignoring 
the constant values, the 
worst case complexity of 
the proposed algorithm is 
 
⇒ |ॼ଴|ସ 
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P complexity class is a category of algorithms which solve problems in 
polynomial time. The time complexity function for this class is ܱ(݌(݊)) and it can be 
bounded. On the other hand, exponential time algorithms are known as the “inefficient” 
algorithms where the time complexity function for such algorithms cannot be bounded. 
Any computational problem is regarded as well-solved if there is a polynomial solution 
for it [122]. 
NP is an acronym for Non-deterministic Polynomial time. NP denotes a 
category of algorithms which solve problems in non-deterministic polynomial time. NP 
includes P and NP-Complete classes. Consequently, NP-Complete class is a subset of 
NP class and is regarded as the hardest problems in NP. There are a number of examples 
of NP-Complete class problems, for instance, satisfiability and Hamiltonian path 
problems [122]. Another related class of complexity is known as NP-Hard class. This 
class categorises the problems which are as hard as the hardest problems in NP with a 
possibility that these problems are not in NP [122], [123].   
Table 13 shows the results of studying the complexity of both brute-forces 
pattern detection algorithm (Table 8) and efficient proposed pattern detection 
algorithm, the brute-force algorithm complexity is O(2|ॼబ|	) and the efficient proposed 
algorithm (Table 9) complexity in its worst case is ܱ(|ॼ଴|ସ). When saying ݊ =|ॼ଴|where ॼ∗ ≜ 	ॼ଴⨄	ॼଵ	⨄… .⨄	ॼୢ	such	that	d < 3, and ै = {ॼ∗,ℝ, I} [38], and ै  
is one of the inputs of both algorithms, the complexity of the brute force algorithm can 
be shown as ܱ(2௡) and the complexity of  our proposed efficient  algorithm can be 
shown as ܱ(݊ସ).  
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It is important to discuss the possibility when the brute force algorithm can 
outperform our proposed algorithm. As the complexity of the brute-force algorithm is  
ܱ(2௡), clearly, it can outperform our proposed algorithm when ݊ < 16. However, ݊ 
represents the number of classes and methods in the source code as  ݊ = |ॼ଴| and |ॼ଴| 
is the number of entities of 0-dim in the model ै of the source code. This means that 
the brute-force algorithm can outperform our proposed algorithm ONLY when the 
source code contains less than 16 classes and methods. In addition, when dividing this 
number as each class in the source code has at least one method, the source code would 
contain 8 classes with 8 methods for each class. It is obvious that a source code with 
this number of components can only be regarded as a small or a demo source code.  
Medium and large scale source codes are often industrial software and are 
developed using patterns. These kinds of source codes are hard to understand and are 
manually checked, unlike source codes with 16 classes and methods. Our proposed 
algorithm outperforms the brute-force algorithm in the detection of pattern in medium 
and large scale source codes where pattern detection is a need. Furthermore, from the 
complexity of our proposed algorithm, it can be seen that it terminates when detecting 
patterns in medium and large scale source codes, whereas the brute-force algorithm 
does not.    
It is evident that the proposed algorithm (Table 9) is a polynomial algorithm 
and can be regarded as an efficient solution for the problem of pattern detection in the 
comparison with the brute-force algorithm (Table 8) which can be classified as NP-
Complete algorithm and a far exponential algorithm when it is used in pattern detection 
in medium or large scale source codes.  
Having the above argument, it can be concluded that the proposed algorithm 
outperforms the brute force algorithm and offers an efficient polynomial solution for 
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the problem of pattern detection  when the inputs are a model (representing the 
program) and a formal visual specification such as Codecharts (representing the pattern 
which is to be found in the program).  
7.8 A dry-run example to compare the Brute force pattern detection algorithm 
with the proposed efficient algorithm  
 
In this section, a performance comparison between the Brute force pattern 
detection algorithm (Table 8) and the proposed efficient algorithm (Table 9) will be 
made and discussed. An arbitrary pattern has been chosen in order to be found in an 
arbitrary implementation. The pattern is shown in Figure 48. Regarding the 
implementation, it is a large scale source code which is the source code of the TTP-
Toolkit. The model of the source code has extracted the information needed for the 
purpose of the comparison was. Table 14 shows details needed in the dry-run 
comparison example: 
Table 14: TTP-Toolkit source code key parameters for Dry-run example |ॼ଴| 2234 number of classes and methods entities 
݉ܽݔ(|ܴ|) 1988 the size of the largest relation set in the ℝ 
which is Member 
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Figure 48: Codecharts: Complexity dry-run example arbitrary pattern 
 
Table 15 shows the dry-run comparison which illustrates how the proposed 
algorithm significantly outperforms the brute force algorithm (Table 8). Now, it has 
been proven that the proposed algorithm (Table 9) tackles the problem in a reasonable 
amount of time. Moreover, as the example of a large scale implementation, the 
proposed algorithm shows efficiency in such situations. 
Table 15: Brute force and our algorithm dry-run example comparison analysis 
 Brute force pattern detection 
algorithm 
Proposed efficient pattern detection 
algorithm 
Complexity  2|ॼబ| Average case:      ݉ܽݔ(|ܴ|)ଶ 
Worst case:          |ॼ଴|ସ 
 
Result 2ଶଶଷସ 
=Infinity 
 
Average case:       1988ଶ =15808576 
Worst case:       2234ସ = 
24907645451536 
Note: the results are shown in a time unit 
which costs a computer processor 
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Now, it is beneficial to explain how the brute force algorithm (Table 8) and the 
proposed algorithm (Table 9) work to find the instances of the arbitrary pattern shown 
in Figure 48. As it can be seen in Figure 48, the pattern has 3 classes namely (ClassA, 
ClassB, and ClassC). In addition, it has one method named (mthA) and a set of classes 
named (ClassesX). In order to find all instances of the pattern, brute force algorithm 
will, first, generate all the subsets (power sets) of the entities in the source code which 
are in a set of ॼ଴. Having all the subsets of the 0-dim entities in the model of source 
code means that the brute force algorithm now have all candidates of the element 
named (ClassesX) in the pattern in Figure 48. As the rest of elements in the patterns 
are 0-dim elements, their candidates are in ॼ଴ . Next, the brute force algorithm will 
generate all possible combinations of the entities in the source code and the 1-dim 
entities that were generated early to be candidates for ClassesX. The combinations will 
form instances of the pattern. Next, it will create assignments from the pattern to each 
generated combination. Finally, it will use the TTP Toolkit verifier to check each 
assignments and save a correct ones.  
On the other hand, the proposed algorithm (Table 9) aims to reduce the search 
space by the means of considering the relations instead of considering the entities. In 
addition, it expand the 1-dim elements in the patterns and tread them as 0-dim in order 
to find the correct entities that can be grouped to form a candidate. So, the algorithm 
will start by retrieving the sets of tuples of relations that are shown in Figure 48 namely 
Create, Member, Call, and Return. Next, it will label the tuples according to the names 
of elements in the pattern.  
For example, let say that the Return relation set on the model looks like Return 
={<java.String.toString(),java.String>,…..,}. The proposed algorithm will retrieve and 
copy this set as it is one of the relations shown in the pattern, then, the algorithm will 
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label all the tuples in this set according to the elements that have this relation in the 
pattern. In case of the pattern in Figure 48 the results of this process would look like 
this Return ={<mthA:java.String.toString(),ClassB:java.String>,…..,}. 
After having all the sets of relations copied and labelled, the proposed algorithm 
(Table 9), will find the instances of the patterns by checking the values according to 
the labels. By doing so, list of instances will be found and, then, the algorithm will 
cluster the list according to the entities of labels (mthA, ClassA, ClassB, ClassC). Next, 
the algorithm will group the entities that has the label ClassesX In order to create the 
1-dim entities that can be assigned to ClassesX. Grouping will the ultimate set of 
entities that can be assigned to the 1-dim element (ClassesX) in the pattern. By doing 
so, the proposed algorithm (Table 9) will improve on the brute force algorithm (Table 
8) by avoiding to generate all the subsets of ॼ଴ to find the sets of entities that can be 
assigned to ClassesX to form a correct instance of the pattern.  Finally, the proposed 
algorithm (Table 9) will generate all assignments for the found instances that have been 
checked in the relations sets and use the TTP Toolkit to verify them. 
 
7.9 Correctness of proposed efficient pattern detection algorithm 
 
In this section, a study on the correctness of our proposed pattern detection 
algorithm (Table 9) will be carried about and explained. The method used to prove the 
correctness of the algorithm is the contradiction method. First, the assumptions of the 
proof will be articulated. Next, some clarifications regarding the algorithm and the 
proof will be given. Finally, the theorem will be stated and the proof will be shown.   
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7.9.1 Assumptions 
 
1. ρ  is a look-for design or security pattern. 
2. ݂ ∶≝
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
ܷ݊ܽݎݕܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊(ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊)
ܤ݅݊ܽݎݕܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊(ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊,ܴܽ݊݃݁)	
ܣܮܮ(ܷ݊ܽݎݕܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊,ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊)
ܱܶܶܣܮ(ܤ݅݊ܽݎݕܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊,ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊,ܴܽ݊݃݁)
ܫܱܵܯܱܴܲܪܫܥ(ܤ݅݊ܽݎݕܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊,ܦ݋݉ܽ݅݊,ܴܽ݊݃݁) 
3. Ψ ∶≝ {݂} 
4. Ψ	  represents ρ 
5. Vஏ 	 ∶= 	{ݒଵ,ݒଶ, … , ݒ௞}|{ݒ௜}௜ୀଵ…௞   is free variables in some ݂ ∈ Ψ 
6. g୶ is a mapping function denote as g୶: Vஏ → ݔ 
7. x	 ∶= {cଵ … . . c୬}୬ୀଵ→|୚ಇ| where c୧ ∈ ॼ଴ 
8. S represents the set of all instance of ρ found by the algorithm  
9. ݔ is a missed instance of ρ iff ै	 ⊨୥౮ Ψ and x ∉ S 
 
7.9.2 Clarifications 
 
From the above assumptions, the meaning of 	⊨௚ೣ Ψ needs to be clarified. It 
means that ∀݂ ∈ Ψ , the elements in x , are in a tuple in R ∈ ℝ , where R 
corresponds to ݂ and these elements correspond to the same variables in all f. When 
saying R corresponds to ݂, this means that if ݂ ∶= ܫ݊ℎ݁ݎ݅ݐ(ݒଵ,ݒଶ) , then the 
corresponding  R	is Inherit ∈ ℝ	 
In order to clarify this more, let’s assume that ݂ ∶= ܫ݊ℎ݁ݎ݅ݐ(ݒଵ,ݒଶ) and ݂ ∈
Ψ. Then ∃cଵ, cଶ ∈ x  and ∃〈cଵ, cଶ〉 ∈ Inherit where Inherit ∈ ℝ	and cଵ, cଶ replace the same vଵ, vଶ in all ݂ ∈ Ψ. For example, lets say Ψ ∶= 	ܫ݊ℎ݁ݎ݅ݐ(ݒଶ, ݒଵ) ∧
ܯܾ݁݉݁ݎ(ݒଶ, ݒଷ) ∧ 	ܣ݃݃ݎ݁݃ܽݐ݁(ݒସ,ݒଷ). Ψ is depicts in the Codechart in Figure 49.   
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Figure 49: Codechart for algorithm correctness example 
Lets assume that ݔ ∶= {cଵ, cଶ, cଷ, cସ} and x is an instance of the pattern 
represented by Ψ. Then x elements need to be in tuples in each time  R corresponds to 
an f ∈ Ψ as follows: 
 〈cଶ, cଵ〉 ∈ Inherit 
〈cଶ, cଷ〉 ∈ Member 
〈cସ, cଷ〉 ∈ Aggregate  
And {cଵ, cଶ, cଷ, cସ} ∈ ॼ଴ 
 
7.9.3 Theorem 
 
For any Ψ our algorithm finds all the instances that satisfy Ψ 
 
7.9.4 Proof of correctness  
 
Assume ݔ is an instance of Ψ and ݔ ∉ S. This means that the tuples having the 
elements of ݔ and belonging to {R} ∈ ℝ (where {R} corresponds to all ݂ ∈ Ψ) are not 
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checked by our algorithm. Thus ݔ is a missed instance of Ψ. Two cases can be identified 
in order to allow this instance to be missed by our algorithm. 
Case 1: a tuple in one of the corresponding R-having elements of x has not been 
listed for the algorithm to be checked. From the algorithm (Table 9), it can be seen 
clearly that steps (6, 12) in the main algorithm assure that all tuples in the corresponding R are copied to π and sent to the appropriate JoinAlgorithm (Table 10or Table 11) for 
checking. Therefore this case cannot occur.   
Case 2:  a tuple in one of the corresponding R has not been checked. Checking 
in the JoinAlgorithms (Table 10and Table 11) is to make sure that an element in x is 
corresponding to the same variable in all f ∈ Ψ. Again, this case cannot happen as steps 
(3, 5, 9, and 13) in BinaryRelationJoin (Table 10) and steps (3 and 4) in 
UnaryRelationJoin (Table 11) are to retrieve each tuple in π and check it with the 
already checked and stored tuples. Furthermore, our algorithm (Table 9) assures that if 
there are no already checked tuples, all the tuples of the corresponding R (which are 
listed in π) are returned as already checked tuples. This is made in steps (18, 19, and 
20). So, it is not possible to skip any tuple in the checking process. 
Finally, form Cases 1 & 2, it can be concluded that the assumption of having x 
as an instance of Ψ and x ∉ S is not a valid assumption and it can be proven the 
correctness of our algorithm (Table 9).    
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7.10 Implementation 
 
In this section, a discussion and demonstration of the implementation of our 
pattern detection algorithm (Table 9) will take place. First, an explanation of the main 
processes of our pattern detection algorithm will be shown. In addition, the explanation 
will highlight the integration of the implementation of our approach into the TTP 
Toolkit. Furthermore, the forms of the inputs and the outputs, which are designed and 
implemented to interact with the user, will be illustrated. Finally, some of the 
limitations in the implementation, which are caused by various reasons, will be 
highlighted. 
First, the implementation of the system was developed in the Java programming 
language. This is due to the fact that the TTP Toolkit was developed using the same 
language. Therefore, in order to integrate out implementation of our pattern detection 
approach into the TTP Toolkit, the source code of the TTP Toolkit had to be studied in 
order to develop the pattern detection implementation in such a way that allows it to 
integrate into the TTP Toolkit is a part of it. 
It is important to illustrate the main processes in the implementation of our 
pattern detection approach. The implementation relies on the inputs of the user, which 
are mainly a reversed-engineered program and a pattern in the form of Codecharts. 
Next, the pattern detection starts and returns a set of potential instances of the patterns. 
However, these instances need to be verified. In order to verify their design 
conformance against the given source code, the pattern detection implementation 
generates an “assignment” which is a form of input that the TTP Toolkit understands 
and can process.  
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   After the verification of an instance is completed, the result of the verification, 
then, is tested. If the result is “Passed”, this means that the instance is correct. Next, the 
implementation will save the “assignment” and will visualise the instance.  However, 
in case that the result is “Failed”, the instance is dismissed.  This process will be 
repeated for all the potential instances. Figure 50 shows the processes explained above.  
 
 
Figure 50: Flowchart for our pattern detection 
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The main functionality which our implementation has added to the TTP Toolkit 
is the pattern detection. However, in order to accomplish this main functionality, a 
number of sub-functions are added as well. These sub-functions are as follows: create 
new detection entity, and detect (run a detection entity). 
One of the objectives of the implementation of our pattern approach is to 
integrate it into the TTP Toolkit. In order to achieve this objective, the same 
conventions (which have been followed in the development of the TTP Toolkit) were 
adhered to in order to fully integrate our pattern detection implementation into the TTP 
Toolkit. Therefore, creating a detection entity is a sub-function added for full 
integration, as the idea of creating entities of process (such as creating chart entity, 
assignment entity, and verification entity) was in the TTP Toolkit.  Figure 51 illustrates 
the integration of the implementation of our pattern detection approach into the TTP 
Toolkit Graphical User Interface (GUI). It can be seen clearly from the figure that an 
item called “detect” has been added into the main menu bar. This item can be expanded 
to show the main two sub-functions. Furthermore, an item called “detection" has been 
added in the left hand bar. This item can also be expanded to show the created detection 
entities, where a user can rename and/or delete a detection entity.   
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Figure 51: Screenshot showing the detection integration in TTP Toolkit 
Creating a new detection entity allows a user to detect a pattern. In order to 
create an entity, first, a user needs to click on the “new detection” in the main menu bar 
under the “detect” menu’s item. In addition, a user can carry out the same process 
taking advantage of the drop-down list when mouse-left-clicking on the “detection” 
item on the left hand bar and going to “New resource”>”Detection”. Either way will 
open an input window for the user to allow him/her to enter the name for the detection 
entity. Figure 52 and Figure 53 demonstrate the above mentioned procedures and the 
outputs of them. 
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Figure 52: Screenshot showing the detection entity definition in the TTP Toolkit 
 
Figure 53: Screenshot showing the detection entity in the TTP Toolkit 
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After creating the detection entity, what is left is using the second sub-function, 
which is “detect”. A user of the TTP Toolkit needs to specify the source code of the 
program that is needed in order to search for pattern instances. Afterwards, the user 
needs to create a new chart to draw the Codecharts of the pattern into it. Finally, in 
order to detect the pattern, the user needs to go to the main menu bar of the TTP Toolkit 
and click on “detect” under the menu of “detect”. This will open a window asking 
him/her to choose the pattern to be found in the given source code as shown in Figure 
54. 
 
Figure 54: Screenshot showing the selection of the input pattern for detection 
Our pattern detection will start searching for the selected pattern into the source 
code. This will include the processes described in Figure 49. Immediately after the 
pattern detection is completed, the main results of the pattern detection process will be 
summarised and shown to the user as can be seen in Figure 55. The summary shown 
includes the name of the source code given and the number of detected instances. 
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Furthermore, the time spent in the entire pattern detection process is shown as well in 
the summary.    
 
Figure 55: Screenshot showing the results of detection 
Finally, as it has been mentioned earlier in this section, the pattern detection 
visualises the detected instances. Furthermore, it provides the reasoning for these 
instances of the available pattern. The reasoning, which is already verified, can be 
checked by the user at any time.  The reasoning is the mappings between the variables 
in the pattern Codecharts and in the source code components.  
The user can, after the detection process is completed, view the visualised 
pattern instances as well as the mapping (Assignments). Figure 56 shows the left hand 
bar of the TTP Toolkit GUI where the pattern detection saves the detection results. It 
can be seen clearly from the figure that the instances of the pattern which have been 
named according to the following form “DetectedInstanceNO_#_Of_#”. This is to 
distinguish them from other existing Codecharts as well as to allow for indicating their 
number and pattern.  
 In addition, Figure 56 shows the mappings which have been used to verify the 
instances and reason them out. The mappings can be seen in the left hand bar of the 
TTP Toolkit under the Assignment hierarchy. It can be noticed that the assignment used 
in the detection is named according to the following form “DetectionAssignment_ #”. 
The number indicates the number of the potential instance of the pattern.    
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Figure 56: Screenshot showing the detection results in the TTP Toolkit 
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7.11 Summary  
 
In conclusion, in this chapter, the pattern detection problem was considered. 
This includes clearly articulating the problem definition. Furthermore, the brute force 
(Table 8) solution was formalised and shown. Besides, our pattern detection solution 
was discussed and formalised. This includes a description of the way which our 
solution uses in order to control and minimise the search space in in the source code.  
Furthermore, a comparison analysis between the two solutions was carried out 
and demonstrated. This was alongside with a dry-run example in order to compare the 
two solutions. Moreover, a proof of the correctness of our pattern detection algorithm 
was discussed and explained. Finally, the implementation of our pattern detection 
algorithm was illustrated and explained. This included the illustration of the integration 
of our algorithm implementation into the TTP Toolkit.   
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8 Case studies: Pattern Detection   
 
 
This chapter describes the empirical work of this research in the direction of 
pattern detection. First, the way in which the case studies are conducted will be 
described. Second, the open sources used in the case studies will be briefly described. 
The open sources denote the source codes which have been considered in order to 
detect the patterns in them.  
The rest is divided into two subsections. The first subsection will discuss some 
case studies carried out in order to detect a number of security patterns formally 
modelled in Codecharts. The second subsection will discuss Composite pattern case 
studies in order to show the use of our pattern detection approach to detect design 
patterns. Finally, a summary of the results and findings of all the case studies will 
conclude this chapter with tables compiling the results together to be used later in the 
evaluation chapter of this research. 
 
8.1 Case studies scenario 
 
In this research, case studies are the evaluation methodology. Therefore, it is 
essential to explain how they are carried out and to clarify all the stages of each case 
study. The following are the stages which each case study goes through. However, it is 
important to state here that all the case studies of security patterns rely on the formally 
modelled security patterns using Codecharts shown in the chapter entitled “Security 
Patterns Formalisation” and APPENDIX A. With regards to the design patterns case 
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studies, the formalised design patterns in the book of Eden et al. [38] were used in 
design patterns detection case studies. 
The first stage, after formally modelling a pattern, is the stage of searching for 
a claim of pattern implementation in a source code. This stage is basically related to a 
formalised pattern and source code, which are claimed to be implementing this pattern. 
The claim is important for the validity of the detected pattern’s instances in the source 
code. Furthermore, it leads to a source code for the case studies. However, some the 
claims found are for patterns to be implemented in proprietary or commercial source 
codes [9], [27], which are non-open sources. 
The next stage is to find the source code and to extract its model using the TTP 
Toolkit. Here, the source code needs to be a Java-based code. This is due to the fact 
that, although the TTP Toolkit is software engineering tools of object-orientation, the 
current version is only supporting Java-based source codes. After finding the source 
code which is claimed to implement the looked-for pattern, the TTP Toolkit is used for 
extracting the model of the source code. 
Having the source code model and the Codecharts of the pattern, the next stage 
is for detecting the instances of the pattern in the extracted model of the source code. 
This stage comprises using our pattern detection algorithm, auto-generating of the 
mappings (Assignments) from the patterns components to source code components, 
auto-using of the TTP Toolkit verifier, and auto-visualising of the correct instances of 
the pattern.  
Finally, showing the results is the last stage. This stage includes showing a 
summary of the case study. The important information in the summary is the name of 
the source code used, the number of detected correct instances of the pattern, and the 
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time spent in the detection stage. To sum up, a case study comprises looking for a claim 
of pattern implementation in a source code, searching for the source code and extracting 
its model using the TTP Toolkit, detecting the instances of the pattern in the source 
code, and showing the results.   
The pattern detection case studies have been divided into two sets. The first set 
is gathering the pattern detection case studies on security patterns. The second set is 
gathering the pattern detection case studies on design pattern. The difference between 
these two sets of case studies is that the first set relies on the formally modelled security 
patterns which this research has produced, as shown in the chapter entitled “Security 
Patterns Formalisation” or in APPENDIX A.  The second set of the case studies relies 
on the already formalised design patterns, which are shown in the book of Eden et al. 
[38].      
 
8.2 Source codes used in the case studies  
 
The following is a short description of the open source codes which have been 
considered in the case studies in order to detect patterns in. The models of these source 
codes have been extracted by the TTP Toolkit [13], [38]. Table 16 shows a statistical 
summary of the model of each open source, including the numbers of classes and 
methods as well as the numbers of relations among components (classes and method).  
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Table 16: Summary of information of source codes used for case studies 
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JHotdraw 632 3372 3372 5218 306 1081 198 373 3744 5 423 300 
JRefactory 1408 10390 10390 18918 340 4967 459 2136 11542 46 576 773 
GanttProject 1040 6941 6941 5811 169 1485 441 318 8374 155 1106 526 
Junit 528 1885 1885 661 18 206 12 74 2028 5 46 48 
Log4J 338 2298 2298 3162 53 608 153 147 2699 14 107 135 
Lexi 138 771 771 852 1 223 39 60 917 3 34 18 
JSettlers 179 1725 1725 3983 2 586 195 178 2002 37 10 81 
JRISK 137 1287 1287 2697 30 547 80 186 1483 2 44 43 
 
 
 JRefactory 
JRefactory is a refactoring tool for Java programing languages. It was 
developed by Chris Seguin during the period from 1999 to 2002 using Java. Then, the 
tool was taken over by Mike Atkinson. It is available to download at this link 
http://jrefactory.sourceforge.net/.  JRefactory takes a Java code and generates UML 
class diagrams. Furthermore, JRefactory allows moving classes between packages, 
renames fields and other actions, then it makes changes to the given source code 
accordingly. In addition, it includes a code checker and code metrics. JRefactory 
supports a number of Integrated Development Environments (IDEs) such as Netbeans, 
and jEdit [124].  
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 JHotdraw 
JHotdraw is a Java framework which aids graphics with drawing and editing. It 
was mainly developed to exercise design patterns implementation. It is a Graphical 
User Interface editor. In addition, JHotdraw has been documented at an early stage with 
regards to design patterns use. Moreover, JHotdraw was designed to be reused and 
extended. Therefore it can be customised when its structures are understood [125], 
[126]. 
JHotdraw is an open source implementation. It is available to download at this 
link http://www.jhotdraw.org/. Many design pattern detection systems researchers have 
used JHotdraw to conduce their detection and pattern identification case studies [3], 
[4], [7], [101] 
 
 GanttProject 
GanttProject is an open source implementation. It has been developed using 
Java programing language and it is available at http://www.ganttproject.biz. 
GanttProject is software for project management and scheduling. It provides many 
features which help the project administrator in the management. GanttProject is 
widely used in open source community in order to conduct empirical work as it is 
considered to be industrial and well-designed implementation [127], [128]. 
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 JUnit 
JUnit a framework written in/for Java programing language and it is an instance 
of xUnit architecture for unit testing. It is freely available at http://junit.org/.  JUnit 
provides a facility for test-driven development. It allows for automated testing by 
providing annotations to methods to be tested as well as many features like assertions, 
test runners, and others. In addition, it helps with developing more robust software in 
java [129], [130].  
 
 Lexi 
Lexi is a free open source word processor. It was developed using Java 
programming languages. Lexi was introduced by Brill Pappin and Matthew Schmidt in 
1999. It has basic features of a word processer. Lexi is freely available at 
http://lexi.sourceforge.net/. Some design and security patterns are claimed to be 
implemented in Lexi [3], [9]. Therefore, this open source is used in the case studies of 
this research. 
 
 JSettlers 
JSettlers is a java-based game. The game is based on Catan board game [3], 
[131]. This game’s source code has been used in the compared-with pattern detection 
systems. Therefore, this implementation have been used in order to carry out our case 
studies on pattern detection. The source code is freely available at 
http://sourceforge.net/projects/jsettlers/.  
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 JRISK 
JRISK is a strategy game that provides support for multi-layers players [3]. The 
game is originally based on the classical board game. The game has been implemented 
in Java programing language. A number of versions have been advanced. The source 
codes and all versions are freely available at 
http://sourceforge.net/projects/javarisk/files/. In this research, RISK v2.0 has been used 
in the case studies of pattern detection.    
 
8.3 Detection of security patterns case studies 
 
Using this research pattern detection approach, which has been described in the chapter 
entitled “Pattern Detection”, a number of case studies on security patterns detection in 
source codes have been conducted. This section reports on some of those case studies. 
Further case studies can be found in APPENDIX C.  
 
8.3.1 Single Access Point pattern in JAAS. 
 
In the chapter “Case Studies:  Formalisation and manual conformance checking 
of security patterns”, a case study on a manual Single Access Point (SAP) pattern 
conformance checking in JAAS was carried out. The result was finding an instance in 
JAAS which conform to SAP.  However, a number of disadvantages were experienced. 
One example was the uncertainty of the results that all instances were found. Another 
disadvantage was the considerable amount of time to manually find an instance and 
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create assignment (mapping from source code components to participants of pattern) 
in order to verify the detected instance. 
Using the pattern detection approach of this research, it was possible to 
overcome these disadvantages. The SAP pattern, shown in Figure 24, has been detected 
in JAAS and the results can be seen in Figure 57 and Figure 58. It is clear that the 
automated detection found 2 instances of SAP in JAAS. The detection process includes 
finding the instances, generating assignments, using the TTP Toolkit verifier to verify 
the instances by the generated assignments, and visualising the instances.  
 
Figure 57: Results of detecting SAP in JAAS 
 
Figure 58: Results of detecting SAP in JAAS shown in the TTP Toolkit sidebar 
P a g e  | 169 
 
 
 
The 2 detected instances of the SAP pattern has been automatically visualised 
as can be shown in Figure 59.Figure 60 illustrates the auto-generated assignments of 
the detected instances to the pattern participants.  A number of points need to be 
clarified here in these instances. The first point is that “LoginContext$4” and 
“LoginContext$5” are the static objects which the class “LoginContext” Instantiate of 
itself when “LoginContext” is initialised. Therefore, the TTP Toolkit treats 
“LoginContext$4” and “LoginContext$5” as independent classes when extracting the 
model of the JAAS source code. 
 
Figure 59: Codechart: An instance of SAP detected in JAAS 
Another point is that the “LoginContext$4” and “LoginContext$5” can play  
both roles of “RecipientUnknownOrRecipientUnavailable” and “accessLog”. This is 
due to the fact that they are configured by a separate text file attached to JAAS. This 
configuration file is written according to the need. So, the detected instances are 
similar.    
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Figure 60: Assignments of SAP detected in JAAS 
With a comparison between this case study and the same case study of SAP in 
JAAS carried out with a manual method and shown in the chapter “Case Studies:  
Formalisation and manual conformance checking of security patterns” (Chapter 6), a 
number of points can be highlighted.  First of all, the pattern detection approach shows 
another instance of SAP in JAAS, whereas the manual method showed only one 
instance of the pattern. Another point is the efficiency in the time of finding, generating 
assignment, using the TTP Toolkit verifier, and visualising the instances. In the manual 
SAP checking conformance case study of SAP in JAAS, the time spent was 20 hours; 
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whereas using the pattern detection approach took only 12 seconds for finding, 
generating assignments (mappings), verifying by using the TTP Toolkit verifier, and 
visualising the instances as shown in Figure 57.    
Pattern detection aims to find correct instances of a design/security patterns, 
however, false instances of patterns can occur during the process of pattern detection. 
So, it is important to articulate what false instances mean. In the context of this 
research, false instances are the ones that do not conform to the pattern design 
specification which are drawn in Codecharts. 
During manual pattern detection, the source code is manually studied and when 
a combination of classes and methods are assumed to form an instance of the pattern, 
an assignment object is manually created and TTP Toolkit verifier is used in order to 
check whether the instance conforms to the pattern design specification. For example, 
Figure 61 illustrates an assignment, which has been manually created, and the results 
of the TTP Toolkit verification on this assignment. As can be seen in the verification 
results just at the bottom of the figure, the instance is a correct instance and labelled 
with “PASSED” from the TTP Toolkit verifier.  
172 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 61: correct instance in manual pattern detection process 
 
False instances are checked in the same way in the manual pattern detection. 
For example, let’s take the instance in the previous figure and assume that ALL 
methods in “Subject” class (which represents the InternalComponent in the pattern) are 
secured. Having this assumption we might have a false instance as a result. So, for the 
purpose of illustration, “secureAction” has been assigned to another method named 
“isReadOnly()” which exists in Subject”. Figure 62 shows that this new combination 
of components form the source code does not conform to the pattern specification 
(Codecharts).  
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Figure 62: False instance in manual pattern detection process 
 
As can be seen at the bottom of Figure 62, the verification results is “FAILED”, 
therefore, the instance forms a false instance of the pattern. Moreover, as TTP Toolkit 
verifier is employed in this research, it provides some reasoning on the false instances. 
Figure 63 shows the reasoning of regarding the new instance as false instance.  
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Figure 63: TTP Toolkit reasoning on the false instance – manual detection 
 
In the case of automatic pattern detection, false instances are, firstly, detected 
while our approach algorithm is checking the source code components that are in 
relations which the pattern specifies. During the checking, most of the false instances 
are detected and omitted. Next, our approach employs the same means of the manual 
pattern detection that has been previously explained. The means are the use of 
assignments and TTP Toolkit verifier. However, it is important to mention here that 
our approach will automatically generate assignments for the found instances of the 
pattern and automatically check those assignments using TTP Toolkit verifier.  
In the common case of automatic pattern detection, the false instances are 
detected during the process of relation checking of the source code components, 
however, some false instances might occur. In particular, false instances when 
Exclusive operator is used in the specification might occur. So, using the means of 
assignments and TTP Toolkit verifier will allow detecting false instances and omitting 
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them prior the final detection results is shown. Figure 64 shows the TTP Toolkit verifier 
reasoning on regarding the instance 24 as false instance, whereas, Figure 65 illustrates 
the auto-generated assignment named “DetectionAssignment_24” which has been 
created automatically by our approach algorithm and sent to the verifier. As it can be 
seen from the figures, the instance is regarded as a false instance because of the 
violation of the exclusive operator. Because of the use of TTP Toolkit, our approach 
has been able to find that the “updateRoleMap(String, Role, List)” is not the ONLY 
method that calls  “getRoleValue()” method, there is another method named 
“sendRoleUpdateNotification(String, Role, List)” which also calls “getRoleValue()” 
method. According to the specification (Codecharts) of Single Access Point pattern, in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis, this means that this instance is not conforming to the pattern 
(in particular specification of exclusive operator) as the “getRoleValue()”  method 
(which represents the secureAction in the pattern) should be called by ONLY one 
method in the class that represents the SAP in the patterns Codecharts.    
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Figure 64: TTP Toolkit reasoning on the false instance – automatic detection 
 
 
Figure 65: An Example of false instance – automatic detection 
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8.3.2 Intercepting Validator in Apache Struts 
 
A case study using the pattern detection approach of this research has been 
carried out to detect the instances of the Intercepting Validator pattern in Apache Struts. 
The pattern has been discussed and formally modelled in former chapters and shown 
in Figure 26. This case study demonstrates the pattern detection of a security pattern 
when 1-dim vocabulary of Codecharts is used in modelling. In the former chapters, the 
need for 1-dim vocabulary for depicting the abstraction shown in the patterns 
descriptions has been discussed. In the Intercepting Validator pattern, the 1-dim 
vocabulary is the hierarchy class variable. 
Figure 66 illustrated the outcomes of our pattern detection approach. It is shown 
that the approach found 2 instances of the Intercepting Validator pattern in the Apache 
Struts source code. Figure 67 demonstrates one instance which has been automatically 
checked for conformance and automatically visualised using the approach.  
 
Figure 66: Results of detecting the Intercepting Validator in Apache Struts 
 
Figure 67: Codechart: An instance of the Intercepting Validator detected in Apache Struts 
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In order to use the TTP Toolkit to check and verify the conformance of the 
detected instances, our approach automatically generated 2 assignments (mappings) 
from the Intercepting Validator pattern to the components of the source code, as can be 
seen in Figure 68. Two points have to be clarified here. The first point is that the 
component “Hrc_3” is the candidate auto-created by our pattern detection approach to 
represent the set of classes that play the role of “Validators” participant in the pattern. 
Figure 69 illustrates the elements of “Hrc_3” and shows the other candidates which 
have been created by the approach for the other instances which have not passed the 
conformance checking.  
 
Figure 68: an assignment of the Intercepting Validator detected in Apache Struts 
 
Figure 69: Auto-defined higher-dimension entities (Hierarchy) (Intercepting Validator - Apache 
Struts) 
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The second point is the similarity between the two detected instances. It can be 
seen from Figure 68 that the only difference between the instances is the source code 
components which play the role of the signature variable named “validate”, which is in 
turn superimposed on the 1-dim hierarchy variable named “Validators”. This is due to 
the implementation of the pattern in Apache Struts as the method named 
“doBeforeInvocation(ActionInvocation)” in the class named “ValidationInterceptor” 
relies on a parameter named “declarative” to determine what validation method 
(“validate(object, String)” or “validate (object, String, String)”) to call. This parameter 
should be passed to the “validate” method and the determination process should run 
there, especially as the “declarative” parameter is of the type Boolean. It is possible to 
see   that the pattern is not implemented correctly in the code; however, this makes the 
code have two different instances found by our pattern detection approach,  which 
helped to notice deviation in the implementation of the pattern.      
In order to invite comparison, the same case study, using the manual method 
(Chapter 6), took 19 hours, while it took only 1 second with the use of our pattern 
detection approach . Furthermore, our pattern detection approach found another 
instance of the pattern, whereas in the manual method, not all instances were found. In 
addition, all the stages of the manual method of checking conformance have been 
automated in our pattern detection approach. Moreover, as this pattern has a 1-dim 
vocabulary variable, it is necessary to create the candidates of this variable. Our 
approach automatically generates these candidates as shown in Figure 69.   
 
8.4 Detection of design patterns case studies  
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In order to test our pattern detection approach with other patterns than security 
pattern and to allow for evaluate it with other similar pattern detection systems that 
detect design patterns, a number of case studies were conducted to detect a number of 
well-known design patterns in some open source codes. This section reports on a case 
study of the detection of the Composite pattern in Java.AWT. However, further case 
studies can be found in APPENDIX C.  
 
8.4.1 Composite pattern in Java.AWT 
 
Eden et al. [38] have formally modelled the Composite design pattern. Figure 
70 shows that pattern according to Eden et al. It can be seen in the figure that a number 
of different relations are modelled among different types of vocabulary variables of 
Codecharts. Some of these variables are 1-dim vocabulary and denote abstractions 
shown in the description of the pattern such as “ComponentOps”, “CompositeOps”, 
and “Leaves”     
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Figure 70: Codechart: Composite pattern [38] 
As discussed and explained earlier in the former chapters, our pattern detection 
approach is introduced to detect any pattern modelled in Codecharts, even when 1-dim 
vocabulary is used. So, this case study is shown here to allow for expressing the 
generality of the approach. Figure 71 demonstrates the outcome of the detection 
process, which took only 2 seconds for detecting the solo instance of the composite 
pattern. Figure 72 shows the auto-visualisation of the detected instance.   
 
Figure 71: Results of detecting the Composite pattern in Java.AWT 
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Figure 72: Codechart: An instance of the Composite pattern detected in Java.AWT 
The approach has used the TTP Toolkit to verify the instance by the auto-
generated assignment shown in Figure 73. As can be seen in the figure, “Classes”, 
“Signatures_1”, and “Signatures_2” are assigned to the 1-dim variables in the 
Composite pattern (Figure 70). These are auto-created entities which represent sets of 
source code components that play the roles of the corresponding participants in the 
pattern.  
 
Figure 73: An auto-generated assignment of the Composite pattern detected in Java.AWT 
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Figure 74 illustrates the auto-created 1-dim signature constants (“Signatures_1” 
and “Signatures_2”) in the TTP Toolkit interface, while Table 17 itemises the actual 
methods in the source code for each constant. In addition, Figure 75 demonstrates the 
auto-created 1-dim class constant (“Classes”) in the TTP Toolkit interface. 
The auto-created constants are to be assigned to the corresponding variables of 
the pattern. Each constant abstracts many actual methods in the source code of AWT 
and plays the role of corresponding variables of the pattern. With this, it can be seen 
that our pattern detection approach is able to detect any pattern modelled in Codecharts, 
not only security patterns. In addition, it is able to detect the patterns which are 
modelled using 1-dim vocabulary that depicts abstraction of the pattern design. 
Furthermore, it automatically carries all the stages of pattern detection and auto-creates 
or auto-defines 1-dim constants which are to be assigned to 1-dim variables.   
 
 
Figure 74: Auto-defined higher-dimension entities (Methods) (Composite pattern - Java.AWT) 
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Table 17: Details of Signatures sets candidates for Composite instance 
Signatures Set  Details 
Signatures_1 invalidate(), addNotify(), getMaximumSize(), lightweightPrint(java.awt.Graphics), 
paramString(), isFocusCycleRoot(java.awt.Container), nextFocusHelper(), 
checkGD(java.lang.String), 
addPropertyChangeListener(java.lang.String,java.beans.PropertyChangeListener), 
applyComponentOrientation(java.awt.ComponentOrientation), preferredSize(), 
addPropertyChangeListener(java.beans.PropertyChangeListener), print(java.awt.Graphics), 
eventEnabled(java.awt.AWTEvent), removeNotify(), 
dispatchEventImpl(java.awt.AWTEvent), lightweightPaint(java.awt.Graphics), 
list(java.io.PrintWriter,int), transferFocusBackward(), list(java.io.PrintStream,int), 
minimumSize(), getAlignmentY(), setFont(java.awt.Font), 
processEvent(java.awt.AWTEvent), getListeners(java.lang.Class), getAlignmentX(), 
deliverEvent(java.awt.Event) 
Signatures_2 createChildHierarchyEvents(int,long,boolean), 
printHeavyweightComponents(java.awt.Graphics), proxyEnableEvents(long), 
lightweightPrint(java.awt.Graphics), isFocusCycleRoot(java.awt.Container), 
getListenersCount(int,boolean), 
addPropertyChangeListener(java.lang.String,java.beans.PropertyChangeListener), 
getPreferredSize(), print(java.awt.Graphics), containsFocus(), removeAll(), 
getContainerListeners(), add(java.awt.Component,java.lang.Object,int), 
lightweightPaint(java.awt.Graphics), setFocusCycleRoot(boolean), 
writeObject(java.io.ObjectOutputStream), transferFocusBackward(), 
clearCurrentFocusCycleRootOnHide(), checkAdding(java.awt.Component,int), 
remove(java.awt.Component), getAccessibleAt(java.awt.Point), 
findComponentAt(int,int,boolean), paint(java.awt.Graphics), update(java.awt.Graphics), 
createHierarchyEvents(int,java.awt.Component,java.awt.Container,long,boolean), 
add(java.awt.Component,java.lang.Object), getListeners(java.lang.Class), getAlignmentX(), 
findComponentAt(int,int) 
 
 
 
Figure 75: Auto-defined higher-dimension entities (Classes) (Composite pattern - Java.AWT) 
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8.5 Summary 
 
In conclusion, the above case studies show the use of our pattern detection 
algorithm to detect a number of security patterns and design patterns. The detected 
instances of the patterns have been automatically verified by the TTP Toolkit verifier 
in order to check their design conformance. In addition, the instances have been 
automatically visualised using our pattern detection approach. 
The verifications for the detected instances of patterns were carried out using 
the assignments (mappings) from a pattern to source code components. The 
assignments were automatically generated by our pattern detection approach. 
In addition, as this research aims to detect abstraction shown in the patterns 
formalisation in the Codecharts, a number of entities in the detected instances are 
shown in an abstract manner using Codecharts notations of sets of signatures constant, 
hierarchy constant, and/or classes constant. For more elaboration on these notations, 
refer to Figure 5. Those entities are auto-defined using our pattern detection approach.  
Table 18 and Table 19 summarise the results of all pattern detection case studies 
on a number of design and security patterns in different open source codes using our 
pattern detection approach. In addition, NI denotes the Number of Instances of a given 
pattern in a source code, while T denotes the Time taken to detect, verify, and visualise 
the detected instances. The time is shown in seconds. The dashes shown in the tables 
mean that the detection of a pattern on the shown source code was not carried out or 
did not find correct instances of the pattern. The reason behind the cases of not carrying 
out the detection is that a claim of an implementation of the pattern in the source code 
could not be found or the compared-with detection systems have not considered these 
detection cases.   
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Table 18: Design Patterns Detection results 
Open source 
 
 
Pattern 
JH
otdraw
 
JR
efactory 
G
anttProje
ct 
JSettlers 
R
ISK
 2.0 
Java.A
W
T 
NI T NI T NI T NI T NI T NI T 
Class 
Adapter 9 120 2 206 8 61 1 11 8 17 
1 4 
Factory 
Method 5 46 1 279 - - - - - - 
- - 
Strategy 1 14 2 145 - - - - - - 1 19 
Composite - - - - - - - - - - 1 2 
 
Table 19: Security Patterns Detection results 
Open source 
 
 
Pattern 
JA
A
S 
A
pache 
Struts 
LEX
I 
NI T NI T NI T 
SAP 2 12 - - - - 
Check Point 8 1 - - - - 
SAP & Check Point 12 8 - - - - 
Intercepting Validator - - 2 1 - - 
Full View with Error - - - - 2 1 
 
The results above show the outcomes of case studies of pattern detection of 4 
design patterns as well as 5 security patterns. The design patterns are Class Adapter, 
Factory Method, Strategy, and Composite pattern. The security patterns are Single 
Access Point (SAP), Check Point, SAP & Check Point, Intercepting Validator, and Full 
View with Error. These patterns were searched for in a number of open source Java-
based codes using our pattern detection approach. Finally, the information in the above 
tables will be used in the evaluation of our pattern detection approach with the other 
pattern detection systems. Therefore, in the evaluation chapter of this research, these 
above tables might be referred to for clarity and linking.   
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9 Results and Evaluation 
 
This chapter focuses on describing the evaluation of the research as well as 
showing the main findings of the research. The evaluation is divided into two main 
parts. The first part is to evaluate the research by means of feature analysis with 
comparison to other state of art pattern detection systems. The second part is to evaluate 
the system performance.  
 
9.1 Evaluation criteria  
 
Guéhéneuc et al [3] have defined a set of criteria which the current pattern 
detection systems should meet. The criteria are: high precision, ease-of-use, ability to 
detect incomplete instances, explanation, and performance efficiency. Fulfilling these 
criteria is the evaluation method which is followed in order to evaluate this research. 
However, some other common criteria, which have been sought after in the 
introductions of other pattern detection systems, are considered as well, such as 
reasoning, availability, ability to detect new patterns, dynamic checking, and full 
automation. The following are short descriptions for each criterion. 
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 Good Precision 
 
Precision can be defined as the percentage of the correct pattern’s instances 
over all the returned instances. Most design pattern detection systems introduce new 
approaches to actually improve the precision of the results, which their systems 
generate in the process of detecting given patterns [4]. High precision is a sought-after 
feature in any pattern detection system. 
 Ease-of-use 
 
It is obvious that pattern detection systems need to be easy to use by the 
intended users. Usually, users are software engineers, architects, security architects, 
verifiers, and maintainers. The ease of use is generally measured by the ability of the 
system to interact easily with the user. In addition, it is measured by means of allowing 
the users to be able to use the systems’ functionality by the minimum effort. Generally, 
using the technique of “Click of button” is the best way to measure the system ease of 
use.      
 Incomplete instance 
 
An incomplete instance of a pattern is an instance which represents the 
occurrence of a subset of the pattern according to the user of detection system 
preferences. This feature is required by maintainers when a pattern is not determined 
or is thought to be implemented incompletely. The ability of the pattern detection 
system to allow detecting incomplete instances of a pattern makes the system more 
flexible and adaptable. 
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 Explanation 
 
The pattern detection system should be able to explain the results, which are the 
detected instances of a given pattern. This explanation includes describing the results, 
whether they are complete or incomplete instances, as well as describing how the 
instances are similar to the pattern. Often, visualisation of the detected instances are an 
effective way of explaining the results.    
 Performance 
 
Although pattern detection systems are meant to find instances of a given 
pattern in a given source code, it has been noticed that some well-known pattern 
detection systems suffer from serious performance efficiency issues. Therefore, 
performance efficiency has been a feature of the evaluation of pattern detection 
systems.   
 Reasoning 
 
One of the most important features that any pattern detection system is 
evaluated with is the ability to reason out the correct as well as the negative pattern’s 
instance. Many pattern detection systems use different reasoners which might be 
developed especially for that pattern detection system or might be reasoners already 
available and developed by other parties. However, reasoning the results shows more 
confidence in the detected instances and allows for theoretical argument of the results.    
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 Availability 
 
Providing the pattern detection system for academic researchers allows for 
evaluating the systems by others. This is by making the systems available publicly as 
well as carrying out the systems evaluation tests on open source implementations, such 
as JHotdraw [125]. Allowing replications of the evaluation tests on the introduced 
system is a sign of confidence in and correctness of the introduced system.    
 
 Ability to detect new patterns 
 
 Design patterns are evolving, and new patterns are being introduced. It is 
important for a pattern detection system to be able to detect any new pattern [132]. This 
feature can be referred to as the “generality” of the pattern detection system. In order 
to measure the generality of a pattern detection system, two features need to be 
available in the system. The first feature is that the external inputs (which are the 
pattern) are not hard-coded in the system but are rather   external items which the 
system can parse and then detect into a given source code. The second feature is the 
language used to describe the pattern. It is obvious that the language needs to be formal 
or semi-formal [132]. However, it, in addition, needs to be easy to understand and needs 
no solid mathematical foundation.  
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 Dynamic checking 
 
Checking the instances of patterns is carried out either statically or dynamically. 
The dynamic check involves the execution of a source code and tracing the objects calls 
and interactions. This check is often conducted after a static check and it is to find or 
to verify the instances against patterns’ behavioural statements. 
 Full automation 
This criterion measures the ability of the pattern detection system to detect a 
pattern’s instances with no intrusion of human interaction in the searching and 
following steps until the results are shown. Many systems are regarded as semi-
automatic systems, especially those systems which use machine learning techniques. 
The human interaction might be at minimum; however, it is needed from a person who 
is experienced in the patterns and in the source code. An interaction of a person with 
undesirable experience might lead the system to generate incorrect results. This 
dependency on the human interaction might actually make the system useless when an 
experienced person is not available.  In order to measure whether the pattern detection 
system is fully automated, the system needs to be able to have the pattern and the source 
code as the inputs and the results should be generated fully independent from the human 
interaction. 
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9.2 Feature analysis comparison 
 
Using the aforementioned criteria, our approach has been evaluated with 
comparison to a number of state-of-the-art pattern detection systems. Table 20 
summarises the features analysis evaluation results. The information in the table was 
retrieved from the direct use of the available compared-with systems, the original 
publications of the compared-with systems, and other publications considering the 
systems [3]–[5], [8], [132]–[134].   
Table 20: Features Analysis results 
Feature 
 
 
System 
G
ood precision 
Incom
plete instance 
A
vailability 
ease-of-use 
R
easoning 
Explanation 
G
enerality 
D
ynam
ic checking 
fully autom
ated 
Our approach √ √ √ √ √ √ √ × √ 
DeMIMA × √ √ × √ √ × × × 
Similarity 
Scoring 
√ × × √ × × × × × 
DP-Miner √ × √ √ × √ × √ × 
PTIDEJ × √ √ √ √ √ × × × 
   
It can be seen from Table 20 that the competitive approach is the DP-Miner [5] 
and Similarity Scoring approach [8]. DP-Miner has a feature of dynamic checking of 
the instances of patterns after static check. Our pattern detection approach is not able 
to carry out any dynamic check of the patterns instances as Codecharts is limited only 
to model decidable statements.  
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However, our approach outperforms the DP-Miner and Similarity Scoring 
approach by the feature of generality, which allows for detecting a user-specified 
pattern. This makes our approach general for the detection of any design pattern which 
is specified in Codecharts, whereas, the other compared-with approaches are limited to 
a fixed pre-defined set of design patterns.  
In addition, our approach has been developed to be full automated, so, no 
human intervention is required during the detection process, whereas the DP-Miner, 
Similarity Scoring, and others compared-with approaches required a human 
intervention at some point in the detection process. This makes them semi-automated 
pattern detection approaches. 
In addition, our approach provides a mean of reasoning on the results of the 
detection by the use of the TTP Toolkit verifier. This means that it shows that the 
instances of a given pattern found in the source code are correct instances and have 
been checked. Moreover, with the use of TTP Toolkit verifier, it was possible to reason 
on the incorrect instances during the detection process and allow omitting incorrect 
instances from the final results of the detection.   
Similarity Scoring does not have the feature on explaining on the results 
whether the instances found are complete or not, as it is only find complete instances. 
In contrast, our pattern detection approach can find complete and incomplete instances 
of a given pattern and explain on them visually. Incomplete instances can be detected 
using our pattern detection approach as a user can modify and remove the unwanted  
elements  of  a  pattern  Codecharts  then  detect  the  modified  version. Moreover, the 
feature of explanation of the results is provided by our approach as it visualises the 
instances and the assignments (mappings) from source code components to a given 
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pattern. With regards to the detection of incomplete instances, DP-Miner does not have 
the ability of detecting them. 
Evaluation of the outputs and the results of our approach were conducted by 
means of case studies. A case study consists of four phases. All the phases are 
automatically carried out. The first phase (source code model extraction) is to have the 
model of the given source code extracted using the TTP Toolkit. The second phase 
(pattern presentation) is to have a selected pattern visually and formally modelled in 
Codecharts using the TTP Toolkit. The third phase (pattern detection) is to detect and 
verify the instances of a given pattern against their design conformance to the source 
code using our approach and the TTP Toolkit verifier. The final phase (result reporting) 
is to visualise all the pattern’s instances and the assignments (mappings) from source 
code components to a given pattern. 
In order to carry out the case studies, a number of open source codes have had 
their models extracted using the TTP Toolkit. In addition, the security patterns, which 
have been formally modelled in this research, have been used. Regarding the other 
design patterns, the design patterns shown in [38] have been imported for the purposes 
of the case studies. 
In order to compare the results of our approach with the results of other pattern 
detection approaches, the same case studies (which have been conducted by other 
detection approaches) have been replicated. This means detecting same patterns in the 
same open source codes. So, a number of case studies from the empirical work of this 
research have been selected. The case studies are to detect four patterns, namely 
Adapter, Factory Method, Strategy, and Composite patterns, in three different source 
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codes named JHotdraw, JRefactory and Java.AWT. The source codes are industrial 
large scale source codes, i.e. they are regarded as good case studies inputs.    
One of the main aims of our approach was to reach the highest precision in the 
results of the detection. Figure 76 illustrates the precision comparison of our approach 
with other pattern detection systems. Equation 1 illustrates the common way of 
calculating the precision of the results of pattern detection systems, where TP denotes 
the number of true positive instances and FP denotes the number of false positives 
instances.   
Equation 1: Pattern Detection Systems Precision 
ܲ ∶= ܶܲ(ܶܲ + ܨܲ) 
 
The precision ratio is affected by the number of false positives. If a detection 
system detects a high number of instances, generally, most of them are false positives. 
Pattern detection systems vary in the way of removing those false positives. Some 
systems remove them manually; others remove them automatically. However, false 
positives occur commonly in systems that rely on machine learning, graph matching, 
and/or information retrieval algorithms.    
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Figure 76: Average Precision of pattern detection systems 
With comparison to two state-of-the-art pattern detection systems with highest 
precision, it can be seen in Figure 77, Figure 78, and Figure 79 that our approach 
produces the lowest number of instances of the given patterns. This is due to two 
reasons. The first reason is that the patterns are formally described with rich structural 
information, as our approach uses Codecharts, unlike other systems which rely on UML 
diagrams and/or information retrieval parameters such as names and comments of 
source code components, which might be misleading in most cases. Furthermore, 
Codecharts can capture the abstraction in the patterns with the use of 1-dim notations 
as well as hierarchy notations. This allows our approach to minimise the number of 
patterns by encapsulating many instances that differ in one of the pattern’s participants, 
which is meant to be modelled as an abstract set. The second reason is that our 
approach, as part of the detection process, relies on a verifier which takes the instances 
and verifies them against the source code.  
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Figure 77: Instances numbers of JHotdraw case studies compared with the Similarity Scoring 
system 
 
 
Figure 78: Instances numbers of JRefactory case studies compared with the Similarity Scoring 
system 
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Figure 79: Instances numbers of Java.AWT case studies compared with the DP-Miner system 
The Similarity scoring approach [8] is currently the pattern detection approach 
with the highest precision ratio. Having this in mind, it is, in addition, the approach 
with the lowest number of instances for the given patterns in the given source codes. It 
can be seen clearly from Figure 77 and Figure 78 that our approach reaches the closest 
number of instances in the same case studies.  
Moreover, our approach has a better lower number of instances in the case study 
results shown in Figure 77 and Figure 78. This is due the detection of abstraction, which 
the scoring similarity does not consider. The abstraction is in the strategy role of the 
Strategy pattern. The similarity scoring represents it as three classes or perhaps more, 
whereas, this research approach detect it using Codecharts notations which represent it 
as one hierarchy. 
The lower number of instances of patterns, illustrated in Figure 77, Figure 78, 
and Figure 79, shows that our pattern detection approach does not return many false 
positive instances, which improves the overall precision of the results. In addition, it 
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means that the instances of the patterns in the source code are found with the original 
abstraction level of encapsulation and information hiding, which is described in the 
patterns’ original catalogues. This is due to the use of 1-dim notations of Codecharts 
(hierarchy, 1-dim signature variable, and 1-dim class variable), unlike the other 
compared-with pattern detection systems which use UML diagram to model the 
patterns.     
 
9.3 Evaluation performance 
 
Efficiency is one of the most important features which any pattern detection 
system aims to acquire. Efficiency, here, refers to the overall performance of pattern 
detection approaches. This section describes the efficiency of our approach in detecting 
patterns in different source codes with comparison to other pattern detection systems.  
In order to evaluate the performance of our approach, the time spent for each 
case study has been automatically calculated. This was by the means of capturing the 
time before the detection starts and capturing the time after the results of detection are 
verified and visualised. The calculated time is presented for each case study as shown 
in the previous chapter.  
Next, the case studies, which are the same to the ones that other pattern 
detection systems have conducted, have been replicated. This means selecting, from 
this research empirical works, the case studies for the patterns and the source code 
which other pattern detection systems have considered. So, the Adapter pattern case 
studies, in two different source codes, namely JHotdraw (4004 components) and 
JRefactory (11798 components), have been selected. In addition, The Factory Method 
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and Strategy pattern case studies, on the same aforementioned source codes, have been 
selected. Those case studies have been conducted by two pattern detection systems, 
whose results are available and published.  
The performance has been measured with two parameters. The first parameter 
is the time taken to carry out the case study. The second parameter is the source code 
size. There are different ways to measure the source code size. Many measure it with 
the number of code lines. Others rely on the number of classes and methods in the 
source code. However, for object-oriented source codes, the number of classes and 
methods is widely used in order to say how large a source code is. Therefore, and as 
this research aims to detect patterns from object-oriented source codes, it has been 
decided to consider the number of classes and methods as the measurement means for 
the size of source codes. Therefore, when stating the number of source code 
components, it refers to the number of methods and classes in this source code.      
Figure 80, Figure 81, and Figure 82 show the performance of our approach in 
comparison with the DeMIMA [4] and Similarity Scoring system [8]. To the best of 
our knowledge, up-to-date, the Similarity Scoring system is the most efficient pattern 
detection system [3]. It can be seen clearly from the figures that our approach 
outperforms the DeMIMA system. Furthermore, our approach is competitive to the 
Similarity Scoring approach, which is the current most efficient pattern detection 
system.    
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Figure 80: Adapter pattern case study performance 
 
 
Figure 81: Factory Method pattern case study performance 
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Figure 82: Strategy pattern case study performance 
Comparing our approach with more pattern detection systems is a scientific way 
to evaluate our approach effectively and correctly. Therefore, the comparison of the 
performance of our approach with others was not limited to the DeMIMA and 
Similarity Scoring systems. Furthermore, our approach performance was compared 
with another pattern detection system called Ptidej.   
So, from this research set of case studies, three case studies of detecting the 
Adapter pattern have been selected which were conducted to detect Adapter pattern in 
three different source codes, namely JSettlers (1904 components), GanttProject (7981 
components), and RISK (1424components). Figure 83 shows the comparison between 
our approach and Ptidej in terms of detecting the Adapter pattern in the same 
aforementioned source codes. It can be seen in the figure that the x-axis represents the 
source code size and the y-axis represents the time taken in seconds. 
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Figure 83: Adapter pattern case study performance compared with PTIDEJ 
From Figure 83, it can be concluded that our approach significantly outperforms 
the Ptidej system. This is due to the fact that our approach is not considering the source 
codes components; it rather considers the relations among those components and only 
the relations which are relevant to the formulas representing the pattern structure. The 
source codes of the case studies are regarded as large-scale source codes. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that our approach is suitable to be used to detect patterns in the large-
scale source codes.   
Another performance comparison was made between our pattern detection 
approach and the DP-Miner pattern detection system. Figure 84 illustrates the 
performance of our pattern detection approach to detect three design patterns, namely 
Adapter, Composite, and Strategy in Java.AWT source code (708 components), with 
comparison to DP-Miner.    
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Figure 84: Java.AWT case study performance compared with DP-Miner 
It can be seen from Figure 84 that our pattern detection approach considerably 
outperforms the DP-Miner in the performance of the detection process of Adapter and 
Composite patterns in Java.AWT. Although DP-Miner seems to perform better in the 
detection process of the Strategy pattern, the difference is not significant in time. 
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9.4 Summary  
 
In conclusion, this chapter has described the evaluation of our pattern detection 
approach in comparison with other state-of-the-art pattern detection systems. First, our 
approach was evaluated using features analysis methodology. Second, our approach 
has been evaluated using the results of our approach case studies with comparison to 
other pattern detection systems case studies results by comparing the number of false 
positive instances. It can be concluded that our approach has been developed with 
considerations of the desirable features in pattern detection systems and it is 
competitive with the state-of-the-art pattern detection systems. 
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10 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, in this thesis, a new way of modelling security patterns was 
investigated and employed. Codecharts was used to formally and visually model 
security patterns. The investigation shows a number of benefits of using Codecharts. 
These benefits can be summarised in the following three points: 1) modelling secure 
relations among components; 2) modelling abstraction in patterns’ descriptions; and 3) 
formality.  
Additionally, using Codecharts for modelling security patterns highlights 
patterns variations, which come from the inconsistency of the descriptions of the same 
patterns in different security patterns catalogues. Using Codecharts allows for 
recognising the inconsistency and reasoning out the variations of the patterns.  This 
would in turn enable the assurance of the same understanding among the people who 
experience security patterns in their work.   
In addition, using Codecharts allows for further studies of patterns. One of these 
is the studying and reasoning of the relations among security patterns and with other 
well-known design patterns. Validating these relations helps in the overall 
understanding of the patterns as well as in the correct implementation of these patterns.   
Despite the fact that security patterns formalisation has not been considered 
sufficiently by researchers, many researchers have introduced their approaches for 
design patterns formalisation. Based on the fact that security patterns are design 
patterns but for specific domains, these approaches have been compared and contrasted 
in terms of the formalisation direction adopted in each piece of research. The first 
drawback of these approaches is that they involve the transformation of UML diagrams 
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to formal language. This introduces some types of information loss depending on the 
chosen formal language; whereas using Codecharts to model the security patterns from 
the patterns’ description does not involve any transformation. Moreover, using 
Codecharts offers formal and visual outputs, unlike other approaches outputs which are 
often textual.  
Furthermore, this thesis demonstrates a new pattern detection approach which 
aims to find, from the source code, instances of patterns that are represented as 
Codecharts. The approach, unlike other pattern detection systems, is developed for 
general patterns detection, which means that it can detect security, design, and/or user 
defined patterns.  
The pattern detection approach proposed in this thesis was evaluated against 
the known features which have been outlined for pattern detection systems. In addition, 
the approach has been compared with a number of well-known pattern detection 
systems. Moreover, it has been implemented and integrated into the TTP Toolkit.  
The approach was concluded to be competitive with peers’ pattern detection 
systems in many features. Most importantly, the approach could compete in the feature 
of precision of the results. In addition, performance efficiency is a current problem that 
many pattern detection systems, which aim to find exact instances, suffer from. 
However, from the case studies conducted using the approach to detect exact instances 
of patterns in large scale source codes, the approach appears  to be efficient in 
processing time in  comparison with the existing most efficient pattern detection 
systems.  
However, some disadvantages were experienced. First, Codecharts were able 
to model only decidable statements of the patterns descriptions. This means that they 
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could not model some of the behavioural statements shown in patterns descriptions. 
Second, limited support and recognition of Codecharts stood as an obstacle for the use 
of Codecharts. Finally, the TTP Toolkit (the Codecharts tool support) had a lack of 
maintenance and a number of code bugs were not fixed.     
This rest of this chapter shows a number of limitations which are worth 
mentioning here. The limitations focus on highlighting some obstacles and 
disadvantages of using Codecharts in modelling and detecting security patterns. In 
addition, the chapter suggests some directions for future work in order to take this 
research further and overcome the faced limitations.  
 
10.1 LIMITATION 
 
This section highlights a number of limitations which have been recognised 
along with the investigation in this research. These limitations might have attributed to 
the chosen way of modelling security patterns. They might also suggest ideas to take 
this research further in the future. However, these limitations have not been resolved in 
this research. 
One limitation is in the used modelling notations which are Codecharts 
notations. Although Codecharts offer a competitive way for visually and formally 
modelling security patterns, it is limited only to modelling structural patterns. This is 
due to the LePUS3, which is the language of Codecharts. LePUS3 can only support 
specifying fully decidable statements. This limitation affects the modelling of some 
behavioural statements which exist in architectural security patterns. In addition, 
modelling behavioural security patterns was not possible. 
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The pattern detection approach demonstrated in this research was limited to 
static check of the detected instances of the looked-for patterns. Dynamic check was 
not possible in order to complete the checking of the instances. This limitation is due 
to the aforementioned limitation as Codecharts does not offer the modelling of 
behavioural statements of patterns. Furthermore, the TTP Toolkit verifier, which has 
been used to check the detected instances, is limited to static check of the source codes 
against the instances. 
In addition to these limitations, although the TTP Toolkit, which is the tool 
support for Codecharts, is developed to deal with any given object-oriented source 
code, the latest version of it is limited to Java-based source codes. This fact shows the 
drop of support of the Codecharts and the TTP Toolkit. In addition, this limitation 
restricted the empirical case studies to Java-based source codes. 
As this research uses the TTP Toolkit in the detection to model the patterns and 
to verify their instances, a number of code bugs in the TTP Toolkit were found during 
the use of it. The code bugs are mainly related to Exclusive Operators (exclamation 
mark), in particular the Right Exclusive Operator. The TTP Toolkit verifier 
misunderstands it and considers it as the Left Exclusive Operator. So, it incorrectly 
verifies a modelling that has such use of it. In addition, the TTP Toolkit cannot model 
a Codecharts that has a 1-dim notation which has a relation from the notation or to the 
notation with any Exclusive Operators (exclamation mark) on the relation.   
  Finally, UML is widely used as a standard for any design modelling. Many 
researchers have introduced and built their work on patterns using UML. This has made 
its notations easy to be recognised and understood. However, although Codecharts 
offers some features which UML cannot, such as formality, without a need for 
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transformation, Codecharts is not widely recognised. This might be due to the fact that 
some people consider it as UML-like diagrams and others consider it as a new 
language, although it has been more than 10 years since the introduction of its early 
versions. Another reason for Codecharts not being widely recognised is the lack of 
research on it. This includes extensions of it in order to model behavioural aspects. In 
addition, it includes the development and/or maintenance of tool supports.  
 
10.2 FUTURE WORK 
 
This research has focused on examining the use of Codecharts to formally 
model security patterns. It has also proposed a new novel approach for pattern detection 
using Codecharts and the TTP Toolkit. However, a number of research directions can 
be considered in order to improve the research results as well as to take this research 
further. 
First, modelling the behavioural statements in the security patterns descriptions 
using Codecharts is the next demanding research direction. This direction of research 
needs to focus of extending LePUS3, the language of Codecharts, in order to enable it 
to accommodate modelling behavioural statements. However, the extension of LePUS3 
might involve combining it with new behaviour notations from other modelling 
languages. It is important to be aware of the properties which LePUS3 has been built 
with. 
  In this research, the pattern detection approach employs the TTP Toolkit 
verifier to check and reason out the design conformance of the detected instances of a 
given pattern. However, the TTP Toolkit verifier only conducts a static checking of the 
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given instances in the source code. Although static checking of the instances of patterns 
is the corner stone for any pattern detection system, dynamic checking is essential to 
determine whether the instances of the given pattern conform to the remaining 
behavioural properties of the pattern.  
Dynamic checking needs to follow and rely on the static check of the instances 
of the given pattern. In addition, dynamic checking involves executing the source code 
and extracting the trace of method calls and objects creations in order to check the 
behaviours of the components which correspond to the given pattern’s participants. The 
online and offline checking of the extracted trace should be available depending on the 
behavioural properties which have been modelled as the patterns behaviours. 
To allow dynamic check, first, the direction of the extension LePUS3, the 
language of Codecharts, has to be carried out. Second, the TTP Toolkit verifier has to 
integrate new source code execution and trace extraction mechanism or probably 
import one of the existing ones. Finally, the pattern detection approach of this research 
has to be able to search through extracted execution trace of the source code for 
instances of the given pattern and link them to the detected instances after the static 
checking. This allows having two separate searching mechanisms, one for architectural 
and structural properties and another for behavioural properties, where the former relies 
on static checking and the latter relies on dynamic checking. 
     Future work may consider improving the presentation of the results of the 
pattern detection approach proposed in this research. One of these is introducing the 
ability to prepare a full printable report of the results of the pattern detection. Currently, 
the results of the pattern detection are shown in the left-hand side bar of the GUI of the 
TTP Toolkit. Although the results have been presented following the current 
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categorisation of the TTP Toolkit GUI, a full printable report would enhance the 
readability of the results.  
  The pattern detection approach provides three types of outputs, which are a 
summary of the detection results (number of instances and time spent for the detection 
process), visualisations of instances as Codecharts, and assignments from the pattern’s 
participants to the source code components. The visualisations of instances refer to the 
concrete entities in the source code. However, the relations among these entities are not 
referred to in the source code. Therefore, in the future, referring to the places of the 
relations in the source code by the line numbers would help with tracing the instances 
in the source code.  
Finally, the existing pattern detection systems, such as DP-Miner, employ the 
visualisation of the instances of the looked-for pattern in order to ease the 
understanding of the detection results. Often, UML diagrams are applied for the results 
visualisations. In the pattern detection approach shown in this thesis, visualisations of 
the results of the detection have been considered and implemented. Codecharts have 
been used for the visualisation of the results. However, as has been discussed earlier, 
Codecharts notations are not as popular as UML diagrams. Therefore, in the future, 
beside the existing current feature of visualizing the outputs of the detection process, 
as in Codecharts, adding a feature of converting the Codecharts to UML diagrams 
would improve the readability of the outputs and enable the user to compare and 
understand the Codecharts. 
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Appendices    
APPENDIX A:  More Security patterns in Codecharts 
 Check Point Pattern 
Pattern description catalogue:[106]  
 
 
Figure 85: UML class diagram: Check Point Pattern [27]  
224 | P a g e  
 
 Secure Logger 
Pattern description catalogue: [26] 
 
 
Figure 86: UML class diagram: Secure Logger Pattern [26] 
 
 
Figure 87: LePUS3 and Class-Z schema of Secure Logger Pattern 
 
 
 Role pattern 
Pattern description catalogue: [106] 
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Figure 88: Codecharts: Role pattern 
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 Secure Architecture 
This pattern combines Single Access Point, Check Point, and Role. 
Pattern description catalogue: [106] 
 
Figure 89: Codecharts: Secure Architecture 
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 Role and Session  
Pattern description catalogue: [106] 
 
Figure 90: Codecharts: Role and Session 
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 Authentication Enforcer Pattern 
Pattern description catalogue:[26] 
 
 
Figure 91: Codecharts: Authentication Enforcer Pattern 
 Account Lockout Pattern 
Pattern description catalogue: [28] 
 
 
Figure 92: Codecharts: Account Lockout Pattern 
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 Authenticated Session Pattern 
Pattern description catalogue: [28] 
 
 
Figure 93: Codecharts: Authenticated Session Pattern 
 
 Client Data Storage Pattern 
Pattern description catalogue: [28] 
 
Figure 94: Codecharts: Client Data Storage pattern 
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 Network Address blacklist Pattern 
Pattern description catalogue: [28] 
 
Figure 95: Codecharts: Network Address blacklist pattern 
 
 Password Authentication Pattern 
Pattern description catalogue: [28] 
 
 
Figure 96: Codecharts: Password Authentication pattern 
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 Password Propagation Pattern 
Pattern description catalogue: [28] 
 
 
Figure 97:  Codecharts: Password Propagation pattern 
 Full View with Error pattern 
Pattern description catalogue: [9] 
 
Figure 98: Codecharts: Full View with Error pattern 
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Figure 99: UML class diagram: Full View With Error Pattern [9] 
 
 
Figure 100: LePUS3 and Class-Z schema of Full View with Error Pattern 
 
APPENDIX B:  More Manual Conformance Checking Case Studies 
 
 
Check Point pattern in JAAS 
Implementation: JAAS  
Claim in: [9] 
Formalized pattern: Figure 31 
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Figure 101: Codechart: An instance of Check Point in JAAS 
 
 
Figure 102: Manually created assignment of Check Point in JAAS  
 
Figure 103: Verification Result of Check Point instance in JAAS  
 
 
Secure Architecture pattern 
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Implementation: JAAS  
Claim in: [9] 
Formalized pattern: Figure 89 
 
 
Figure 104: Codechart: An instance of Secure Architecture Pattern in JAAS  
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Figure 105: Manually created assignment of Secure Architecture Pattern in JAAS  
 
Figure 106: Verification Result of Secure Architecture Pattern instance in JAAS   
 
APPENDIX C:  More Automatic Pattern Detection Case Studies 
Check Point pattern in JAAS. 
 
Formalized Security Pattern Figure 31  
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Figure 107: Results of detecting Check Point in JAAS 
 
 
Figure 108: Codechart: An instance of Check Point detected in JAAS 
 
 
Figure 109: an assignment of Check Point detected in in JAAS 
 Results  Explanation  
Client SampleAzn 
CheckPoint LoginContext 
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CounterMeasure LoginContext$SecureCallbackHandler, AccessController, 
LoginException, SecurityManager 
Policy LoginException, LoginContext$SecureCallbackHandler, 
AccessController, SecurityManager 
Access main(java.lang.String[]) 
Action LoginContext$SecureCallbackHandler(java.security.AccessControl
Context,javax.security.auth.callback.CallbackHandler), 
checkPermission(java.security.Permission), 
LoginContext(java.lang.String,javax.security.auth.callback.Callbac
kHandler), LoginException(java.lang.String), getContext(), 
doPrivileged(java.security.PrivilegedAction,java.security.AccessC
ontrolContext) 
Check LoginContext(java.lang.String,javax.security.auth.callback.Callbac
kHandler) 
Enforce LoginException(java.lang.String),checkPermission(java.security.P
ermission), 
doPrivileged(java.security.PrivilegedAction,java.security.AccessC
ontrolContext), getContext(), 
LoginContext$SecureCallbackHandler(java.security.AccessControl
Context,javax.security.auth.callback.CallbackHandler) 
Single Access Point & Check Point in JAAS. 
 
 
Formalized Security Pattern Figure 35   
 
 
Figure 110: Results of detecting Single Access Point & Check Point in JAAS 
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Figure 111: Codechart: An instance of Single Access Point & Check Point detected in JAAS 
 
Figure 112: an assignment of Single Access Point & Check Point detected in JAAS 
 
Results Explanation 
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Client SampleAzn 
CounterMeasure {AccessController, LoginContext$SecureCallbackHandler, 
LoginException} 
CheckPoint LoginContext 
SAP LoginContext 
Check LoginContext(java.lang.String,javax.security.auth.callback.Callbac
kHandler) 
Access login() 
InternalComponent Subject 
makeRequest main(java.lang.String[]) 
secureAction Subject() 
RecipientUnknownOr
RecipientUnavailable 
{LoginContext$4, LoginContext$5} 
accessLog {LoginContext$4, LoginContext$5} 
Policy {LoginContext$SecureCallbackHandler, AccessController, 
LoginException} 
Availabilitychecker {invokePriv(java.lang.String), 
invokeCreatorPriv(java.lang.String)} 
Action {LoginContext$SecureCallbackHandler(java.security.AccessContr
olContext,javax.security.auth.callback.CallbackHandler), 
getContext(), LoginException(java.lang.String) } 
createEntity {LoginContext$5(javax.security.auth.login.LoginContext,java.lang
.String), 
LoginContext$4(javax.security.auth.login.LoginContext,java.lang.
String)} 
Enforce {LoginContext$SecureCallbackHandler(java.security.AccessContr
olContext,javax.security.auth.callback.CallbackHandler), 
LoginException(java.lang.String), getContext()} 
logAccess {invokePriv(java.lang.String), 
invokeCreatorPriv(java.lang.String)} 
showMessage {LoginContext$4(javax.security.auth.login.LoginContext,java.lang
.String), 
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LoginContext$5(javax.security.auth.login.LoginContext,java.lang.
String)} 
 
 
Full View with Error pattern in LEXI 
 
Formalized Security Pattern Figure 98 
Claim of implementation in LEXI is in [9] 
 
Figure 113: Results of detecting Full View with Error pattern in LEXI 
 
Figure 114: Codechart: An instance of Full View with Error pattern detected in LEXI 
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Figure 115: Assignments of Full View with Error pattern detected in LEXI 
 
 
 
Figure 116: Auto-defined higher-dimension entities (Methods) (Full View with Error pattern 
Validator - LEXI) 
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Class Adapter pattern Case Studies 
Class Adapter pattern in JRefactory 
 
Figure 117: Codechart: Class Adapter pattern [38] 
 
 
Figure 118: Results of detecting Class Adapter in JRefactory 
 Results  Explanation  
The difference is only with the client class. The rest are the same: 
adaptee  LinedPanel 
adapter   UMLPackage 
client  {<Symbol:SaveMenuSelection,FullQualifier: 
net.sourceforge.jrefactory.uml.SaveMenuSelection>, 
 
<Symbol:org.acm.seguin.uml.SaveMenuSelection 
FullQualifier:org.acm.seguin.uml.SaveMenuSelection>} 
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target  Saveable 
Operations  Signatures_3 
Requests  Signatures_16 
SpecificRequests  Signatures_22 
 
 
 
Figure 119: Codechart: An instance of Class Adapter pattern detected in JRefactory 
 
Figure 120: an assignment of Class Adapter detected in JRefactory 
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Figure 121: Auto-defined higher-dimension entities (Methods) (Class Adapter - JRefactory) 
 
Signatures Set details 
Signatures_16={save()} 
Signatures_22={getLineIterator()} 
 
Class Adapter pattern in GanttProject 
 
Figure 122: Results of detecting Class Adapter in GanttProject 
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 Results  Explanation  
 
adaptee  {ConstraintImpl} 
adapter   {FinishFinishConstraintImpl, 
FinishStartConstraintImpl, 
StartStartConstraintImpl, 
StartFinishConstraintImpl} 
client  {RecalculateTaskScheduleAlgorithm, 
CriticalPathAlgorithmImpl$Processor} 
target  {TaskDependencyConstraint} 
Operations  {Signatures_26, Signatures_29} 
Requests  {Signatures_25, Signatures_28} 
SpecificRequests  {Signatures_24, Signatures_27} 
 
 
 
Figure 123: Codechart: An instance of Class Adapter pattern detected in GanttProject 
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Figure 124: Assignments of Class Adapter detected in GanttProject 
 
 
Figure 125: Auto-defined higher-dimension entities (Methods) (Class Adapter - GanttProject) 
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Signatures Set details 
Signatures_24={shift(java.util.Date,int), getDependency(), clone()} 
Signatures_25={getBackwardCollision(java.util.Date)} 
Signatures_26={findLatestFinishTime(ganttproject.task.algorithm.CriticalPathAlg
orithmImpl$Node,ganttproject.task.algorithm.CriticalPathAlgorithmImpl$Node,ga
nttproject.task.dependency.TaskDependency)} 
Signatures_27={addDelay(biz.ganttproject.core.time.GanttCalendar), 
getDependency(), clone()} 
Signatures_28={getCollision()} 
Signatures_29={fulfilDependencies(), 
fulfilConstraints(ganttproject.task.dependency.TaskDependency)} 
 
Class Adapter pattern in JSettlers 
 
Figure 126: Results of detecting Class Adapter in JSettlers 
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Figure 127: Codechart: An instance of Class Adapter pattern detected in JSettlers 
 
Figure 128: An assignment of Class Adapter detected in JSettlers 
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Figure 129: Auto-defined higher-dimension entities (Methods) (Class Adapter - JSettlers) 
 
Signatures Set details 
Signatures={removeConnectionCleanup(soc.server.genericServer.Connection), 
removeConnection(soc.server.genericServer.Connection), connectionCount(), 
stopServer(), broadcast(java.lang.String)} 
Signatures_1={processCommand(java.lang.String,soc.server.genericServer.Conne
ction)} 
Signatures_2={run()} 
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Class Adapter pattern in RISK 2.0 
 
Figure 130: Results of detecting Class Adapter in RISK 2.0 
 
 
Figure 131: Codechart: An instance of Class Adapter pattern detected in RISK 2.0 
 
Figure 132: An assignment of Class Adapter detected in RISK 2.0 
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Figure 133: Auto-defined higher-dimension entities (Methods) (Class Adapter - RISK 2.0) 
 
Signatures Set details 
Signatures_22={processRecruitment(de.javaRisk.v2.game.network.FieldUpdate), 
processMovement(de.javaRisk.v2.game.ArmyCollection)} 
Signatures_23={getGameField(), 
processRecruitment(de.javaRisk.v2.game.network.FieldUpdate), 
processMovement(de.javaRisk.v2.game.ArmyCollection), isInTurn()} 
Signatures_24={processConquest(de.javaRisk.v2.game.network.FieldUpdate), 
processDestruction(de.javaRisk.v2.game.ArmyCollection), 
setGameField(de.javaRisk.v2.game.GameField), 
processBuild(de.javaRisk.v2.game.network.FieldUpdate), 
processPullDown(de.javaRisk.v2.game.network.FieldUpdate), 
processRecruitment(de.javaRisk.v2.game.network.FieldUpdate), 
processMovement(de.javaRisk.v2.game.ArmyCollection)} 
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Signatures_25={getGameField(), 
processConquest(de.javaRisk.v2.game.network.FieldUpdate), 
processDestruction(de.javaRisk.v2.game.ArmyCollection), 
setGameField(de.javaRisk.v2.game.GameField), 
processBuild(de.javaRisk.v2.game.network.FieldUpdate), 
processPullDown(de.javaRisk.v2.game.network.FieldUpdate), 
processRecruitment(de.javaRisk.v2.game.network.FieldUpdate), 
processMovement(de.javaRisk.v2.game.ArmyCollection), getId(), isInTurn()} 
Signatures_32={setGameField(de.javaRisk.v2.game.GameField)} 
Signatures_43={displayGameField(de.javaRisk.v2.game.GameField,java.lang.Stri
ng)} 
Signatures_44={drawGameField(de.javaRisk.v2.tools.DrawProperties)} 
Signatures_45={getGameField(), getCallingComponent()} 
Signatures_46={paintComponent(java.awt.Graphics)} 
Signatures_47={setCenteredField(java.awt.Point), 
setGameField(de.javaRisk.v2.game.GameField)} 
 
Class Adapter pattern in JHotdraw 
 
 
Figure 134: Results of detecting Class Adapter in JHotdraw  
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Figure 135: Codechart: An instance of Adapter pattern detected in JHotdraw 
 
Figure 136: assignments of Class Adapter detected in JHotdraw  
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Figure 137: Auto-defined higher-dimension entities (Methods) (Adapter - JHotdraw) 
Signatures Sets details 
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Signatures_29={getPolygon()} 
Signatures_28={getClippingShape()} 
Signatures_30={getShape()} 
Signatures_31={displayBox()} 
Signatures_35={figureRequestRemove(org.jhotdraw.framework.FigureChangeEv
ent), change()} 
Signatures_37={figureRequestRemove(org.jhotdraw.framework.FigureChangeEv
ent), figureRequestUpdate(org.jhotdraw.framework.FigureChangeEvent)} 
Signatures_52={add(org.jhotdraw.framework.Figure)} 
Signatures_65={displayBox(), getPolygon(), getInternalPolygon()} 
Signatures_66={displayBox(), getArc()} 
Signatures_101={invokeStart(int,int,org.jhotdraw.framework.DrawingView)} 
Signatures_136={run()} 
Signatures_137={displayBox(), moveBy(int,int), figures()} 
Signatures_138={animationStep()} 
Signatures_149={includes(org.jhotdraw.framework.Figure), displayBox(), 
invalidateRectangle(java.awt.Rectangle), listener()} 
Signatures_167={containsFigure(org.jhotdraw.framework.Figure), 
add(org.jhotdraw.framework.Figure), 
_addToQuadTree(org.jhotdraw.framework.Figure), 
figureRequestUpdate(org.jhotdraw.framework.FigureChangeEvent)} 
 
Class Adapter pattern in Java.AWT 
 
Figure 138: Results of detecting Class Adapter pattern in Java.AWT 
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Figure 139: Codechart: An instance of Class Adapter pattern detected in Java.AWT 
 
Figure 140: An assignment of Class Adapter pattern detected in Java.AWT 
 
Figure 141: Auto-defined higher-dimension entities (Methods) (Class Adapter pattern - 
Java.AWT) 
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Signatures Set details 
Signatures_18={isMaximumSizeSet(), setFont(java.awt.Font), 
isMinimumSizeSet(), 
firePropertyChange(java.lang.String,java.lang.Object,java.lang.Object), 
isPreferredSizeSet(), getFont(), invalidate(), getTreeLock()} 
Signatures_19={setFont(java.awt.Font), invalidate()} 
Signatures_20={setFont(java.awt.Font)} 
 
 
Strategy pattern Case Studies 
It is important to report that case studies of the strategy pattern (shown in Eden 
[38]) could not be detected as seen in Figure 143 and Figure 149. This is due to the 
client participant shown in the pattern Codechart. However, as this participant should 
be a user defined class, the participant in the Codechart could be removed. Figure 142 
shows the pattern Codechart without the client participant. Having this new Codechart, 
the pattern could be detected and the Figure 144 and Figure 150 shows the detection 
results of strategy pattern in JRefactory and JHotdraw respectively. 
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Figure 142: Codechart: Strategy pattern (without Client class variable) 
 
Strategy pattern in JRefactory 
 
 
Figure 143: Results of detecting Strategy in JRefactory 
 
Figure 144: Results of detecting Strategy (without Client class variable) in JRefactory 
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Figure 145: Codechart: An instance of Strategy pattern (without Client class variable) detected 
in JRefactory 
 
Figure 146: assignments of Strategy (without Client class variable) detected in JRefactory 
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Figure 147: Auto-defined higher-dimension entities (Hierarchies) (Strategy -without Client class 
variable - JRefactory) 
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Figure 148: Auto-defined higher-dimension entities (Methods) (Strategy -without Client class 
variable - JRefactory) 
Signatures Set details 
Signatures_136={isFinal(), isSynchronized(), isStrictFP(), isExplicit(), isNative(), 
isPublic(), isVolatile(), isAbstract(), isTransient(), isPrivate(), isInterface(), 
isProtected(), isStatic()} 
Hierarchies details 
Hrc_16={org.acm.seguin.summary.FieldAccessSummary, 
org.acm.seguin.summary.TypeSummary, org.acm.seguin.summary.FileSummary, 
org.acm.seguin.summary.MethodSummary, org.acm.seguin.summary.Summary, 
org.acm.seguin.summary.PackageSummary, 
org.acm.seguin.summary.ImportSummary, 
org.acm.seguin.summary.TypeDeclSummary, 
org.acm.seguin.summary.MessageSendSummary, 
org.acm.seguin.summary.VariableSummary} 
 
Strategy pattern in JHotdraw 
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Figure 149: Results of detecting Strategy in JHotdraw 
 
Figure 150: Results of detecting Strategy (without Client class variable) in JHotdraw 
 
Figure 151: Codechart: An instance of Strategy pattern (without Client class variable) detected 
in JHotdraw 
 
Figure 152: an assignment of Strategy (without Client class variable) detected in JHotdraw  
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Figure 153: Auto-defined higher-dimension entities (Hierarchies) (Strategy -without Client class 
variable - JHotdraw) 
 
Figure 154: Auto-defined higher-dimension entities (Methods) (Strategy -without Client class 
variable - JHotdraw) 
Signatures Set details 
Signatures_8={isJDK12(), createCollectionsFactory(java.lang.String)}  
 
Hierarchies details 
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Hrc_5={org.jhotdraw.util.CollectionsFactory, 
org.jhotdraw.util.collections.jdk11.CollectionsFactoryJDK11, 
org.jhotdraw.util.collections.jdk12.CollectionsFactoryJDK12} 
  
 
Strategy pattern in Java.AWT 
 
Figure 155: Codechart: Strategy pattern [38] 
 
 
Figure 156: Results of detecting Strategy in Java.AWT 
 
Figure 157: Codechart: An instance of Strategy pattern detected in Java.AWT 
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Figure 158: An assignment of Strategy detected in Java.AWT 
 
Figure 159: Auto-defined higher-dimension entities (Hierarchies) (Strategy - Java.AWT) 
 
Figure 160: Auto-defined higher-dimension entities (Methods) (Strategy - Java.AWT) 
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Factory Method Case Studies 
 
Factory Method pattern in JHotdraw 
 
Figure 161: Codechart: Factory Method pattern [38] 
 
 
 
Figure 162: Results of detecting Factory Method in JHotdraw 
 
Figure 163: Codechart: An instance of Factory Method pattern detected in JHotdraw 
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Figure 164: Assignments of Factory Method detected in JHotdraw 
 
Figure 165: Auto-defined higher-dimension entities (Hierarchies) (Factory Method - JHotdraw) 
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Hierarchies details 
Hrc_8={org.jhotdraw.samples.javadraw.JavaDrawApplet, 
org.jhotdraw.samples.nothing.NothingApplet, 
org.jhotdraw.samples.pert.PertApplet, org.jhotdraw.applet.DrawApplet} 
Hrc_9={org.jhotdraw.samples.javadraw.BouncingDrawing, 
org.jhotdraw.standard.StandardDrawing} 
Hrc_53={org.jhotdraw.samples.javadraw.JavaDrawApp, 
org.jhotdraw.contrib.MDI_DrawApplication} 
Hrc_65={org.jhotdraw.contrib.SimpleLayouter, 
org.jhotdraw.contrib.StandardLayouter} 
Hrc_121={org.jhotdraw.figures.ConnectedTextTool$UndoActivity, 
org.jhotdraw.figures.TextTool$UndoActivity} 
Hrc_122={org.jhotdraw.standard.DeleteCommand$UndoActivity, 
org.jhotdraw.figures.ConnectedTextTool$DeleteUndoActivity} 
Hrc_123={org.jhotdraw.figures.ConnectedTextTool, 
org.jhotdraw.figures.TextTool} 
 
Factory Method pattern in JRefactory 
 
 
Figure 166: Results of detecting Factory Method in JRefactory 
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Figure 167: Codechart: An instance of Factory Method pattern detected in JRefactory 
 
 
Figure 168: an assignment of Factory Method detected in JRefactory 
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Figure 169: Auto-defined higher-dimension entities (Hierarchies) (Factory Method - JRefactory) 
 
Hierarchies details 
Hrc_289={org.acm.seguin.pretty.line.NumberedLineQueue, 
org.acm.seguin.pretty.LineQueue} 
Hrc_284={org.acm.seguin.pretty.PrintData, 
org.acm.seguin.pretty.line.LineNumberingData} 
 
 
 
